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ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

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*Containing the Papers read before the Society during the
Forty-first Session, 1919–1920.*

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PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY.

1919-1920.

*Meeting at 22, Albemarle Street, W. 1, on November 3rd, 1919,
at 8 P.M.*

I.—THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: "IN THE BEGINNING"

By JAMES WARD.

THE topic to which I would invite your attention is that of the method of philosophy. It is, I think, still an unsettled question what this method should be; though the question is one which was raised at the outset of what we call modern philosophy—and notably by Locke and by Kant. It is a question, too, which—till it is threshed out—seems seriously to bar the way to further progress: I doubt indeed if there is any "prolegomenon to every future metaphysic" which more urgently requires continuous discussion. The most I can hope to achieve now is, however, merely to make the issue as clear as I can; and I shall be amply rewarded if I should succeed in inducing any of you to follow it up further.

"Begin at the beginning" is a sound but commonplace maxim; and if it should be respected anywhere, it should—many think—be respected by philosophers. They, it has been said, are bound to seek truth without making assumptions. In practical undertakings there is often no alternative: we must begin at the beginning. To build a house we must first lay the foundations: we must first catch our hare before we can cook it. In philosophy, however, this practical maxim is one—as it seems to me—that we can never observe; and the failure of all the many attempts to conform to it that have

hitherto been made is strong presumptive evidence against all methods in philosophy that purport to be primarily direct and constructive.

We must now try to be clear about our leading terms. When we say, begin at the beginning, the imperative refers to time, but the substantive does not necessarily do so, and, in fact, in the main does not. When we say: you must begin building by laying the foundations, the significance of these for the superstructure is not exhausted by their place in the temporal order of the process. When this is finished and the building stands complete, what we may call the logical priority of the foundations still remains. It is in this sense that—by a sort of metonymy—we come to talk of principles—*prima capienda*—or ἀρχαί as what epistemologically come first, and answer to what ontologically are their grounds, primary beings or *entia*, as Aristotle called them. But now in building a house, though we begin by laying the foundations, we do not provide the earth or ground on which the foundations are to be laid, yet that is the first essential; but then it is already there. In keeping with this procedure in the practical arts, Aristotle found an analogous procedure in the theoretical sciences. These all rest on principles, take for granted grounds, which they do not examine; though some investigate further than others, mathematics further than physics, for example.* Aristotle, then, conceived the theoretical sciences as a sort of hierarchy, and thought it obvious that there must be a highest science, and this he called “first philosophy.” But though first in the order of rank, it was as the highest the furthest removed from us.

This is a point on which it will be well to enlarge. Speaking generally, the problem that the universe sets us is an inverse problem. George III's bewilderment as to how the apple got into the dumpling or the puzzle of bygone days as to which was first, the hen or the egg, are trivial instances

* Cf. *Metaphysics*, IV, i-iii, VI, i.

of an inverse problem. George III had presumably never seen a dumpling made; and all that our forbears could say was that all the hens they knew of had been hatched from eggs and all the eggs they knew of had been laid by hens. In some such quandary Goethe represents Faust on returning to his study after his Easter Day saunter with his colleague, Wagner. Wagner had lamented that life was not half long enough to reach the beginnings of things, and so Faust bethought himself of revelation. Taking up the New Testament, he sat down to render into his 'beloved German' the opening sentence of the fourth gospel: *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος*. *Im Anfang war das Wort* he found too literal: the meaning must be *Im Anfang war der Sinn*. Yet could it be merely *Sinn*, nothing but thought that moves in all things? Surely it should be *Im Anfang war die Kraft*. Still something warns him that he cannot stop at that. Then the inspiration comes and he boldly writes *Im Anfang war die That*. But what deed and whose deed; further, was there one doer or many?

Aristotle, as I have said, recognised at the outset that his problem was an inverse one, though unhappily before very long he forgot the fact. At any rate he did clearly recognise that, as he put it, the *ordo ad nos* is the inverse of the *ordo ad universum*. Goethe, too, recognised this inverse character of the philosopher's problem, and, moreover, suggested the only way towards its solution that seemed open:—

Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten
Geh' nur im Endlichen nach aller Seiten.

And this is the way which, in fact, mankind has unconsciously followed. Partial advance from the more known, the *notiora nobis* has secured partial knowledge of the less known, the *notiora natura*. From whatever side the unknown has been effectively explored, this, as I have said, has always been the method followed. A method implies definite direction, discursiveness, and implies, too, a definite starting point, viz., from where we are, i.e., in *mediis rebus*. By

induction from particulars we may advance to deduction; but such advance, though it may yield an exact science—as in mathematics—can never carry us beyond the restricted “universe of discourse” to which such particulars belong. *À propos* of this, two or three remarks—though they must needs be more or less disjointed—may help us on. First, every special science, we say, represents a restricted universe of discourse. A satisfactory classification of these sciences, what Dr. Bosanquet has happily called a morphology of them, is still a desideratum. But for our present purpose a single division will suffice, that into abstract and concrete. In the abstract sciences—logic, mathematics, and what is called rational dynamics, if it be conceded that this is truly an abstract science—we have universal propositions; in the special concrete sciences we never have. Their ‘laws’ are but generalisations and belong entirely to the region of what Hume called probability as distinct from exact knowledge. The knowledges furnished by the exact sciences are beyond cavil, true always and of all conceivable worlds, dependent on no other knowledges and implicated in all our concrete knowledge. So far as they go, we regard them as ideal knowledges inasmuch as no other knowledges come up to their standard. For all that, they are not the ideal of knowledge, of that knowledge embracing the whole of things which is what philosophy seeks. They provide us, we are told, with our so-called ‘laws of thought,’ with all our theoretical axioms and ‘archetypal’ ideas: we *apply* them to the real world, but they do not belong there. The existence or non-existence of that is no affair of theirs.

And yet, we may next remark, they alone carry us on one side to *das an allen Seiten Unendliche* which Goethe talked of. We owe to them our precisest instances of the infinite, the absolute, the perfect, the simple. All the concrete sciences together, on the other hand, fall short of this. Moreover, at a time when these sciences were practically non-existent, the

exact sciences were comparatively advanced. No wonder, then, that philosophy should have been started on a false track. It was, in fact, so started when Plato assumed that the exact sciences do furnish the ideal of knowledge, and therefore prescribe its method. From ideas as archetypes to things as but their ectypes or imperfect copies, seemed to be clearly the only way; and to be not only direct but unerring. Philosophy then for Plato began at the beginning. To be sure Aristotle protested, but in large measure he stultified his protest by forgetting it, as I have said, instead of holding to his first conviction. And so philosophy wandered in the wilderness for a couple of thousand years. How little the situation was changed is shown by the attempt of Descartes and more especially of Spinoza to develop metaphysics *more geometrico*. The first effective protests were made by Bacon, Locke, and Hume; though Kant it was who formulated them independently with more completeness and more precision. He insisted on the strictly formal character of what is ordinarily called logic, and pointed out the radical difference between mathematics and philosophy; the difference being that mathematics can start from intuition and construct its concepts, whereas philosophy can do neither.

This is a point important enough to deserve special remark. Kant was fully alive to this difference quite early in his career. In an essay written for a Berlin Academy prize, *Concerning the Intelligibility of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals*,* he first of all examines how mathematics and philosophy respectively obtain their definitions, for definitions are everywhere indispensable to permanent advance. Till these are laid down we are left with nothing better than temporary and tentative exploration by trial and error. Here, however the mathematician is so far master of the situation that we may call

* The prize was awarded to Kant's friend, Moses Mendelsohn, and his own essay, adjudged *proxime accessit*, was published as an appendix to Mendelsohn's in 1764. *Werke*, Hartenstein's ed., ii, p. 281 ff.

his work almost creative; for he obtains his definitions directly in the very act of synthesizing the concepts they define. The philosopher, on the other hand, to obtain his definitions, has, as best he can, to analyze the more or less obscure concepts that are already there, thrust upon him by experience. As a matter of fact, in numberless cases, he finds his problem insoluble, or, like the old physicists, who resolved all matter into four or five elements, he goes off content with an analysis that turns out to be incomplete. The mathematician can begin at the beginning because he can define all the way through as he goes: pure intuition enables him at once to construct his most elementary concepts and to formulate axioms concerning them. But for the philosopher the elementary concepts that are first by nature are the last to be reached by his analytic method. When, then, he attempts by imitating the mathematician to begin at the beginning, he forgets that what is here first in the order of knowledge is not the easiest but the hardest to conceive, consists of *die allerabgezogenste Begriffe*, the most abstract concepts of all. Both psychology and the history of thought bear Kant out completely in maintaining that such concepts are therefore just those which are not reached historically till the last.* Accordingly he concludes, "that the right course for the philosopher is to start from what one certainly knows, *even though it be but little!*" Albeit we may make attempts, setting out from such (avowedly) imperfect knowledge, hoping that perchance we may come upon the trail of something more certain. But in any case we must not mix up the two.†

In short, as everywhere in dealing with reality, so in philosophy, we proceed in Baconian fashion '*per scalam ascensoriam*,' through *axiometica media* towards the highest truth. But, if 'the sides,' as Goethe called them, are infinite, and if the steps along each are infinite too, obviously we can never accomplish

* Cf. *Psychological Principles*, pp. 293, 231 ff; Hegel, "Phænomenology of Mind."

† *Op. cit.*, p. 294.

our task. Aristotle bethought himself of this and maintained that the sides are finite, and that the steps must be finite too, or there would be no ἀρχὴ at all. I must content myself with saying that, so far as I know, his reasoning has failed to satisfy his commentators either of ancient or modern times.* As for Kant, he did not shrink from the consequences. We not only cannot begin at the beginning, the ultimate ground or ἀρχὴ of things, but theoretically we can never reach it. A science of metaphysics, that is a science transcending all science, is for us an impossibility. We cannot hope by intellectually searching to find out God.† But though philosophy must not try to imitate mathematics by beginning with definitions, it may, Kant maintained, make use of provisional definitions, as the concrete sciences do which it seeks to co-ordinate and systematize. This, in fact, is all that in spite of itself metaphysics has ever done: hence it comes that, unlike the formal sciences, philosophy, as he says, "swarms with faulty definitions, especially such as really contain some elements towards a definition though they are not complete."‡ So far, however, as these "relate to an object which we can never reach in any experience," they are to be called speculative not scientific. Speculation, in fact, has been described as experimenting with ideas.§

The proper function of speculation, according to Kant, is not to dogmatize beyond all we know, but—having criticized what knowledge we have—to organize in conformity with regulative ideas the further knowledge we may obtain. This is the main burden of his first *Critique*. Here, however, he

* Cf. *Metaphysics*, bk. a, ch. ii, init. Post. anal. II, ch. xxv.

† *Critique*, on "The Ideal of the Pure Reason," § vii.

‡ *Critique*, A, pp. 730 f.; B, pp. 758 f.

§ Cf. F. Harms, *Geschichte der Logik*, 1881, p. 24. Mr. Bradley, in a specially interesting chapter (*Truth and Reality*, 1914) on "Some Aspects of Truth," describes his own speculation as experimenting. Here, however, Dr. Bosanquet apparently does not follow him. Cf. his Presidential Address to this Society, *Proceedings*, 1914–15.

proved to be anything but the ruthless iconoclast of dogmatic rationalism that he was at first supposed to be. On the contrary, his speculative ideas or 'ideas of reason,' as he himself called them, ushered in a new phase of philosophy which far outstripped in boldness and brilliancy the old dogmatic ventures of Descartes and Spinoza. Whereas the latter had taken mathematics as their paradigm, the new outburst sprang from logic; not, however, from the old Aristotelian logic that had reduced rationalism to the barren formalism of the Leibniz-Wolffians, but from the new 'transcendental logic,' which Kant himself had propounded.* This was not analytic but synthetic, and would effect, Kant claimed, a revolution in philosophy comparable with that effected in astronomy by Copernicus. But—as often happens in revolutions—the immediate result was anything but what Kant expected; and it filled him with dismay, though he only lived to become acquainted with the first stage of it. The circumstances are one of the curiosities of literature, but I must resist the temptation to dwell on these at any length here. Suffice it to say that the young and struggling Fichte introduced himself to Kant in a gushing letter covering a manuscript entitled *Critique of Revelation*. This new critique claimed merely to fill a *lacuna* in Kant's own system; and Kant at first approved so far as to arrange for its publication; and when it appeared—as it chanced anonymously—it was actually hailed as a long expected work by Kant himself. I mention this as evidence of a certain continuity, such as that connecting an adventitious bud and its parent stem. It was as the bud developed that its divergencies—its sporting character became alarming. Kant compelled to disown Fichte, whom he called "a clumsy friend," described the *Wissenschaftslehre* as "like a sort of ghost, when you thought you had caught it, lo! there was nothing there but

* On Kant 'transcendental logic' as the fountain-head whence the 'metaphysical knowledge' of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sprang, cf. F. Harms, *Op. cit.*, p. 216 ff.

yourself, or rather just your hand vainly clutching." It was, in short, a case of hunting the snark and finding it a boojum. Such was all that, so far as he could see, Fichte's Absolute Ego and its *kleiner Anstoss* came to. Doubtless he would have said the same of Schelling's supplementation of Fichte's Absolute and of Hegel's development of Schelling's Absolute.

But the innovators themselves thought otherwise. In the first volume of his *Encyclopædia*, commonly spoken of as the *Smaller Logic*, published in 1817, nearly 14 years after Kant's death, Hegel presumed to say: "People in the present day have got over Kant and his philosophy; everybody wants to get further." About 14 years later Hegel died himself, and the collapse of the new movement at once began. A spell of rampant materialism inaugurated in good part by Hegelians of the so-called "left" set in. A little over 30 years later still, a period of some 60 years after Kant's death—that of Hegel falling about half way—Otto Liebmann, reviewing the collapse of each of the new idealisms in turn, raised the cry: *Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden.* (We must then, go back to Kant). So Neo-Kantianism began; Kant was revived, but Hegel slumbered on. Yet that is not altogether true; for have we not in England, at any rate, our Neo-Hegelians too, and among them, in the opinion of most of us, the most distinguished of our contemporary philosophers? And so it comes that with us one still hears more about Hegel than about Kant.

From first to last in this whole movement, "the Absolute" is the name for the dominant or first principle; this is the beginning, and with this the movement professes to begin. I do not propose to discuss the very different forms this Absolute assumed in the earlier systems—the Absolute Ego, the Absolute Identity of such polar opposites as Ego and non-Ego, the Absolute Idea. But the prior question, what in general is meant by the term itself—the Absolute—it may be worth while to raise. In what sense, can an Ego or an Idea, or anything else be called the Absolute? Now we are familiar in the

works of Plato and Aristotle with such phrases as the true, the beautiful, the good ; and it seems to be on the analogy of these that modern philosophers talk of the Absolute. This terminology is peculiar, and perhaps it ought to strike us more than it does.* We can readily find particulars to which the adjectives true, beautiful, and good apply, and can more or less intelligently use the abstracts, truth, beauty, and goodness formed from those adjectives: we can even regard the true, the beautiful, and the good not as severally many nor yet as abstracts, but as ideals in Plato's sense, which we nowhere find completely realised in our concrete experience. But when we come to the Absolute the case is by no means so simple.

What is there in or within our experience of which the Absolute is the ideal—leaving the archetypal but formal ideals of mathematics out of account? We talk of absolutely good or absolutely wicked, but this is obviously hyperbole, and we may leave it aside for the present. No quality that we know of is absolute or perfect in this sense. We talk again of an absolute monarch or autocrat or of a judicial sentence that is final, as being thus absolute. This sense of absolute as unconditioned or unconditional is perhaps the most literal of all. Absolute accordingly is often thus defined: it is unconditional or non-relative. But do we know of anything of which this can truly be said? At least, so we are told, the relative or conditional *implies* the absolute or unconditional. But is this so? Would it not be more correct to say that what relative implies is some correlative†—as father implies child or master implies servant;

* Ficino in his celebrated translation of Plato published in 1482, *à propos* of τὸ καλόν, wrote "Unumquodque e singulis pulchris, *pulchrum* hoc Plato vocat; formam in omnibus, *pulchritudinem*: speciem et ideam supra omnia, *pulchrum ipsum* [τὸ αὐτὸ καλόν]. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur." Quoted by Grote, *Plato*, ii, p. 210n.

† "The word absolute is put upon much too hard duty in metaphysics not to be willingly spared where its services can be dispensed with."—J. S. Mill, *Logic*, I, ii, § 7.

and that what conditioned implies is its conditions—as effect implies a cause and means imply an end? Further the term non-relative, like all so-called ‘infinite terms,’ unless the universe of discourse in which they are applied is restricted, becomes meaningless. It is infinite in the old sense of *ἀπειρον* or indeterminate. The most we can say of the Absolute regarded from this logical standpoint is that it is ambiguous. If all things, *distributively* regarded, are correlative, then the Absolute becomes nothing: hence perhaps Hegel’s favourite saying, “God without the world is not God.” If all things are *collectively* regarded, they as the whole are all there is. The whole may be then called the Absolute, for it is related to nothing. Hence perhaps it is—such is the tendency of our intellect to cling to relations—that we find the idea of the Absolute so frequently associated with the idea of nothing; and that not only by the Mystics and by Schelling, but even by Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. The All, or as we say the Universe, can, however, hardly be called an ideal, save perhaps as the knowledge of it is an ideal, since we can never attain to it. This, of course, was the burden of Kant’s cosmological antinomies.

But after all we reach an ideal if we go back to the meaning of absolute when it is applied to individuals. As ordinarily used, however, the word in this sense is always really comparative. The autocrat, as compared with the monarch limited by a constitution, is absolute; and similarly the decisions of a supreme court as compared with those of a court from which there can be an appeal. Still even the greatest autocrats live in ‘fear of change’ and have often been overthrown; and the highest judicial functions are liable to *ex post facto* legislation. But we can, or think we can, imagine an ideal individual free from all limitation. In this way, in fact, we attain our idea of God, which the very presence everywhere of limitation and dependence suggests—hence the argument *a contingentia mundi*.*

* So Schleiermacher traced religion to *ein schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*—a feeling of absolute dependence.

Now between these two ideas of the Absolute, the Universe and God, there has been and still is more or less oscillation, even in philosophy, to say nothing of religion. We have theism, pantheism, often 'a polite atheism,' and panentheism.* Of course, when the two ideas of the Absolute are combined one must be subordinated, for there cannot really be two Absolutes. The alternatives are (1) Krause's panentheism, in some form the All in God, and (2) God in the All—for which I know of no name, unless we use *henism* in this sense. This seems to be the doctrine of our neo-Hegelians, with whom we are now chiefly concerned.

Let us see then what we can say about the Universe so understood. First, we can deny that it had an origin in time and space; for they—however we explain them—must fall within it; since apart from it there is nothing. Secondly, we may deny that it had a cause and so is an effect; for again, all conditions must fall within it; since beside it there is nothing. To call it a first cause or *Causa sui* seems meaningless; for it only repeats the sort of mistake made by Locke's "poor Indian philosopher, who imagined that the earth also [as well as everything in it] wanted something to bear it up."† To apply to it the scholastic term 'aseity' is simply to say that it absolutely is. Obviously then we cannot call it phenomenal, for all appearance presupposes reality. Nor, thirdly, can we equate it with the entire sum of things as a plurality, regard it, that is to say, as merely what Wm. James called a *multiverse*. It is the whole and therefore a unity. Regarding this one whole or Absolute, is there anything more which we are bound to say?

Indeed there is, we are told. It must be a self-consistent

* As to the last, see in J. E. Erdmann's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, Bd. III, ii, 1853, pp. 637–686, the account of an *allendliche Lösungsversuch*, by K. C. F. Krause, for a short time a junior colleague of Hegel. In consequence largely of the forbidding terminology which Krause invented, the high place which Erdmann assigns to him has only recently been at all generally recognised. Verily, a warning to us all!

† *Essay*, II, xiii, § 19.

whole, for were it—even in its smallest part—contradictory, there would be no eliminating the contradiction. With one such little rift' within it, the universe could not be real. True as this is it hardly seemed to need saying, since it is also trite. But have you realised all that it means, we may be asked? Apparently not; for, since the Absolute excludes contradiction that implies, it is said, that it excludes discord. In other words the absence of logical opposition is identified with the absence of real opposition, Leibniz and Kant notwithstanding.* Not merely so: the absence of discord—by no means the only form of real opposition—is forthwith equated with perfection; and finally the Absolute is declared to be "Experience, individual and perfect." These seem giant strides to accomplish by a principle "so absurdly simple" to quote Mr. Bradley—as "the law of contradiction which says no more than that sheer incompatibles must not be conjoined."†

Anyhow we may allow that the Absolute does not contradict itself, and with this negation as an absolute criterion the epistemological problem, the criticism of our knowledges is to begin. Now, in the tentative process of acquiring these, we are often pulled up by some logical opposition between two alternative possibilities. One or other must be false—so much the law of contradiction declares—but which? We may have to wait for long before we find some crucial instance that decides. Very different is the purely logical treatment of *propositions*. A proposition, without going beyond it, may by the mere explication of its content be shown to contradict itself, and similarly two propositions to contradict each other. But no *thing*, I think we may confidently say, ever really contradicts

* I refer, of course, to the distinction drawn by Leibniz between our knowledge concerning possible existence and our ignorance concerning compossible existence (*De Veritatibus primis*, Erdmann's ed., p. 99); and especially to Kant's classic paper, *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in der Weltweisheit einzuführen* (*Werke*, Hartenstein's ed., ii, p. 71 ff).

† *Principles of Logic*, 1883, p. 141.

itself, nor does one thing ever really contradict another. It is only on the strength of this conviction that we maintain that the universe is at least not self-contradictory. We may call this fact the ontological ground of the so-called "law of contradiction," and it was clearly announced in this form by Aristotle.*

Yet the thinkers I have in view seem flatly to deny all this. According to them, Reality, *i.e.*, the Absolute, being the one complete whole, must be the ultimate subject of every item of what we take for knowledge. But as they stand, and ignoring this implication, all our knowledges are declared to be more or less self-contradictory—most so when the subject is merely designated as "this," least so when the subject is defined as Spirit or, if you will, as God. Instead of saying S is P, we ought, we are told, to say the Absolute as or in S is P. P is not strictly a predicate of S, for S itself is ultimately but a part, and, so far, but an adjective of the Absolute. Disregarding for the present this questionable identification of part and predicate, we may ask why it is contradictory to say S is P and yet not equally contradictory to say the Absolute is P. The logical definition of S or subject is that which cannot be a predicate but can only be predicated of: and taken strictly in this sense the Absolute alone is the ultimate subject, for whatever is, only is as a predicate of it. Suppose, taking a lump of sugar, I say this substance is white, is soluble, is sweet; I find, however, that it is only white in certain lights, only soluble in some liquids, only sweet to some tastes. What it would prove to be if it could be taken as an *ens per se subsistens* is more than any of us know. Some there are who like Hume maintain that it would be nothing, that it is but a bundle of relations; forgetting that relations imply fundamenta and that interactions imply agents. Others like J. S. Mill think it suffices to fall back on the notion of the 'permanent possibility.' But obviously the 'bundles' of

* Cf. my article in the current number of *Mind*, No. 112.

one and the 'possibilities' of the other imply some actuality, and so our difficulties with the lump of sugar remain. We cannot deny that there is something there; for otherwise, treating all other things in the same fashion, there could be nothing anywhere. On the other hand, if I find that anything that I take up is what it seems to be *in itself* solely in virtue of its relations to *other things*; and if all my attempts to determine its own nature only lead me beyond it in a search that I can never complete; am I not driven to conclude that it is but a part, an element, or a member of a continuous whole, that is to say, of the Absolute?*

Let me say in parenthesis that I am not now objecting to this way of looking at things in itself, but only to the use that is made of it to resolve all finite things, along with their relations and interactions, into a tissue of contradictions; for it is just this tissue of finite things and their mutual appearances that constitute our real world. "Our procedure," it is allowed, "naturally makes its start from [these] common facts of our lives." Nevertheless, in almost the same breath we are told that "We should begin from above." This is the method I am venturing to question; and surely what we naturally do and have always done is 'a procedure' that should either be directly refuted at the outset or at any rate discredited by one that supersedes it by better results. Let us then briefly examine some of these results.

But first a word or two concerning the resolution or partition into predication which is offered, at one time as an epistemological ground, at another as an ontological consequence, of the

* A long paragraph in Locke's *Essay* (IV, vi, § 11) is pertinently cited in support of the affirmative. I may quote a sentence or two from his summary:—"This is certain: things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers to other parts of nature for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable qualities, actions, and powers, are owing to something without them"—a something which he has previously described as "utterly beyond our view" and "impossible for us to determine." Then, of course, there is Tennyson's familiar apostrophe to the "flower in the crannied wall."

doctrine of absolutism. I ventured just now to speak of such identification as 'questionable': to have said more than might have savoured of dogmatism. Now, however, I will go so far as to say that in my opinion the criticisms advanced from many sides against this logical innovation have completely disposed of it.* That the parts of any concrete whole are constitutive of its reality, not terms in its definition, is a truth recognised throughout the history of logic from Aristotle, who expressly rejected 'physical definition,' to Aldrich,† and onwards to our own day.‡ The venerable doctrine of the five predicables is proof enough of this. A part as such is never predicated, though the possession of it may be. We may describe men as two-legged, dogs as four-legged, spiders as eight-legged, and so on; but we never say a man is *inter alia* two legs, or a dog four legs. Nor again, so far as I know, has this reality of a whole ever been maintained while at the same time the reality of its parts was denied. To be sure, the part may be called an appearance: it cannot be called a mere appearance. *Wie viel Schein so viel Hindeutung aufs Sein* was one of Herbart's trenchant phrases embodying the truth fully recognised by Kant, viz., that phenomenal reality is never mere illusion. If, however, the parts are to be called phenomenal, their whole must be called so too. To deny this is to ignore the difference between a partial whole which limits and is limited by other partial wholes, on the one hand, and the absolute whole which includes them all, on the other. Lastly, so far as I know, no logician has ever maintained that whatever is predicable of the part is predicable *simpliciter* of the whole, maintained, for example, that a cat with white paws must itself be white. *Secundum quid*, viz., as to its paws, the cat may be said to be white. But what is this beyond the admission that perhaps, after all,

* I refer especially to the criticisms of Professor Stout, to be found in the *Proceedings* of this Society; as also to those of Professor Pringle-Pattison and of Professor A. E. Taylor.

† Whose laxity is censured by Mendel (*Rudiments*, p. 41).

‡ Cf., e.g., Drobisch, *Neue Darstellung d. Logik*, § 17, § 127.

the cat, which we may never have seen, is not white, though its paws are. We cannot, then, straightway apply to the Absolute as such what we can truly predicate of its parts as such.

Granted, it is said, not as such; for, though in the Absolute all that is is there, yet it is there so transformed and merged that its partial nature has vanished. In fact, much that we examine as appearance, in the hope of escaping its self-contradictions, is found on the way to the Absolute to be landed in the Castle of Despair, and there commits suicide. There are some seven or eight of such suicides on record. Well! this is one of the results of beginning from above, to which I would now invite your attention.

It is allowed that the Absolute *is* its appearances, for there is nothing it is not. But it is not its appearances *as such*, for they are a plurality. It is then its appearances, as utterly fused and transformed, *i.e.*, as *Reality*. This is the new dialectic movement. Meanwhile the untransformed, unmediated discrepant appearances remain to perplex *us*—and to perplex us incomparably more, I will venture to add, if this is indeed the truth about them. Is the Absolute making a sport of us? we ask. That can hardly be, since these appearances are said to be its revelation. Yet again we ask, But how is that possible since the two sides—if there are indeed two sides—are thus utterly different? Perhaps the way out of this difficulty is to treat the question not as ontological but as merely epistemological, not as concerning the being of what we simply feel and do not differentiate, but a concerning what Wm. James would have called the face-value of such differentiations, what for us they are known as. And, in fact, stress is laid on this 'aspect.' Comparing the knowledge and conduct of the grown man with that of the child he once was, we realise that many transformations and blendings have taken place. And a like contrast comes out when we compare the knowledge and conduct of savage races and of races that are civilised.* The

* Cf. *Psychological Principles*, pp. 413, 467.

unification and systematisation of particular experiences is the principle underlying all human development, individual and social. Due reflexion on this principle, imperfectly realised though it be with us, is yet sufficient, it is said, to remove any difficulty in conceiving what is, so to say, *fait accompli* in the Absolute—or rather ‘never accomplished,’ for it is always there. Such language ceases to be appropriate when what eternally is and never becomes is in question. Still we might pardon an expression so natural to our standpoint, if that were all. If, that is to say, the reality of the percipients to whom the so-called phenomenal world is ‘given’ or revealed was respected and retained. But even so, the progress of knowledge with us, though it involves both what Hegel called the *Aufhebung* or reconciliation of contradictions and also an ever-increasing coherence, yet shows no signs of reducing the leading categories of thought and the fundamental concepts of science to a number of mere adjectives.

When, however, those who know are also resolved into appearances destined to share the common lot of either fusion and transformation, we begin to wonder what it all means.* For the principle illustrated from experience of this process of transformation and blending in its epistemological ‘aspect’ is now appealed to to show that within experience a like process is discernable from the ontological standpoint. Persons are described as ‘organizations of content’—content which is essentially impersonal and objective—like ‘the objective mind’

* I must confess it reminds me of the German legend of *Rübezahl*. With a stroke of his wand this gnome, it will be remembered, converted his carrots into companions for the princess he had carried off. They played their part so long as the juices of the carrots kept fresh, and thereafter were returned to the common earth from which they came, to be followed by others presently to be treated in like manner. All that was permanent was just this common ground from which they sprung and with which they were once more blended. But anyhow the princess was not a carrot, and has still to be accounted for : without her the whole drama becomes meaningless. We shall fall in with her again under the *alias* of ‘finite centre.’

of Hegel, we may assume. What we ordinarily call personality is but a formal distinction of a precarious and superficial nature, which is ever being transcended and impaired, as this identity of content within formally different selves preponderates more and more. In other words, selves in the truest sense tend ever more and more to coalesce, being, in fact, hindered only by the impotence which their formal distinctness entails. Nothing but our mortal coil with its partial outlets and their 'broken lights' stands in the way. In the absolute transparency all such division disappears. So again, it is argued that our own experiences of the advance towards a higher unity should suffice to convince us that in the Absolute this unity is already complete. But the first question is : does our experience verily furnish the slightest evidence that with increasing understanding, sympathy and co-operation real personalities tend to disappear ? It is a lamentable fact that in ne respect it does ; but that, unfortunately for the argument in question, is one that makes against the goal of our endeavours being reached. I mean, of course, the want of *character*, the absence of almost everything but formal distinctness, that makes so many people but *gens moutonniers*, as Ribot called them. On the other hand, it is precisely the stability and originality of people of character that keep the world from stagnation. Nevertheless it is contended that all alike turn out in ultimate analysis to be but 'connexions of content,' within the Absolute. At all events we may at least maintain that our experience cannot fairly be appealed to in verification of any such contention.

Other results incident to the particular method of beginning from above that I am venturing to discuss follow from the identification of the Absolute with Reality. Reality, as Aristotle long ago remarked, is an ambiguous term. We owe the stress now laid on things to the Cartesian dualism of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. Leibniz, for good and all, as I believe, started philosophy on a better track by making activity, not substantiality or reality, the fundamental idea. So Faust was

right in yielding to the inspiration that led him to say: *Im Anfang war die That*. *Quod non agit non existit*, said Leibniz too. The main antithesis to "real" is "imaginary." Appearances then are real or actual, that is to say they imply something active, but they are not active themselves. Appearances, therefore, cannot appear to other appearances, for so far there would be no activity at either end. But what experience implies is activity at both ends, *i.e.*, reciprocal interaction, *commercium dynamicum*, as Kant called it. When, then, 'finite centres of experience' are mentioned, are we not entitled to understand this phrase as meaning individual agents *en rapport* together? We can give no explanation of this rapport which does not covertly imply it; for we come here to the bedrock of experience: it involves two agents, we know that, and that is all we can say in the beginning. But it requires also the Absolute, we shall be told, and that again perhaps now we should hardly think of denying altogether. What comes first in our knowledge, however, and is the *basis* of all our speculations about the Absolute, is this interaction, this duality of subject knowing and object known. To reduce these finite centres to appearances means, I think, the '*Disappearance of reality*' for us.

Again, is it not a mistake to speak of these finite centres as 'fragmentary'? To reduce the universe to fragments with 'ragged edges' comes perilously near to bringing back the chaos of older ways of thought. After all, 'Rags and Bones' is not the cry of science: what it finds everywhere, save *per accidens*, is form, unity, function, and organization. As Professor Pringle-Pattison has said: it finds "that mind is organic to nature and nature organic to mind." From this, I repeat, we actually start. Our knowledge is acquired apart from any speculation about the Absolute, speculation that first becomes urgent as the limitations and difficulties of the pluralism from which we begin make themselves felt. This procedure our neo-Hegelians, as we have seen, are bent on reversing. Begin-

ning with 'the concrete universal' which they denominate by the abstract term Reality, they are led by their logic to deny that the particular reals have any independence at all. They all fall somewhere in the rank of appearances, and have only less or more of such reality as may pertain to these. And so we seem back at the *bouleversement* just now indicated. The reality of our world, the major premiss from which we all start is refuted by a conclusion which it could not yield—a conclusion based rather on a dialectic which has, I think, been shown to be not entirely sound. And surely here we have a result which confirms this exposure. As another critic has said: "The unity with which the system concludes tends to abolish the plurality of centres from which it starts." I would rather say: the unity from which the system, as such, starts tends to abolish the plurality of centres which, in fact, it finds. But this leads on to a fresh point.

That experience takes place in finite centres, is admitted as a fact, but a fact that is felt to be inexplicable. Why or how the Absolute divides itself into centres and still remains one—this is beyond us. But to be inexplicable is by no means the same thing as to be incompatible. With this presumably we all agree. And if only the so-called 'divisions' of Reality into finite centres of experience were recognised as themselves real—real in a sense quite different from appearance, in short, as real in the sense in which the Absolute itself is real; if in other words, they were regarded as creatures who have their part in carrying on the work of creation, beings endowed with the 'main miracle' of will, to which one of our neo-Hegelians refers, a will that can accept as its own, 'the immanent will of the Universe' to quote a phrase of another—in that case, certainly, we should have less ground to dissent from their doctrine. We might still object to the so-called divisions of the Absolute being described as fragmentary, or as needing to be blended or 'cemented,' although the Absolute itself still remains one. Again, if the Absolute is the *Universe*, i.e., the totality of the

interrelated plurality which we otherwise call the cosmos, then to speak of such diversity in unity as inexplicable is to utter either a paradox or a truism: a paradox in view of the admitted complexity of the Universe, a truism in view of the necessary inexplicability of what is all and ultimate. But if the Absolute is *Experience*, than why this should involve finite experiences is indeed inexplicable, especially experiences "in endless error hurled." Why such an Experience, like the *νόησις νοήσεως* of Aristotle's divine being, should not be absolutely self-sufficing, rendering anything beside not only superfluous but even 'incompatible,' has been the common crux of absolutism from the first.*

The two ideas of the Absolute, then, the Universe as the whole, and the Individual whose Experience is Reality, our neo-Hegelians, so far as I can discover, do not clearly distinguish. Both seem merged in a unity that has suggested henism as perhaps the most appropriate term by which to characterise their doctrine. But the two ideas cannot, I believe, be identified: 'predicates' seem more appropriate to the one, 'contents' in its psychological use, more appropriate to the other; and yet these terms are used almost interchangeably. So I think I find in the philosophy before us—what we find elsewhere—viz., more or less oscillation between two distinct ideas of the Absolute. The only solution of the difficulty open to us, as it seems to me, is the solution we naturally reach by beginning where we are, instead of attempting to begin with a 'One above,' that is theoretically inaccessible. On this view the Absolute would consist of God and the World in which God is immanent, while yet transcending it. For this view we might, as I have suggested, adopt Krause's term, panentheism, if we concede to the agnostic that we cannot prove either by any logic or any science—any more than he can disprove—the existence of such a being as that which we call

* Cf. *The Realms of Ends*, pp. 30 ff.

God. Such a concept is a rational ideal: it may be 'without a flaw,' as Kant maintained; but its use in theoretical philosophy can only be regulative, as he also maintained. Its value for religious faith is another matter; and it has there other grounds. This faith too we may contend is reasonable; but it is not science.

Only a word or two more must suffice by way of summary. Hegel compared Schelling to a painter who had but two colours on his palette, suggesting that his work was ineffective through deficiency. I will venture to compare our neo-Hegelians to philosophers who work with two principles, which implies failure through redundancy. It is the sort of defect that Kant abhorred and stigmatized as philosophical rhapsodizing; it lacks continuity and so it lacks coherence. Ferrier too, somewhat paradoxically maintained that it is more important that a philosophy should be continuously reasoned than that it should be true. I will content myself with saying that it is more important that philosophy should be systematic than that it should be complete. Complete, in fact, it cannot be. It seems, then, a hopeless attempt—one that, as I have said, is held by general consent to have hitherto always failed—to begin from the standpoint which only a completed philosophy would occupy (*i.e.*, if it were not absorbed!). To advance continuously and to be coherent—that, it seems to me, should be our golden rule. The whole procedure will be tentative—that must always be the case with inverse problems. Crises will occur in the future as they have in the past: they are inevitable incidents in the development of concrete knowledge at any rate. But as the days of elemental cataclysms are over for our planet and merely superficial earthquakes are the worst that we need fear; so with philosophy. It has passed the nebulous stage and become at least an inchoate organism or system. What Poincaré has said of the present crisis in 'mathematical physics' would be true of philosophy: its crisis would only be cases of 'sloughing an outgrown skin,' an incident of growth

and enlargement rather than a real disease. Like knowledge generally, philosophy on the whole has progressed, growing from within, *i.e.*, following the *ordo ad nos*; and so long as it abides by the method which Nature herself observes, and makes no leaps, why should it not progress still? * But we cannot dismember philosophy and have two independent 'growing points.' Wolff tried to do this and failed. †

But when we are offered two principles so disparate as, on the one hand, the self-contradiction that makes utter havoc of all our world or at least 'infects' it in varying degrees; and as, on the other, the Absolute, in which it is reconstituted for ever beyond our ken; when, too, the result is such that, "forgetting other points of view, we might say:

Thus every part is full of vice,
Yet the whole mass is Paradise";

where, finally, it is maintained "that it is through their imperfection [the 'infection' of the parts] that the Absolute is enabled to affirm itself," may we not exclaim with the *Geisterchor* in Goethe's *Faust*:—

Weh! Weh!
Du hast sie zerstört
Die schöne Welt,
Mit mächtiger Faust;
Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!
.
.
.
Wir tragen
Die Trummern ins Nichts hinüber,
Und klagen
Ueber die verlorne Schöne.

* I trust I may be pardoned for referring here to an address (which I had the honour of giving just thirty years ago to another Philosophical Society) entitled "The Progress of Philosophy." It appeared in *Mind*, 1890, pp. 213 ff.

† Cf. Zeller, *Gesch. d. deutschen Philosophie*, pp. 217 f.

*Meeting at 22, Albemarle Street, W. 1, on December 1st, 1919,
at 8 P.M.*

II.—THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

By GERALD CATOR.

"No man ever told one great truth, that I know, without the help of a good dozen of lies at least."—BROWNING in *A Soul's Tragedy*.

"THE General Nature of Reality" is the title of the most constructive and important chapter of Mr. Bradley's famous book. I am persuaded that it incidentally discloses the fundamental presupposition, and fallacy, of Absolutism—namely, that reality as such, *i.e.*, in virtue of its very realness, must have some general character, must if it is to be real be something more than merely real, must, for instance, be such that we can say of it that it is individual, or spiritual, or super-personal, or self-conscious, or not self-conscious, or something of some sort. The group of arguments against this absolutist doctrine which I shall advance in this paper are not brought to that degree of unity and of coherence with which I should have wished to present them. Indeed, I rather divine than see clearly and mediate that they are all outcrops of one problem.

My theses are, (a) logical doctrines, (b) metaphysical applications. (a) That there are for thought, no things which being given something else different from them necessarily follows. That advance by inference always involves infiltration. That no logical connexion can be at once pure and synthetic. That there is no logical "ought," no canon of demonstration and no authoritative court of appeal to decide between conflicting theories. (b) That the Absolute taken as meaning the all-inclusive reality has no character. That that which has the character of being "that than which no greater can be

conceived" cannot simultaneously have any other character, *i.e.*, that it is a contentless limit. That exhaustive mediation—mediation which completely regenerates its data—is not possible. That no highest possible level of apperception is possible. That no genuine judgment in the form "Reality is" can be made—*e.g.*, "Reality is one experience" or "Reality is such that if M then (certainly, probably or possibly) N."

I shall make no attempt to prove these theses one by one. I shall only try to recommend a general logical view of which they form the most salient and recognizable features. Scientific or common-sense thinking does not, except when the scientific man or the common-sense thinker happens also to be a philosopher, criticize its presuppositions. Consequently, it must be to some extent, in the last resort, using words without knowing what they mean. Its utterances must have something of the character of incantations or soothing spells, they produce in the subject a state of logical peace, or, at least, of temporary ease, but he does not quite know how or why.

I find myself forced to the conclusion that philosophy is in the same case, that no higher type of certainty than that to which common-sense or natural science attains is attainable or distinctly desirable. I have somewhere seen Mr. Russell quoted as saying: "Mathematics is the science in which we never know what we are speaking about nor whether what we say is true." I think this true also of all sciences and of every philosophy. I think that it is by not recognizing this that we lay waste our powers, turning with too fastidious appetites from apples, pears, cherries, etc., and demanding fruit which is nothing but fruit. Perhaps it is something of an impertinence to introduce a criticism of Absolutism by an allusion to Hegel, but this is how it appears to me: in an Absolutism which was true to its logic no result would ever be attained, but (as it were) every result would always be just-about-to-be attained. The goal of the dialectic would always be ahead of the yield of

the dialectic. The promissory note would never mature, but would always be just on the verge of an ever receding maturity. There is no more remarkable instance of the apparent power of thought to conjure something out of nothing—knowledge out of the very substance of ignorance—than is found in the logic of chance. The story is told of a lady traveller in an omnibus, who, when the conductor came to collect her fare, found she had left or lost her purse. An old gentleman, a fellow-passenger, saw her predicament and paid for her. The next day she was travelling again, same conductor, same lack of penny. The conductor stopped the 'bus and ordered her out. She glancing wildly round in her shame and distress caught the eye of the same old gentleman again—a fellow-passenger—with an unconscious appeal. "No you don't" he said. Who would have said anything else?—And yet (I hope the ratios are right—but, if not, no matter), if the probability of the lady going out purseless was $\frac{1}{N}$ she *ought* to go out purseless twice running once in N^2 times, ought to meet the same conductor say once in M^2 times and the same fellow-passenger once in P^2 times. And all these coincidences *ought* to coincide once in $N^2 \times M^2 \times P^2$ times. Now who is to say that this once, this actual once, is not the once imposed by the laws of chance? What is the justification for the italicized minor premiss in the following syllogism (author, the old gentleman)?

Such a compound coincidence as I have witnessed only happens to an undesigning female one time out of a million times ;

This time is not one time out of a million times ;

Therefore this time is not a time when the coincidence has happened to an undesigning female.

Why is the conductor certain of the lady's guilt? I think the answer is that he makes what amounts to a construction of

the relevant area of reality on the basis of her innocence and another on the basis of her guilt. The construction on the basis of her guilt fuses *inevitably for him** with the abiding construction which is his real world. But if a logician was one of the witnesses of the incident, then for him the world constructed on the basis of the lady's innocence (involving elaborate constructions of coincidences) would also be supportable. Both the innocence-world and the guilt-world would compete for fusion with the logician's real world, so that where the conductor was easily certain, the logician would be laboriously doubtful.

If any one tells me that 2 angels plus 3 angels make 5 angels, he is ostensibly giving me information about the laws of combination of angels, but really he is only giving definitory information about units.† The apparent advance gained by applying the laws of the combination of units to the combination of angels is gained by a trick. This trick consists in obtaining consent to the substitution in the formula of "angels" for "units" under cover of a tacit pledge that "angels" shall mean "angels"—so-far-as-they-have-the-nature-of-units and then, having, under cover of this pledge smuggled "angels" into the formula, straightway restoring to them their angelic natures. It is as if a man should get into Parliament by identifying himself with one party, and then when safely elected not only vote with the other party, but claim the authority of his constituents for so doing. It is obtaining a position by false pretences. It is first pushing aside the difference between angels and units as nothing to the purpose and then the purpose remaining unchanged, triumphantly producing this same nothing as a glorious prize.

Now let us turn our attention to the formula 2 and 3 are 5

* These worlds, *i.e.*, the real world and the ideal world based on guilt are sympathetic, or they would not fuse, but they are different or else the one would not extend to the other. The sympathetic attraction *breaks down*, the conductor's distinguishing power—the hypothesis becomes one tissue with the fact.

† Croce's *Logic*, Eng. trans., p. 217.

and see whether the apparently synthetic character of this judgment is not obtained by similar playing fast and loose. What happens when I effect the judgment that $2+3=5$? Have I before my mind a universal within which "2 and 3" on one side and "5" on another side are interconnected and relevant differences? I think not. I appeal first to an illustration. If the two ends of an electrically charged circuit are gradually brought together, then, when they are a certain distance apart, an arc will form between them. Here we have (electric) continuity and (metallic) discontinuity. Now when I want to refresh my convictions that $2+3=5$ I make an experiment on the following lines (the nature of the experiment would be more obvious if larger numbers were concerned, but still it will serve to show what happens when a judgment is made and how the making of it is prepared), I imagine two clusters of dots, one cluster consisting of two dots and three dots, thus, (cluster "a"), and the second cluster consisting of five dots, (cluster "c"). If I glance at them and deny myself the aid of counting units I experience a flicker of hesitation to equate them. If this hesitation does not at once yield, this is what I do. I interpolate between cluster "a" and cluster "c" a third cluster "b," intermediate in character, *i.e.*, such that the dots are not so obviously divided into groups as in "a" nor so symmetrically placed in one cluster as in "c." This I can do by drawing a faint line across "c," ..|... then I use "b" as a middle term or stepping stone for my thought between "a" and "c." By attending to the line in "b" I emphasize it sufficiently to make it serve for the gap in "a" and thus approximate "b" to "a," then I ignore the line, treat it as nothing, and thus approximate "b" to "c." Lastly, by ignoring the oscillation of my attention I deceive myself into supposing that I have in "b" a middle term which, while remaining unchanged and self-identical, is yet able to unite the opposed "a" and "c."

This example is I know faulty in treatment. It is faulty

also in its facility because it does not reproduce the hesitation, the pause, the break through and spring forward, which distinguish the genuine judgment, which adjudicates something in doubt, from the poor ghosts of judgments, which we perforce experiment with in logic. But this is what is essential. There is an advance and there is a gap. The advance is as great as the gap is wide, and no wonder, for *the gap is the advance*. Leaping to conclusions is not a logically permissible method of progress, and yet leaping is the only possible mode of advancing.* Professor Bosanquet† to whom I owe this insight, though he makes the suggestion only in passing, and in order to reject it, states it as follows, in the course of a discussion of pure cases:—
 “A cannot cohere with B unless B coheres with A. If in actual fact this is found not to hold good, and AB is found to involve AC while AC does not involve AB, it is plain that what was relevant to AC was not really AB but some element $\alpha\beta$ within it. *But (italics mine) may not the irrelevant element be just the element which made AB into AB as distinct from AC, so that by abstracting from it AB is reduced to AC, and the judgment made tautology, i.e., destroyed?*”‡ Professor Bosanquet continues,

* As the 'bus conductor leaped. Source of this view of the middle term, so far as I am concerned, Cardinal Mercier's *Critérologie Général*, pp. 23 and 253.

† Only because Bosanquet's *Logic* has been the wood in which all my arrows have been cut, do I make it a text for my criticism. I am as far as possible from supposing that any substantive criticism of it which I could make, would be of any value. To emphasize this I have quoted throughout from the first and therefore relatively superseded edition. The passage I have italicized states the essence of my argument. There is no distinction without difference, no difference without division, no division without breach of continuity. The dialectic advances characteristic of the intellect, i.e., who says A must say B . . . Z is essentially a sorites which owes the extension between A and Z to its missing links. I cannot forbear from adducing Lotze's criticism on the categorical judgment. “This absolute connexion of two concepts S and P, in which the one is unconditionally the other, and yet both stand over against each other as different, is a relation quite impracticable in thought,” and “the impossible judgment S is P.”—Lotze, *Logic*, Eng. trans., vol. i, p. 79.

‡ *Logic*, 1st edition, vol. i, pp. 261–2.

"The suggestion is tempting because it aims at cutting up by the root a troublesome scientific problem, viz., the statement of connected attributes as purely relevant to one another and yet as distinct. We constantly tend either to insert irrelevancies by way of distinction or to let both attributes fall back into the undistinguished abstract relation which connects them. To grasp a distinction in unity is an effort, and we dislike effort. Nevertheless, if it were impossible, the idea of system, of the one in the many, would be gone."

For my part I am convinced that it is not merely an effort but that it is an impossibility which is never achieved. I interpret the sense of strain, *i.e.*, the effort of grasping distinction in unity, as being the effort of overcoming the inertia of the attention, of keeping it continually on the move, of repeatedly breaking down incipient adhesions. Thus, there is a struggle between two or more extremes for the adhesion of a middle term. A - - - B - - - C appears now as AB - - - C, now as A - - - BC. The differences between A and B and between B and C are, taken separately, below some critical threshold value though the difference between A and C as not broken by the interposition of B is above threshold value, *i.e.*, A and B are indiscernibles, B and C are indiscernibles, A and C are discernible. Then by flickering of attention between A and C mediated and A and C unmediated one gets by superposition a representation of A and C as purely relevant to one another and yet as distinct.*

* *E.g.* Socrates-man mortal.
 Socrates man-mortal.
 Socrates . . . man mortal.

Compare with Mr. Bradley's account of the generation of such pseudo-representations as that of time by means of oscillation of attention. "It is no solution of the discrepancies, and we might rather call it a method of holding them in suspension. It is an artifice by which we become blind on either side to suit the occasion, and the whole secret consists in ignoring that aspect which we are unable to use."—*Appearance and Reality*, p. 47.

The following illustration, which I hope will not be taken to be offered as anything more than an illustration, will perhaps explain what I suppose a concrete universal to be, that is, not a universal but a *tertium quid*. In many text-books of Psychology there are to be found diagrams, which if gazed at fixedly, are seen now as concave now as convex. It is worth noting that any diagram to be suitable for this purpose must fall within a certain range of ambiguity. One can see when one's attention is directed to it that this fluctuation is due to a wandering of the point of regard so as to confer salience now on one feature now on another (which saliences being determined determine in turn sympathetic constructions of the other features). But it is very easy to be unaware of this, and then the diagram seems to go over autogenetically, now into one phase, now into another. Suppose this to happen, as I suppose it might with a properly balanced diagram, rhythmically and automatically, so that the convexity appeared while the impression of concavity was still vivid, then one phase would be as it were seen through the other, and one would see a unity in difference, a concave-convexity.* I cannot find that when I affirm that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points I do anything else than fluctuate rhythmically

* "... those intellectual creations that are the object of philosophical science, in which the whole system not merely appears by its common nature in parts which remain external to each other, but *tends* (my italics) to throw itself in its entirety into each of these differences *passing* by an organic necessity from one difference to another. Here, in short, the differences are not merely parts which remain outside one another, not merely phases which succeed one another, but moments which succeed one another, so that the earlier are retained in the later through a progressive development, and yet the distinctive character of each moment is not weakened" (Bosanquet's *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 194). Note how the climax is worked up to: "*tends*" gives the benefit of 'does' and 'does not' without accepting the responsibilities of either. Then, again, by the traces left by such words as "passing," "succession," "earlier," "latter," "development," etc., we make ourselves beneficiaries of a wealth of suggested meaning, so that we seem to be just on the verge of an experience of activity without change.

between straightness and shortness, *viâ* an ambiguous neutral form. And when I enjoy, as the humblest may do at times, the apparent experience of becoming "spectator of all time and of all existence" I find, on close attention being given to it, that this field of thought is sustained as co-present in a way not dissimilar to the way in which a juggler sustains a dozen balls in the air, by giving each attention in turn. I am thus led to think of thought as an activity of which the characteristic *nîsus* is to mediate between differentials by the interposition of just-nots, separately imperceptible, cumulatively perceptible.

Thought's working principle is that a thing is what it is only just not. That minimal differences may be ignored. That indiscernibles (note the plural) are identical. It is a relating activity, relating by going between, otherwise the manner of preparation of contents for thought connexion by gradual approximation would be uninterpretable. When I raise myself in apperceptive level and, for example, think the immediate predicates of man as mediate predicates of animal, which is the beginning of a process of elevation, which would if continued lead up to envisaging all possible predicates as predicates of being or of reality, I do not attain to an unchanging knowledge of changing things. My thought takes some convenient phantasm—visual, auditory or motor—such as the suppressed utterance of a word, as a basis of operations; and thence makes feints and recoveries to dart across to possible predicates making a sort of *velleities* towards judgments—it achieves agility but not ubiquity.

The ideal of thought would be a complete system, that is to say, a system in which the elements were so disposed as to form a closed system of symmetrically disposed just-nots. As every term in such a system represents a momentary check to thought, thought's striving is to make its movement perfectly smooth, unchecked, uniform, and effortless. But a system of pure thought corresponding to this requirement is as impossible as an electric circuit all spark gap. In the course of such an

activity there would be no subjects and no predicates—these are the stadia of a discontinuous motion. There is a temporary check to thought, a gathering of force, a break through and leap forward, *e.g.*, that man approaching is ... is ... SMITH. Reality is ... I have it ... is *spiritual*. When this sense of check and effort is absent the sense of judging activity is also absent. When a stream of water is checked it deposits part of the matter in suspension, when a stream of thought is checked it deposits terms.

Our position is not that if we play the game of thinking to the end we must take the consequences, understood as consequences of scepticism or nescience, or that we can play it to the end if we will take the consequences. There is no end, there are no consequences, and there is no beginning. A is B is not true, A is A is no truth. That it is a paradox is false, and that it is a truism is insignificant.

Any true statement is a significant statement; it must adjudicate something, conquer a doubt. If it slay but a ghost, it is but a ghost. Any significant statement is a possibly false statement. It must deny something to be, the being of which is not meaningless. Any possibly false statement is a partially false statement. It presents itself unconditionally, but is only conditionally true. It is not a pure case. Any partially false statement is a not absolutely true statement, is an untrue statement, is an absolutely false statement. So we circle from paradox to truism like Idealism from Berkeley to Hegel.*

* I take the following from W. K. Clifford's *Essays* as being Hegelian in spirit: "I am a dogmatic nihilist, and shall say the brain is conscious if I like A true idealism does not want to be stated, and conversely an idealism that requires to be stated must have something wrong about it. In the same way to say that there is God apart from the Universe is to say that the Universe is not God, or that there is no real God at all; it may be all right but it is atheism. *And an Idealism which can be denied by any significant aggregation of words is no true Idealism.*" (It is clear—is it not?—that an Idealism which cannot be denied also cannot be affirmed by any significant aggregation of words, and is, therefore, entirely empty and nugatory.)

Till the last correction has been applied "Reality is spiritual" is not true; *when* the last correction has been applied it is no truth. The rational is the real, seems to promise everything, but it peters out into the real is the rational, so that real and rational are each defined in terms of the other. Every philosophy at once appeals to and yet claims to create a standard of reference. Therefore in the end its utterances are only true in its own Pickwickian, Spinozistic, or Hegelian sense.

Has inference any essential character? When all so-called accidents of inference are purified away, such as transition in time-advance from known to unknown, from premises to conclusion, from given to extension, novelty, discovery, selective abstraction, is there any residuum? I believe not. We can dispense with these accidents in turn, but not with them all at once. Why is a fragment of a circle "able to dictate its continuation" a more effective instance of an active universal than a piece of straight line, and why is a fragment of ellipse more telling than a fragment of circle? I think because of the impression of novelty of the continuing change of direction as against the simple continuance of direction, and of the continuing change of change of direction as against the continuing change of direction. How can it be otherwise than that the attack which is fatal to the *prima facie* intelligibility of cause and effect shall also be fatal to these entirely cognate pairs? Again, what does a curve's present ability to dictate its continuation amount to? I as I look at it itch to continue the sweep with my pencil or eye, but that is not what is wanted. In what order of reality are the degrees of this dictator obeyed? Lastly, "its continuation," *i.e.*, the continuation of it,—it is defined or individuated by forecast of *this* continuation; any other continuation would be a continuation of something else. A broken column may be a complete monument, a broken life a complete tragedy, a broken sentence more expressive than eloquence. Formal completeness in some order is always

secured. It tells us nothing. The bit of curve might be a part of a circle or a part of a sinuous line or a piece of decorative work.

Given a jigsaw puzzle complete but for one piece, or an animal complete but for one bone, or a universe with but one gap in its completeness, could we say with certainty what the missing element must be? No; because the absence of the piece makes the ground of determination itself indeterminate precisely in the direction in which it is required to be determinate. *Either* there is no ground for, or *else* there is no room for, a conclusion. Newman amused himself by picturing how two theologians, disputing about St. Paul's meaning, would insensibly begin to trim and qualify their assertions if suddenly told that the Saint was approaching. Who is not a little relieved when a sum comes out? The laws of arithmetic were to some extent on trial till it did. If I measure B a mile north of A, C a mile east of B, D a mile south of C, and then find D not due east of A, have I measured wrongly? Or, what is it that those learned folk say about actual space being possibly non-euclidean?*

At the very end of his *Logic* Professor Bosanquet writes: "Necessity, then, is a character attaching to parts or differences interrelated within wholes, universals, or identities. If there were any totality such that it could not be set over against something else as a part or difference within a further system, such a totality could not be known under an aspect of necessity. The universe, however we may conceive of it as including subordinate systems, must ultimately be incapable, *ex hypothesi*, of entering as an element into a system including more than

* I may perhaps make one more attempt to enforce the difficulty which I have been trying to illustrate in so many ways, thus. . . . If there *is* no breach of continuity between given and extension the distinction between them is irrational and arbitrary, *i.e.*, there is no reason for saying at any point that here the given ends and the extension begins. But if there *is* any breach in continuity, then the back of the inference which extends the one by means of the other is broken.

it. Strictly speaking, therefore, its relation to knowledge must be one of reality, not of necessity. But also, strictly speaking, it is a reality which we have no power to question or explain, because all our questioning or explanation falls within it. There can be no meaning in talking about what might be the case if the universe were other than it is, or about what has been the case to make the universe what it is. But except in the case of this unique and imaginary reference of that which is assumed to be the absolute whole to something outside itself, every judgment is the synthesis of differences.* I have never been clear as to whether I should read this passage to mean that what I have been contending for in this paper is forcing an open door. Does the passage "strictly speaking, etc.," mean that the ultimate character of reality is just a matter of fact? But a fact not fixed in a system would have no character and no persistent identity, would, in fact, not be a fact, would be nothing for knowledge. And if the ultimate character of reality is nothing for knowledge, then surely all the subordinate characters which arise within and depend upon this nothing are nothings too. Then again the passage beginning "There can be no meaning" Does this mean that (as I contend is the case) if we exact the letter of the law every supposition is illegitimate? It destroys the world on which it rests. Lastly, is there some sense in which the prohibition of discussing "what has been the case to make the universe what it is" prohibits any discussion, and yet permits any other discussion? Either, I think, it permits both a discussion of the "Nature of God as He is in Himself" and a discussion of the causes of the prevailing high prices or else it rules out both these discussions as illegitimate.

Casting my mind back over the previous course of this paper, I feel that in my anxiety to set my opinion in various lights I may have given the impression of firing a charge of

* *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 236.

small shot at reason generally. What I have said comes to no more, however, than that though we can know, we cannot know *what* we know. We can rise to no higher type of certainty than every day certainty. We cannot excogitate a theory of knowledge by means of which we shall be entitled to pass judgment on the claim of any item of ostensible knowledge. And this is not our failure. Such a theory is not a possible achievement of thought. There is nothing specially sceptical about this view, nothing that should make us feel that our established certainties are unduly precarious or at the mercy of emerging new facts. "Evidence is the test of truth" or "the best is good enough for me" might be adopted as its devices. The source of philosophic scepticism is failure to take thoroughly to heart the purely negative character of the ideal of reason, because by this failure a shadowy realm is maintained in being to confront and to depreciate the actual. To be excluded from nothing is no exclusion—no limitation.

As the "ideal of reason" recalls Kant, may I be permitted to bring my paper to an end by a few remarks under the form (merely "under the form") of a criticism of Kant. Kant then, I opine, failed to eradicate the transcendental illusion because he did not see that there is *no* area constructions in which are not vitiated by the autonomy of reason. Rational theology is no more and no less a pseudo-science than history, geology, or physics. The distortion on a Mercator's chart does not begin at the poles, though only at the poles does it become infinite, and patently unbearable.

That the limits of the validity of reason should be taken to coincide with the limits of possible experience—that possible experience should be conceived as a function of sense experience—that sense experience should be (surreptitiously) equated with common-sense experience—that an acorn or an atom should be conceded to be an object of possible experience and an angel or an absolute denied to be such an object—all these are idylls of time and place; accidents of profession, not generated conclusions.

Limit of experience, limit of knowledge, beginning of philosophy, beginning of theology, are all names for the shifting limit at which the burden of supporting complex hypothetical constructions carried out through precise distinctions becomes (for this mind or that) insupportable. This limit, therefore varies from man to man, from interest to interest,* from age to age, expanding and contracting, now in this direction now in that. If we are to determine its locus in general, we can only do so by saying that the real world (in general) is the world which can be sustained with relative definiteness and continuity, by that expenditure of intellectual force which is at the disposal of a standard human mind. And "standard" must be largely, though not entirely, a statistically obtained average in which, in default of any better canon, "Every one counts for one."†

* From interest to interest because—"Idea, quæ esse formale humanæ mentis constituit, non est simplex, sed ex plurimis ideis composita." Spinoza, *Ethics*, Pars. II, Prop. XV. A human mind is a society of mindlets.

† *Vide* my paper, "Theism as an Intellectual Polity," in the *Philosophical Review*, September, 1919. In an earlier group of papers, the "Structure of Reality," *Mind*, N.S., No. 61; "Reality as a System of Functions," *Mind*, N.S., No. 79; "Id quo majus cogitari nequit," *Monist*, October, 1908, I took the absolutist view which is criticized in this paper.

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III.—EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

By G. E. MOORE.

IN the index to *Appearance and Reality* (First Edition) Mr. Bradley declares that *all* relations are "intrinsic"; and the following are some of the phrases by means of which he tries to explain what he means by this assertion. "A relation must at both ends *affect*, and pass into, the being of its terms" (p. 364). "Every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and is, in this sense, intrinsic" (p. 392). "To stand in a relation and not to be relative, to support it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the question" (p. 142). And a good many other philosophers seem inclined to take the same view about relations which Mr. Bradley is here trying to express. Other phrases which seem to be sometimes used to express it, or a part of it, are these: "No relations are purely external"; "All relations qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between which they hold"; "No terms are independent of any of the relations in which they stand to other terms" (See *e.g.*, Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, pp. 11, 12, 46).

It is, I think, by no means easy to make out exactly what these philosophers mean by these assertions. And the main object of this paper is to try to define clearly one proposition, which, even if it does not give the whole of what they mean, seems to me to be always implied by what they mean, and to be certainly false. I shall try to make clear the exact meaning of this proposition, to point out some of its most important consequences, and to distinguish it clearly from certain other propositions which are, I think, more or less liable to be confused with

it. And I shall maintain that, if we give to the assertion that a relation is "internal" the meaning which this proposition would give to it, then, though, in that sense, *some* relations are "internal," others, no less certainly, are not, but are "purely external."

To begin with, we may, I think, clear the ground, by putting on one side two propositions about relations, which, though they seem sometimes to be confused with the view we are discussing, do, I think, quite certainly not give the whole meaning of that view.

The first is a proposition which is quite certainly and obviously true of all relations, without exception, and which, though it raises points of great difficulty, can, I think, be clearly enough stated for its truth to be obvious. It is the proposition that, in the case of any relation whatever, the kind of fact which we express by saying that a given term A has that relation to another term B, or to a pair of terms B and C, or to three terms B, C, and D, and so on, in no case simply consists in the terms in question *together with* the relation. Thus the fact which we express by saying that Edward VII was father of George V obviously does not simply consist in Edward, George, *and* the relation of fatherhood. In order that the fact may be, it is obviously not sufficient that there should merely be George and Edward and the relation of fatherhood; it is further necessary that the relation should *relate* Edward to George, and not only so, but also that it should relate them in the particular way which we express by saying that Edward was father of George, and not merely in the way which we should express by saying that George was father of Edward. This proposition is, I think, obviously true of all relations without exception; and the only reason why I have mentioned it is because, in an article in which Mr. Bradley criticizes Mr. Russell (*Mind*, 1910, p. 179), he seems to suggest that it is inconsistent with the proposition that any relations are merely external, and because, so far as I can make out, some other

people who maintain that all relations are internal seem sometimes to think that their contention follows from this proposition. The way in which Mr. Bradley puts it is that such facts are unities which are not *completely analysable*; and this is, of course, true, if it means merely that in the case of no such fact is there any set of constituents of which we can truly say: This fact is *identical with* these constituents. But whether from this it follows that all relations are internal must of course depend upon what is meant by the latter statement. If it be merely used to express this proposition itself, or anything which follows from it, then, of course, there can be no doubt that all relations are internal. But I think there is no doubt that those who say this do not mean by their words *merely* this obvious proposition itself; and I am going to point out something which I think they always imply, and which certainly does *not* follow from it.

The second proposition, which, I think, may be put aside at once as certainly not giving the whole of what is meant, is the proposition which is, I think, the natural meaning of the phrases "All relations modify or affect their terms" or "All relations make a difference to their terms." There is one perfectly natural and intelligible sense in which a given relation may be said to modify a term which stands in that relation, namely, the sense in which we should say that, if, by putting a stick of sealing-wax into a flame, we make the sealing-wax melt, its relationship to the flame has modified the sealing-wax. This is a sense of the word "modify" in which part of what is meant by saying of any term that it is modified, is that it has actually undergone a change: and I think it is clear that a sense in which this is part of its meaning is the only one in which the word "modify" can properly be used. If, however, those who say that all relations modify their terms were using the word in this, its proper sense, part of what would be meant by this assertion would be that all terms which have relations at all actually undergo

changes. Such an assertion would be obviously false, for the simple reason that there are terms which have relations and which yet never change at all. And I think it is quite clear that those who assert that all relations are internal, in the sense we are concerned with, mean by this something which could be consistently asserted to be true of all relations without exception, even if it were admitted that some terms which have relations do not change. When, therefore, they use the phrase that all relations "modify" their terms as equivalent to "all relations are internal," they must be using "modify" in some metaphorical sense other than its natural one. I think, indeed, that most of them would be inclined to assert that in every case in which a term A comes to have to another term B a relation, which it did not have to B in some immediately preceding interval, its having of that relation to that term causes it to undergo some change, which it would not have undergone if it had not stood in precisely that relation to B; and I think perhaps they would think that this proposition follows from some proposition which is true of all relations, without exception, and which is what they mean by saying that all relations are internal. The question whether the coming into a new relation does thus always cause some modification in the term which comes into it is one which is often discussed, as if it had something to do with the question whether all relations are internal; as when, for instance, it is discussed whether knowledge of a thing alters the thing known. And for my part I should maintain that this proposition is certainly not true. But what I am concerned with now is not the question whether it is true, but simply to point out that, so far as I can see, it can have nothing to do with the question whether all relations are internal, for the simple reason that it cannot possibly follow from any proposition with regard to *all* relations without exception. It asserts with regard to all relational properties of a certain kind, that they have a certain kind of *effect*; and no proposition of this sort

can, I think, follow from any universal proposition with regard to *all* relations.

We have, therefore, rejected, as certainly not giving the whole meaning of the dogma that all relations are internal: (1) the obviously true proposition that no relational facts are *completely* analysable, in the precise sense which I gave to that assertion; and (2) the obviously false proposition that all relations modify their terms, in the natural sense of the term "modify," in which it always has as part of its meaning "cause to undergo a change." And we have also seen that this false proposition that any relation which a term comes to have always causes it to undergo a change is wholly irrelevant to the question whether *all* relations are internal or not. We have seen finally that if the assertion that all relations modify their terms is to be understood as equivalent to the assertion that all are internal, "modify" must be understood in some metaphorical sense. The question is: What is this metaphorical sense?

And one point is, I think, pretty clear to begin with. It is obvious that, in the case of some relations, a given term A may have the relation in question, not only to one other term, but to several different terms. If, for instance, we consider the relation of fatherhood, it is obvious that a man may be father, not only of one, but of several different children. And those who say that all relations modify their terms always mean, I think, not merely that every different relation which a term has modifies it; but also that, where the relation is one which the term has to several different other terms, then, in the case of *each* of these terms, it is modified by the fact that it has the relation in question to *that* particular term. If, for instance, A is father of three children, B, C, and D, they mean to assert that he is modified, not merely by being a father, but by being the father of B, also by being the father of C, and also by being the father of D. The mere assertion that all *relations* modify their terms does not, of course, make it quite clear that this is

what is meant; but I think there is no doubt that it is always meant; and, I think, we can express it more clearly by using a term, which I have already introduced, and saying the doctrine is that all *relational properties* modify their terms, in a sense which remains to be defined. I think there is no difficulty in understanding what I mean by a *relational property*. If A is father of B, then what you assert of A when you say that he is so is a *relational property*—namely, the property of being father of B; and it is quite clear that this property is not itself a *relation*, in the same fundamental sense in which the relation of fatherhood is so; and also that, if C is a different child from B, then the property of being father of C is a different relational property from that of being father of B, although there is only *one* relation, that of fatherhood, from which both are derived. So far as I can make out, those philosophers who talk of all *relations* being internal, often actually mean by “relations,” “relational properties”: when they talk of all the relations of a given term, they mean all its relational properties, and not merely all the different relations, of each of which it is true that the term has that relation to something. It will, I think, conduce to clearness to use a different word for these two entirely different uses of the term “relation”: to call “fatherhood” a relation, and “fatherhood of B” a “relational property.” And the fundamental proposition, which is meant by the assertion that all relations are internal, is, I think, a proposition with regard to relational properties, and not with regard to relations properly so-called. There is no doubt that those who maintain this dogma mean to maintain that all relational properties are related in a peculiar way to the terms which possess them—that they modify or are internal to them, in some metaphorical sense. And once we have defined what this sense is in which a *relational property* can be said to be internal to a term which possesses it, we can easily derive from it a corresponding sense in which the *relations*, strictly so called, from which relational properties are derived, can be said to be internal.

Our question is then: What is the metaphorical sense of "modify" in which the proposition that all relations are internal is equivalent to the proposition that all relational properties "modify" the terms which possess them? I think it is clear that the term "modify" would never have been used at all to express the relation meant, unless there had been some analogy between this relation and that which we have seen is the proper sense of "modify," namely, *causes* to change. And I think we can see where the analogy comes in by considering the statement, with regard to any particular term *A* and any relational property ϕ , which belongs to it, that *A would have been different from what it is if it had not had ϕ* : the statement, for instance, that Edward VII would have been different if he had not been father of George V. This is a thing which we can obviously truly say of *A* and ϕ , in some sense, whenever it is true of ϕ that it *modified* *A* in the proper sense of the word: if the being held in the flame causes the sealing-wax to melt, we can truly say (in some sense) that the sealing-wax would not have been in a melted state if it had not been in the flame. But it seems as if it were a thing which might also be true of *A* and ϕ , where it is *not* true that the possession of ϕ *caused* *A* to change; since the mere assertion that *A* would have been different, if it had not had ϕ , does not necessarily imply that the possession of ϕ *caused* *A* to have any property which it would not have had otherwise. And those who say that all relations are internal do sometimes tend to speak as if what they meant could be put in the form: In the case of every relational property which a thing has, it is always true that the thing which has it would have been different if it had not had that property; they sometimes say even: If ϕ be a relational property and *A* a term which has it, then it is always true that *A would not have been A* if it had not had ϕ . This is, I think, obviously a clumsy way of expressing anything which could possibly be true, since, taken strictly, it implies the

self-contradictory proposition that if A had not had ϕ , it would not have been true of A that it did not have ϕ . But it is nevertheless a more or less natural way of expressing a proposition which might quite well be true, namely, that, supposing A has ϕ , then anything which had not had ϕ would necessarily have been different from A. This is the proposition which I wish to suggest as giving the metaphorical meaning of ϕ *modifies* A, of which we are in search. It is a proposition to which I think a perfectly precise meaning can be given, and one which does not at all imply that the possession of ϕ *caused* any change in A, but which might conceivably be true of all terms, and all the relational properties they have, without exception. And it seems to me that it is not unnatural that the proposition that this is true of ϕ and A, should have been expressed in the form, " ϕ modifies A," since it can be more or less naturally expressed in the perverted form, "If A had not had ϕ it would have been different,"—a form of words, which, as we saw, can also be used whenever ϕ does, in the proper sense, modify A.

I want to suggest, then, that one thing which is always implied by the dogma that, "All relations are internal," is that, in the case of every relational property, it can always be truly asserted of any term x which has that property, that any term which had not had it would necessarily have been different from x .

This is the proposition to which I want to direct attention. And there are two phrases in it, which require some further explanation.

The first is the phrase "would necessarily have been." And the meaning of this can be explained, in a preliminary way, as follows:—To say of a pair of properties ϕ and ψ , that any term which had had ϕ would necessarily have had ψ , is equivalent to saying that, in every case, from the proposition with regard to any given term that it has ϕ , it *follows* that that term has ψ : *follows* being understood in the sense in which from the

proposition with regard to any term, that it is a right angle, it *follows* that it is an angle, and in which from the proposition with regard to any term that it is red it *follows* that it is coloured. There is obviously some very important sense in which from the proposition that a thing is a right angle, it does follow that it is an angle, and from the proposition that a thing is red it does follow that it is coloured. And what I am maintaining is that the metaphorical sense of "modify," in which it is maintained that all relational properties modify the subjects which possess them, can be defined by reference to this sense of "follows." The definition is: To say of a given relational property ϕ that it modifies or is internal to a given term A which possesses it, is to say that from the proposition that a thing has not got ϕ it follows that that thing is different from A. In other words, it is to say that the property of *not* possessing ϕ , and the property of being different from A are related to one another in the peculiar way in which the property of being a right-angled triangle is related to that of being a triangle, or that of being red to that of being coloured.

To complete the definition it is necessary, however, to define the sense in which "different from A" is to be understood. There are two different senses which the statement that A is different from B may bear. It may be meant merely that A is *numerically* different from B, *other* than B, not identical with B. Or it may be meant that not only is this the case, but also that A is related to B in a way which can be roughly expressed by saying that A is *qualitatively* different from B. And of these two meanings, those who say: That all relations make a *difference* to their terms, always, I think, mean difference in the latter sense and not merely in the former. That is to say, they mean, that if ϕ be a relational property which belongs to A, then the absence of ϕ entails not only numerical difference from A, but qualitative difference. But, in fact, from the proposition that a thing is qualitatively different from A, it does follow that it is also numerically

different. And hence they are maintaining that every relational property is "internal to" its terms in both of two different senses at the same time. They are maintaining that, if ϕ be a relational property which belongs to A, than ϕ is internal to A both in the sense (1) that the absence of ϕ entails qualitative difference from A; and (2) that the absence of ϕ entails numerical difference from A. It seems to me that neither of these propositions is true; and I will say something about each in turn.

As for the first, I said before that I think some relational properties really are "internal to" their terms, though by no means all are. But, if we understand "internal to" in this first sense, I am not really sure that any are. In order to get an example of one which was, we should have, I think, to say that any two different qualities are always *qualitatively* different from one another: that, for instance, it is not only the case that anything which is pure red is qualitatively different from anything which is pure blue, but that the quality "pure red" itself is qualitatively different from the quality "pure blue." I am not quite sure that we can say this, but I think we can; and if so, it is easy to get an example of a relational property which is internal in our first sense. The quality "orange" is intermediate in shade between the qualities yellow and red. This is a relational property, and it is quite clear that, on our assumption, it is an internal one. Since it is quite clear that any quality which were *not* intermediate between yellow and red, would necessarily be *other* than orange; and if any quality *other* than orange must be *qualitatively* different from orange, then it follows that "intermediate between yellow and red" is internal to "orange." That is to say, the absence of the relational property "intermediate between yellow and red," entails the property "different in quality from orange."

There is then, I think, a difficulty in being sure that *any* relational properties are internal in this first sense. But, if what we want to do is to show that some are *not*, and that

therefore the dogma that all relations are internal is false, I think the most conclusive reason for saying this is that if *all* were internal in this first sense, all would necessarily be internal in the second, and that this is plainly false. I think, in fact, the most important consequence of the dogma that all relations are internal, is that it follows from it that all relational properties are internal in this second sense. I propose, therefore, at once to consider this proposition, with a view to bringing out quite clearly what it means and involves, and what are the main reasons for saying that it is false.

The proposition in question is that, if ϕ be a relational property and A a term to which it does in fact belong, then, no matter what ϕ and A may be, it may always be truly asserted of them, that any term which had *not* possessed ϕ would necessarily have been other than—numerically different from—A : or, in other words, that A would necessarily, in all conceivable circumstances, have possessed ϕ . And with this sense of “internal,” as distinguished from that which says *qualitatively different*, it is quite easy to point out some relational properties which certainly are internal in this sense. Let us take as an example the relational property which we assert to belong to a visual sense-datum, when we say of it that it has another visual sense-datum as a spatial part: the assertion, for instance, with regard to a coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow : “This whole patch contains this patch” (where “this patch” is a proper name for the red half). It is here, I think, quite plain that, in a perfectly clear and intelligible sense, we can say that any whole, which had not contained that red patch, could not have been identical with the whole in question: that from the proposition with regard to any term whatever that it does not contain *that* particular patch it *follows* that that term is *other* than the whole in question—though *not* necessarily that it is qualitatively different from it. *That* particular whole could not have existed without having that particular patch for a part. But it seems no less clear, at first sight, that there are many

other relational properties of which this is not true. In order to get an example, we have only to consider the relation which the red patch has to the whole patch, instead of considering as before that which the whole has to it. It seems quite clear that, though the whole could not have existed without having the red patch for a part, the red patch might perfectly well have existed without being part of that particular whole. In other words, though every relational property of the form "having *this* for a spatial part" is "internal" in our sense, it seems equally clear that every property of the form "is a spatial part of this whole" is *not* internal, but purely external. Yet this last, according to me, is one of the things which the dogma of internal relations denies. It implies that it is just as necessary that anything, which is in fact a part of a particular whole, should be a part of that whole, as that any whole, which has a particular thing for a part, should have that thing for a part. It implies, in fact, quite generally, that any term which does in fact have a particular relational property, could not have existed without having that property. And in saying this it obviously flies in the face of common sense. It seems quite obvious that in the case of many relational properties which things have, the fact that they have them is *a mere matter of fact*: that the things in question *might* have existed without having them. That this, which seems obvious, is true, seems to me to be the most important thing that can be meant by saying that some relations are purely external. And the difficulty is to see how any philosopher could have supposed that it was not true: that, for instance, the relation of part to whole is no more external than that of whole to part. I will give at once one main reason which seems to me to have led to the view, that *all* relational properties are internal in this sense.

What I am maintaining is the common-sense view, which seems obviously true, that it may be true that A has in fact got ϕ , and yet also true that A might have existed without having ϕ . And I say that this is equivalent to saying that it

may be true that A has ϕ , and yet *not* true that from the proposition that a thing has *not* got ϕ it *follows* that that thing is *other* than A—numerically different from it. And one reason why this is disputed is, I think, simply because it is in fact true that if A has ϕ , and x has *not*, it *does* follow that x is other than A. These two propositions, the one which I admit to be true (1) that if A has ϕ , and x has not, it *does* follow that x is other than A, and the one which I maintain to be false (2) that if A has ϕ , then from the proposition with regard to any term x that it has not got ϕ , it *follows* that x is other than A, are, I think, easily confused with one another. And it is in fact the case that if they are not different, or if (2) follows from (1), then no relational properties are external. For (1) is certainly true, and (2) is certainly equivalent to asserting that none are. It is therefore absolutely essential, if we are to maintain external relations, to maintain that (2) does *not* follow from (1). These two propositions (1) and (2), with regard to which I maintain that (1) is true, and (2) is false, can be put in another way, as follows: (1) asserts that if A has ϕ , then any term which has not; *must* be other than A. (2) asserts that if A has ϕ , then any term which had not, *would necessarily* be other than A. And when they are put in this form, it is, I think, easy to see why they should be confused: you have only to confuse “must” or “is necessarily” with “would necessarily be.” And their connexion with the question of external relations can be brought out as follows: To maintain external relations you have to maintain such things as that, though Edward VII was in fact father of George V, he *might* have existed without being father of George V. But to maintain this you have to maintain that it is *not* true that a person who was *not* father of George would necessarily have been other than Edward. Yet it is, in fact, the case, that any person who was not father of George *must* have been other than Edward. Unless, therefore, you can maintain that from this true proposition it does *not* follow that any person who was *not* father of George *would*

necessarily have been other than Edward, you will have to give up the view that Edward might have existed without being father of George.

By far the most important point in connexion with the dogma of internal relations seems to me to be simply to see clearly the difference between these two propositions (1) and (2), and that (2) does *not* follow from (1). If this is not understood, nothing in connexion with the dogma can, I think, be understood. And perhaps the difference may seem so clear, that no more need be said about it. But I cannot help thinking it is not clear to everybody, and that it does involve the rejection of certain views, which are sometimes held as to the meaning of "follows." So I will try to put the point again in a perfectly strict form.

Let ϕ be a relational property, and A a term to which it does in fact belong. I propose to define what is meant by saying that ϕ is internal to A (in the sense we are now concerned with) as meaning that from the proposition that a thing has not got ϕ , it "follows" that it is *other* than A.

That is to say, this proposition asserts that between the two properties "not having ϕ " and "other than A," there holds that relation which holds between the property "being a right angle" and the property "being an angle," or between the property "red" and the property "coloured," and which we express by saying that, in the case of any term whatever, from the proposition that that term is a right angle, it follows, or is deducible, that it is an angle. Let us express the relation which we assert to hold between a particular proposition p , and a particular proposition q , when we say that in this sense q "follows from" or "is deducible from" p , by the symbol "ent"; which I have chosen to express it, because it may be used as an abbreviation for "entails," and because " p entails q " is a natural expression for " q follows from p ," *i.e.*, "entails" can naturally be used as the converse of "follows from." (We cannot unambiguously use the phrase " p implies q " as equivalent to " q follows

from p ," though it is in fact often so used, because, especially in consequence of Mr. Russell's writings, "implies" has come to be used as a name for a totally different relation: we might perhaps use " p logically implies q " or " p formally implies q ," though Mr. Russell has also given a different meaning to "formal" implication). " p ent q " will then assert that there holds between p and q that relation which holds, for instance, between the two premisses of a syllogism in *Barbara*, taken as one conjunctive proposition, and the conclusion, equally whether the premisses be true or false; and which does *not* hold, for instance, between the proposition "Socrates was a man" and the proposition "Socrates was a mortal," even though it be in fact true that all men are mortal. And we can express the assertion that ϕ is "internal to" A , using (I hope correctly) the symbols of *Principia Mathematica*, in addition to our new symbol "ent" by saying that what it asserts is:

$$(x): \neg \phi x . \text{ent. } x \neq A;$$

or, in other words: "for all values of x , the proposition that you get by asserting of a particular value of x , say B , that B has *not* got ϕ , entails the proposition that B is other than A ." The assertion with regard to a particular term A and a particular relational property ϕ , which A actually has, that ϕ is internal to A means then: $(x): \neg \phi x . \text{ent. } x \neq A$. And this is, of course, logically equivalent to: $(x): x = A . \text{ent. } \phi x$; which is, in its turn, equivalent to "anything which were identical with A , would, in any conceivable universe, necessarily have ϕ " or to " A could not have existed in any possible world without having ϕ "; just as the proposition "In any possible world a right angle must be an angle," is, I take it, just equivalent to $(x): x \text{ is a right angle. ent. } x \text{ is an angle.}$

Having thus got what is meant by asserting of a particular term A and a particular relational property ϕ , which A in fact possesses, that ϕ is "internal to" A , we can then express what I am calling the dogma of internal relations, or the dogma that *all* relational properties are internal to the terms which

have them, by saying that what it asserts is: that, for all those values of ϕ which are relational properties, the proposition " $(x, y) : \phi x :) : \sim \phi y . \text{ent. } y \neq x$ " is true: or (to give the equivalent form) the proposition

$$"(x, y) : \phi x :) : y = x . \text{ent. } \phi y."$$

This assertion that, for all those values of ϕ which are relational properties, this proposition is true is what I called proposition (2) above, and is what I maintain to be obviously false. What I maintain to be true is that for *some* values of ϕ , which are relational properties, the proposition

$$"(x, y) : \phi x :) : \sim \phi y . \text{ent. } y \neq x"$$

is true, and that for others it is false: and those values of ϕ for which it is true I propose to call "internal relational properties," those for which it is false "external relational properties."

And now let us contrast (2) in this form, with what I called above proposition (1), and which I admit to be true, and which I suggested has led to the assertion of (2) through confusion. What (1) asserts is that, for all values of ϕ , the proposition " $(x, y) : \phi x . \sim \phi y : \text{ent. } x \neq y$ " is true; or (what is logically equivalent to this), the proposition

$$"(x, y) : \phi x : \text{ent. } \sim \phi y .) . y \neq x"$$

is true. In other words, it asserts that, if you take a particular relational property ϕ , and a particular term A which has it, then, whatever ϕ and A may be, the proposition that A has ϕ allows the deduction that, *as a matter of fact*, no term, which is without ϕ , is identical with A. It does not for a moment assert that from the proposition that A has ϕ it follows that no term which did not *could* be identical with A; nor even (which is all that (2) asserts) that in no case is the proposition that a particular term has a particular relational property true, and the proposition, that no term *could* be without that property and yet be identical with the term in question, false. (2) therefore, is neither identical with nor follows from (1). To

say that it does follow from it is to say that from $p . q : \text{ent} : r$ it follows that $p :) : q . \text{ent} . r$; which can be easily seen to be false by taking for p and q the two premisses of a syllogism in *Barbara*, and for r the conclusion. The conjunction, "All men are mortal *and* Socrates is a man" does entail "Socrates is mortal." But it is obviously not the case that there follows from this what " $p :) : q . \text{ent} . r$ " asserts; namely, that it is *not* the case that "All men are mortal" is true and the proposition "Socrates is a mortal" *follows* from "Socrates is a man," false. The proposition that "Socrates is a mortal" *follows* from "Socrates is a man" *is* false; and yet "All men are mortal" may quite well be true. Or, to take the alternative form of (1). To say that (2) follows from (1) is to say that from $p : \text{ent} : q .) . r$ there follows the proposition: $p :) : q . \text{ent} . r$. But this again can be easily seen to be false in the same way. The proposition "All men are mortal" does entail that "Socrates is a man" *materially implies* (to use Mr. Russell's expression for)) "Socrates is mortal"; that is to say, it entails that it is not the case both that "Socrates is a man" is true, and "Socrates is mortal" false. But it does not in the least follow from this that "All men are mortal" *materially implies* that "Socrates is a mortal" *follows* from "Socrates is a man"; on the contrary, it may, as we have seen, quite well be the case that "All men are mortal" is true, and yet the proposition that "Socrates is a man" entails "Socrates is a mortal" false.

To maintain, therefore, that (2) follows from (1) is mere confusion. And the source of the confusion is, I think, pretty plain: (1) allows you to assert, that, if ϕA is true, then the proposition " $\sim \phi y .) . y \neq A$ " *must* be true. And what the "must" here expresses is merely that this proposition follows from the hypothesis ϕA , not that it is in itself a necessary proposition. But it is supposed, through confusion, that what is asserted is that, on the hypothesis ϕA , " $\sim \phi y .) . y \neq A$ " is *in itself*, a necessary proposition, that is to say, that ϕA materially implies " $\sim \phi y . \text{ent} . y \neq A$ "—a thing which is true, if ϕ is an

internal relational property, and false if it is an external one. I have here used the phrase "a proposition which is necessary *in itself*," and have implied a definition of it. The definition may be roughly indicated by saying: " $\phi x .) . \psi x$ is a proposition that is necessary in itself (or apodeictic)," means " $\phi x . \text{ent} . \psi x$." That is to say, I am maintaining that $\phi x) \psi x$ is a necessary truth, if and only if it is *also* true that $\phi x \text{ent} \psi x$. This seems to me to give what has in fact been generally meant in philosophy by "necessary truths," *e.g.*, by Leibniz; and to point out the distinction between them and mere matters of fact. Using this language, what the dogma of internal relations asserts may, I think, be expressed by saying that it asserts that, on the hypothesis that ϕA is true, ϕA is itself a necessary truth; since ϕA is equivalent to $x = A .) . \phi x$, and it asserts that, on the hypothesis $\phi A, x = A . \text{ent} . \phi x$. I, on the contrary, in asserting that some relational properties are external, am asserting that ϕA is often a mere matter of fact even where it is true; that is to say, that though, where it is true, $x = A .) . \phi x$, yet this is often *not* a necessary truth, since it is *not* true that $x = A . \text{ent} . \phi x$.

So much for the distinction between (1) which is true, and (2), or the dogma of internal relations, which I hold to be false. But I said above, in passing, that my contention that (2) does not follow from (1), involves the rejection of certain views that have sometimes been held as to the meaning of "follows"; and I think it is worth while to say something about this.

It is obvious that the possibility of maintaining that (2) does not follow from (1), depends upon its being true that from $(x): \phi x .) . \psi x$ the proposition $(x): \phi x . \text{ent} . \psi x$ does not follow. And this has sometimes been disputed, and is, I think, often not clearly seen.

To begin with, Mr. Russell, in the *Principles of Mathematics* (p. 34), treats the phrase " q can be deduced from p " as if it meant exactly the same thing as " $p) q$ " or " p materially implies q "; and has repeated the same error elsewhere, *e.g.*, in

Philosophical Essays (p. 166), where, he is discussing what he calls the axiom of internal relations. And I am afraid a good many people have been led to suppose that, since Mr. Russell has said this, it must be true. If it were true, then, of course, it would be impossible to distinguish between (1) and (2), and it would follow that, since (1) certainly is true, what I am calling the dogma of internal relations is true too. But I imagine that Mr. Russell himself would now be willing to admit that, so far from being true, the statement that " q can be deduced from p " means the same as " $p \supset q$ " is simply an enormous "howler"; and I do not think I need spend any time in trying to show that it is so.

But it may be held that, though " $p \text{ ent } q$ " does not mean the same as " $p \supset q$," yet nevertheless from $(x) : \phi x \cdot \psi x$, the proposition $(x) : \phi x \cdot \text{ent} \cdot \psi x$ does follow, for a somewhat more subtle reason; and, if this were so, it would again follow that what I am calling the dogma of internal relations must be true. It may be held, namely, that though $\phi A \cdot \text{ent} \cdot \psi A$ does not mean simply $\phi A \cdot \psi A$, yet what it does mean is simply the conjunction " $\phi A \cdot \psi A$," and this proposition is an instance of a true formal implication" (the phrase "formal implication" being understood in Mr. Russell's sense, in which $(x) : \phi x \cdot \psi x$ asserts a formal implication). This view as to what $\phi A \cdot \text{ent} \cdot \psi A$ means has, for instance, if I understand him rightly, been asserted by Mr. O. Strachey in *Mind*, N.S., 93; since he asserts that, in his opinion, this is what Professor C. I. Lewis means by " ϕA strictly implies ψA ," and undoubtedly what Professor Lewis means by this is what I mean by $\phi A \cdot \text{ent} \cdot \psi A$. And the same view has been frequently suggested (though I do not know that he has actually asserted it) by Mr. Russell himself (*e.g.*, *Principia Mathematica*, p. 21). If this view were true, then, though $(x) : \phi x \cdot \text{ent} \cdot \psi x$ would not be identical in meaning with $(x) : \phi x \cdot \psi x$, yet it would follow from it; since, if

$$(x) : \phi x \cdot \psi x$$

were true, then every particular assertion of the form $\phi A \cdot \psi A$.

would not only be true, but would be an instance of a true formal implication (namely $(x) : \phi x . \supset \psi x$); and this, according to the proposed definition, is all that $(x) : \phi x . \text{ent.} \psi x$ asserts. If, therefore, it were true, it would again follow that all relational properties must be internal. But that this view also is untrue appears to me perfectly obvious. The proposition that I am in this room does materially imply that I am more than five years old, since both are true; and the assertion that it does is also an instance of a true formal implication, since it is in fact true that all the persons in this room are more than five years old; but nothing appears to me more obvious than that the second of these two propositions can *not* be deduced from the first—that the kind of relation which holds between the premisses, and conclusion of a syllogism in *Barbara* does *not* hold between them. To put it in another way: it seems to me quite obvious that the properties “being a person in this room” and “being more than five years old” are not related in the kind of way in which “being a right angle” is related to “being an angle,” and which we express by saying that, in the case of every term, the proposition that that term is an angle can be deduced from the proposition that it is a right angle.

These are the only two suggestions as to the meaning of “ p ent q ” known to me, which, if true, would yield the result that (2) does follow from (1), and that therefore all relational properties are internal; and both of these, it seems to me, are obviously false. All other suggested meanings, so far as I know would leave it true that (2) does not follow from (1), and therefore that I may possibly be right in maintaining that some relational properties are external. It might, for instance, be suggested that the last proposed definition should be amended as follows: that we should say: “ p ent q ” means “ $p \supset q$,” and this proposition is an instance of a formal implication, which is not merely true but *self-evident*, like the laws of Formal Logic.” This proposed definition would avoid the paradoxes involved in Mr. Strachey’s definition, since such true formal implications as

"all the persons in this room are more than five years old" are certainly not self-evident; and, so far as I can see, it may state something which is in fact true of p and q , whenever and only when p ent q . I do not myself think that it gives the *meaning* of " p ent q ," since the kind of relation which I see to hold between the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism seems to me to be one which is purely "objective" in the sense that no psychological term, such as is involved in the meaning of "self-evident," is involved in its definition (if it has one). I am not, however, concerned to dispute that some such definition of " p ent q " as this may be true. Since it is evident that, even if it were, my proposition that $(x): \phi x \text{ ent } \psi x$ does *not* follow from $(x): \phi x \text{ . } \psi x$, would still be true; and hence also my contention that (2) does not follow from (1).

So much by way of arguing that we are not bound to hold that all relational properties are internal in the particular sense, with which we are now concerned, in which to say that they are means that in every case in which a thing A has a relational property, it follows from the proposition that a term has *not* got that property that the term in question is *other* than A . But I have gone further and asserted that some relational properties certainly are *not* internal. And in defence of this proposition I do not know that I have anything to say but that it seems to me evident in many cases that a term which *has* a certain relational property *might* quite well not have had it: that, for instance, from the mere proposition that this is this, it by no means follows that this has to other things all the relations which it in fact has. Everybody, of course, must admit that if all the propositions which assert of it that it has these properties, do in fact follow from the proposition that this is this, we cannot see that they do. And so far as I can see, there is no reason of any kind for asserting that they do, except the confusion which I have exposed. But it seems to me further that we can see in many cases that the proposition that this has that relation does *not* follow from the fact that it

is this: that, for instance, the proposition that Edward VII was father of George V is a *mere* matter of fact.

I want now to return for a moment to that other meaning of "internal," in which to say that ϕ is internal to A means not merely that anything which had not ϕ would necessarily be *other* than A, but that it would necessarily be *qualitatively* different. I said that this was the meaning of "internal" in which the dogma of internal relations holds that all relational properties are "internal"; and that one of the most important consequences which followed from it, was that all relational properties are "internal" in the less extreme sense that we have just been considering. But, if I am not mistaken, there is another important consequence which also follows from it, namely, the Identity of Indiscernibles. For if it be true in the case of every relational property that any term which had not that property would necessarily be qualitatively different from any which had, it follows of course that, in the case of any two terms one of which has a relational property which the other has not, the two are qualitatively different. But, from the proposition that x is other than y , it *does* follow that x has some relational property which y has not; and hence, if the dogma of internal relations be true, it will follow that if x is other than y , x is always also qualitatively different from y , which is the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This is, of course, a further objection to the dogma of internal relations, since I think it is obvious that the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is not true. Indeed, so far as I can see, the dogma of internal relations essentially consists in the joint assertion of two indefensible propositions: (1) the proposition that, in the case of no relational property, is it true of any term which has got that property that it *might* not have had it and (2) the Identity of Indiscernibles.

I want, finally, to say something about the phrase which Mr. Russell uses in the *Philosophical Essays* to express the dogma of internal relations. He says it may be expressed in

the form "Every relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms" (p. 160). And it can be easily seen, if the account which I have given be true, in what precise sense it does hold this. Mr. Russell is uncertain as to whether by the nature of a term is to be understood the term itself or something else. For my part it seems to me that by a term's nature is meant, not the term itself, but what may roughly be called all its qualities as distinguished from its relational properties. But whichever meaning we take, it will follow from what I have said, that the dogma of internal relations does imply that every relational property which a term has is, in a perfectly precise sense *grounded* in its nature. It will follow that every such property is *grounded* in *the term*, in the sense that, in the case of every such property, it *follows* from the mere proposition that that term is that term that it has the property in question. And it will also follow that any such property is grounded in the qualities which the term has, in the sense, that if you take *all* the qualities which the term has, it will again follow in the case of each relational property, from the proposition that the term has *all* those qualities, that it has the relational property in question; since this is implied by the proposition that in the case of any such property, any term which had not had it would necessarily have been different in quality from the term in question. In both of these two senses, then, the dogma of internal relations does, I think, imply that every relational property is grounded in the nature of every term which possesses it: and in this sense that proposition is false. Yet it is worth noting, I think, that there is another sense of "grounded" in which it may quite well be true that every relational property *is* grounded in the nature of any term which possesses it. Namely that, in the case of every such property, the term in question has some quality *without* which it could not have had the property. In other words that the relational property *entails* some quality in the term, though no quality in the term *entails* the relational property.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower Street, London,
on January 19th, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

IV.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

By J. A. SMITH.

THE minds of English students of contemporary philosophy have been for some time turning with at least curiosity towards Italy. At first what have proved to be minor luminaries caught their wandering eyes. But gradually their gaze has tended to fix itself upon Benedetto Croce, in whose works there has been revealed to them a carefully constructed system of philosophic thought, based upon deep and solid erudition, designed and carried out upon an encyclopædic scale. For some time this system has drawn all eyes, towering impressively above the jerry-built syntheses of outworn positivism. With varied emotions we have come to realize that the great Idealistic movement, which took its rise with Kant in Germany, has not spent its force; that in Croce it possesses a champion not ashamed of its cause, but convinced that with it there came into the world a principle living and indeed immortal as the mind of man. Proclaiming not only Hegel but before him Kant as his spiritual ancestors, and acknowledging his unrepayable debt to their inspiration, he boldly throws aside as antiquated much that has descended from them; and, disengaging the essence from the accidental and contingent details, reconstructs almost from the foundations a system, in which he is confident that the mind of the XXth century with its vastly increased store of scientific and historical experience can still find its home. Nor is he content merely to have erected this impressive palace of many mansions, and to have thrown open its doors to all men of goodwill. With tireless energy he advocates the central principle of its construction, defining and redefining his philosophic position, developing and modi-

fy its form so as to meet the needs which further meditation discloses to him, turning now this now that side of his thought in response to external criticism or attack. The central principle stands clear to view, unmistakable, self-confident, militant; in the heady currents of the fight the standard of Idealism holds steadfast, and for all the dextrous strategy and tactics of the commander in the warfare the main cause is never compromised. Round him Croce has gathered a band of trained and loyal lieutenants, who feel themselves so far at one with him as to join with him in effective co-operation. But we should be mistaken if we regarded all these as mere disciples or ready *jurare in verba magistri*. Some of them at least are themselves also masters, or in the way to become so, and exercising, what he would not only not grudge but welcome, a large independence of judgment, are indeed not so much any longer disciples as colleagues and fellow-workers. Indeed, I may have already exaggerated his predominance among them, and wrongly suggested a planetary subordination of them to him as the light-giving sun of the system which they together form.

In less figurative language, he and they are fellow-heirs of an inheritance which has descended to them from a common ancestry. The line of spiritual descent of which they are the present representatives runs back, as I have said, to Hegel, and behind him to Kant. It passed to them through such fellow-countrymen of theirs as Spaventa, De Sanctis, Jaja, etc. But no more than in the case of our own so-called Neo-Hegelians or Neo-Kantians have we to do with the mere transplantation of a philosophical idea or system of ideas to a foreign soil. Native influences such as that of Vico have gone to the reshaping of it, and the undying spirit has undergone a genuine rebirth, moulding for itself a new body as the vehicle and instrument of its life. The new idealistic system,—or shall we say systems?—which encounter our eyes in modern Italy are adjusted and adapted to their special environment, and

are, though European or worldwide in their significance, redolent of their date and place of origin, have a national (yet not a provincial or parochial) physiognomy. They claim—and with justice—to be at once, as philosophy should be, in essence and spirit universal, and as philosophy also should be, in form adjusted to their special time and place. And for them I at least would allow the claim to be both for all time and for all minds and yet also in the truest sense of the word “modern,” addressed to the demands and problems which arise from modern life and experience—deserving therefore of a respectful hearing from us.

There is one outstanding characteristic of the whole movement on which I would here lay special stress. The ground upon which the whole structure of their philosophizing rests is of course, as it must be, experience. In that there is not, and cannot be, anything distinctive. But what sort of experience? It is not, as it is elsewhere, specially religious nor specially political nor specially ethical, and perhaps above all it is not specially scientific; to them the need for philosophical reconstruction does not appear as specially created by the success (or the failure) of scientific activity. What begets the desire for philosophy is the experience of *History*. In Croce this is particularly plain, for it was just his inner dissatisfaction with the actual practice, so to speak, of the historian that forced upon him the necessity of the search for a philosophy. Yet it is in a large measure true of all of them. The part success, part failure, of history in achieving a theory of itself drives them outward and inward in the quest for self-understanding. This it is which dictates the form of the problem which reflexion finds most urgent. Hence the problem is at once general or universal and particular or even individual. The task which philosophy accepts as now set to itself is that of understanding History, and *imprimis* its own history. And by History we must mean not merely (or at all) the History which unrolls itself before us, but the

History which we enact, and again not merely (or at all) the History which we enact (*historia historizata*), but that which we more potently create in thought or judgment, in ceaseless commentation upon the bare and vanishing facts (*historia historizans*), a commentary which encroaches from the margin upon the text until the gloss extrudes and displaces the evanescent original. In fact, there is no such original: the text itself is the product of mind's self-interpretative activity and fills the whole roll on which is recorded the content of such experience as alone we can have or at least have access to. All else follows the paths of dreams and is lost as soon as it is acquired. Nought remains or holds in being for the tiniest moment save what the mind distils out of what is done or suffered under the sun—out of what we have in the widest sense of the word "experienced." And lastly prerogative reality and worth attaches to what the mind by reflexion further distils out of this precious essence, and in the record of the results of man's philosophizing is the quintessence of all our experience. Out of the history of philosophy arises the need for further philosophizing, and so the life of the mind continues without end as it was without beginning. This is the universal position of mind, which creates at once its object and itself. In this view of its nature and its function lies also the supreme modernity of the philosophy of which we are speaking. For at the present time, surely what we most desire and demand is that the mind should frame and hold some theory of its activity as the interpreter of its own history, and primarily of the manner and justification of its procedure in passing judgments of fact or value upon its past achievements. Might we not define for ourselves the present-day problem of philosophy as the determination, organization, systematization of "the critical presuppositions of history"?

However that may be the group of thinkers among whom Gentile occupies a leading place so understand the problem. Like Croce he takes it as in form determined by the

essentially historical character of all experience and approaches it with a mind prepared for its self-imposed task by an acquaintance deep and wide with the past of the human mind, with that past which still lives in him and in us. And he has spared no pains to lay deep and broad the foundations of his philosophy, sharing Croce's contempt for the shallow and second-hand learning of contemporary positivism. However high their Idealism may soar it springs from and returns to what Bacon calls "the right earth" of historical experience.

So much by way of general introduction to an appreciation of the general character of this movement, always appealing to experience (rightly interpreted) and yet rising, as we shall see, to such heights of idealistic speculation, joining as it were the empyrean to the lowliest and most familiar levels of earth. It is with this endeavour to link together universal and individual philosophy and life that we shall here concern ourselves. I beg leave therefore to omit any attempt even to sketch the external facts of Gentile's life, upon which I am indeed very ill-informed. Indeed I know little more than what I gather from his works, as (probably) that he is by birth and early education a Sicilian, that he studied also at Pisa (at the Scuola Normale Superiore) and that he has been Professor of Philosophy successively at Palermo, Pisa, and Rome, where he now is. Between his student days and his appointment to a Professorial Chair at Palermo, he was, so at least I should divine, a secondary schoolmaster, and, so I should also surmise, singularly successful and happy in his scholastic work. He commenced authorship about 1898, and has since then poured forth a nearly continuous annual stream of books, pamphlets and articles. To the journal *La Critica* he has contributed nearly as much as Croce himself. From time to time he has formulated the results of his systematic thinking, at first briefly and then more at length. The fullest of these statements is in the two volumes entitled, *Sommario di Pedagogia* (1913 and 1914), and in the course of lectures entitled, *Teoria generale dello Spirito come Atto puro* (1916). I

have prepared for myself a rough bibliography of his writings, and have attempted, through such as I have been able to see, to trace the development of his mind. The rapidity and variety of his production has not made my task easy, and I am conscious that I have not always succeeded.

During the period of his development up to the first statement of his systematic position his mind was travelling along several distinct lines which gradually converged. In the first place, he was, as I have said, deepening and enriching his experience as a teacher, and meditating upon the practical and theoretic problems suggested by that experience. He took a large and active part in the public controversies which raged in Italy round the topic of education, especially of secondary education and the training of teachers for it, labouring always to raise the discussion to the philosophic plane, and contending for the necessarily philosophical character of the science of education. He protested against the purblind practicalism which ignores the necessity of clearheadedness about principles and dreams of carrying on without a conception of the nature and development of Mind, and also against the laicism which ignores the essentially religious character of *all* education. In the second place, he was enlarging his view of the history of philosophy. Besides writing a General History of Philosophy, which I have not seen, he contributed to *La Critica* (1903-1913) an elaborate critical review of the chief Italian writers on philosophy from 1850 to the beginning of the present century. Concurrently with this he edited with valuable introductions and notes a large number of the unpublished lectures and rarer treatises of some of his predecessors. In both ways he broadened and strengthened the foundations on which later to erect the fabric of his independent thought.

The result of Gentile's preoccupation with the tasks and problems of the teacher's life has been in the main the conception of the life of mind as essentially a process of education, of self-education, that is, of self-formation or self-creation. Its

life is the life in or of a school, wherein through the conflict and co-operation of minds, in appearance divided but in reality one, ceaseless progress is secured. In such activity lies all the worth, the joy, the sacredness of life, and it is of this that he seeks the philosophy, which is no extraneous addition to the activity which it interprets, but the continuance of that activity itself at a higher level of understanding and power. The universe is itself an immense school, the place as Keats has said, of "Soul-making," where Minds (for he would not accept Keats' distinction of Souls from Intelligences) are moulded into integrity and perfection. The figure lends itself to easy caricature, and will appeal diversely to those whose school experiences are diverse, and to tell the truth, it is in the *Pedagogia* ridden almost to death. But it is used by Gentile with a large measure of enlightening and attractive power, and I commend it to the notice of those who, like so many of us, approach philosophy from the avenue of a professional interest as teachers.

Yet after all the figure and the experience which suggested it determine rather the form than the substance of Gentile's thought and constitute rather its outward physiognomy, much as Croce's thought is in expression determined by his long pre-occupation with the work of erudite history.

Ignoring minor but important influences, I must return to the results of his concern with the History of Philosophy. This interest connects with the former through his identification of Philosophy with the Theory of Education, from which it differs as it were in scale only. The History of Philosophy is just the record of Mind's self-creation. In the study of it we become acquainted with, appropriate, and digest into the substance of our own minds, what Mind has in the past achieved and accumulated. Reviewing the more recently deposited strata and the process of their deposition, Gentile is conducted outwards from Italy and backwards from the present, and of the total process reaches a view wide at once in space

and time, until the prospect has no bounds in either. The Pedagogics enlarges into a Metaphysics—a general theory of Spirit or Mind in its actual life and existence. In this expansion the trees are not lost in the wood, but the details of the vision are preserved to sight while they fall into the order and perspective of a systematic philosophy. The resultant impression may be put in a highly abstract way, which fails to do justice to the concreteness which it really possesses. In the first place, the History of Philosophy is intrinsically identical with History in general, of which, as I have said, it is the quintessence or living spirit. In the second place, the History of Philosophy is intrinsically identical with Philosophy itself. These identities depend upon, or issue from, the still more fundamental identity of Mind or Spirit with itself, of its being with its history, for it *is* what it makes itself, *is* the process of its own self-creation.

This is the cardinal principle of Gentile's philosophy, that Mind *is*, as he puts it, *atto puro*, absolute self-actualization—that and nothing more, less, or other. This is the open secret of its nature and its life, from which all the rest follows. To this as centre all roads of thought converge and out of it all diverge again to reach every quarter of experience. In this Thought, which is not thought merely but knowledge, self-knowledge, all facts of experience are dissolved, to be reborn as themselves thought or knowledge. This all-dissolving but also all-creating or re-creating Thought is thought *a priori* and absolute, is the act or reality of thought at its highest. As it predetermines and prescribes the immanent method of its own development, it begets and maintains an endless philosophy, which may be called by various names, the Idealism of Actuality or Absolute Spiritualism. Nothing is real, such is its fundamental position, save Spirit, and Spirit is naught but the process, without beginning and without end, of its own absolute self-creation.

Now we have heard this often enough, and it may be said to

be the end (which is rather the beginning) towards which was inevitably tending the current of thought that bore Hegel, and those who are not ashamed to avow that they have learned from him, onwards, or perhaps—to put the claim more boldly—towards which has been set the whole movement of modern philosophy. And yet it is hard doctrine, and we take it “with such a heavy mind.” We cannot resolve to embrace it, to stake everything upon it, to commit ourselves finally to its control. We are fain to palter and compromise with the absoluteness of its claim upon us, and even those who first descried or discerned it lost faith in it and wandered back to more familiar and homely ground. But Gentile will admit no compromise or condition: this is to him the *articulus stantis aut cadentis philosophiæ*.

What he offers or presses upon us is a principle of exegesis for the whole of our experience, and he offers it as the last and best result of Mind’s reflexion upon the meaning of its whole past history, the process by which it has come to be what it is, by which it is what it is, and by continuance of which alone can it maintain itself in being; by which also there is whatever else there is, or seems to be, as its environment. In this principle Mind has come to itself, and affirms itself as the knower of its own being, which is its own work and life. To it *rien n’est donné, tout se fait*; nothing is but thinking makes it so in the act of its own self-formation.

It may serve to make this end and beginning of reflexion clearer, if it be thrown up against the better-known system of Croce as its background. This way of presenting it must, however, not be understood as implying a judgment on my part that its emergence has put Croce’s view into the background or has in any way superseded it. To suggest such a relation would be to do injustice to Croce, more especially as his development is by no means at an end and it may be that he will prove able to appropriate and overreach all that Gentile urges. Yet, taking Croce’s view as it is set before us in his systematic presentment of it, what strikes the student of it is

the prominence which is given in it to the articulation of the mind into the distinct grades of Theory and Practice, each with its two sub-grades. Doubtless behind this lies or lurks the unity of the mind which preserves its identity in and through these distinctions. But the unity seems to be separated from the articulation or genuine multiplicity, and is rather a problem than a solution. The articulation is not deduced, but given or assumed. What we start with is one, but it possesses also as its nature what may be called a statical structure; it does not give itself this structure or necessarily endow itself with it. And indeed it remains obscure how or why it distinctifies and diversifies its primordial unity, and so its essence and its existence fall inexplicably apart. The gap which sunders the one from the other is concealed. In justice to Croce, it must be added, that in his actual philosophizing the breach is healed, and that he practices better than he preaches. His grasp upon the primordial unity prevents the distinctions which he draws from stiffening into a dead rigidity, and the concrete manifestations of the life of the Mind, into whatever detail his interest follows them, never finally fall apart, or lose their vital connexion with one another and the whole. The unity is no *roi fainéant*. Yet it is not demonstratively or irrefragably the single and sufficient source of all its complex but orderly multiplicity.

To Gentile it is so. In him perhaps the unity is even too much insisted upon, and upon it is thrown the responsibility of edueing out of itself all the multiplicity that there is. The dialectical process which is its life is completely or absolutely immanent, and, as I have said, is always and everywhere without beginning and without end. The one spirit or mind posits and cancels or supersedes all oppositions and distinctions, and is the author of all forms, degrees, grades, stages of being: it makes and unmakes everything whatsoever including itself, like Time begetting and devouring its own offspring. But it would be misleading to dwell too long upon the contrast

between the two thinkers, lest there seem to be suggested more difference than there is.

It is more important to raise the question whether the principle which is so posited can do what is expected of it. Can it show itself capable of generating out of itself and by its own unaided power, such a system as the Universe is? Or rather must it do so? Does the starting point prescribe a dialectic which by an inner necessity develops into the whole wealth of concrete detail which is the filling of experience?

At first sight the principle seems empty and barren enough. But let us attempt to realize what precisely it is. What it is is Mind in its proper being and existence, that is, Self-consciousness, not as a state or result but as a self-engendering activity. This is to us a paradox, for it is all too common to start with the misconception of it as an attitude towards something else which determines and is determined by it, being presupposed by Mind as theorizing and presupposing Mind as its fashioner or refashioner, not as its creator. Mind starts, so we say to ourselves, with an object over against it as subject, and its history is the tale of how it comes to know that object and modify it, moulding it to its purposes. Gentile bids us, however, go behind this, and reminds us that being what it is or is to be, viz., self-conscious, it can and must posit itself as object and concurrently itself as subject, while still it remains one with itself. The subject, the object, the synthesis of both, are moments in its being and life, moments in and to it eternally distinguishable and distinct, yet also phases or stages in its historical existence. Hence it may be spoken of as separating these from one another, and allowing them the fullest scope to become what they are. Into each in turn it throws itself wholly, so that each constitutes an absolute form of its experience; in each, however widely they are drawn asunder and however they put out of sight the bonds that unite them, it remains indefectibly what it is, consciousness, self-consciousness, in the making. As consciousness of the

subject, it is Art ; as consciousness of the object it is Religion ; as consciousness of the synthesis of both it is Philosophy. Art as the endeavour to develop to the full the moment of consciousness of the subject as such, to be itself the whole being and existence of the mind, defeats itself, issues in empty and impotent subjectivity, and is driven by its intestine self-contradiction to pass into Religion : Religion taking up the task of self-integration finds its work endless if it denies itself the aid of Art, yet with that aid still fails unless it merges together with Art in Philosophy, in whose hands is the knowledge, the principle and method, and the result of the integration of both. "So that Philosophy is the final form in which the others are taken up and reconciled, and represents the Truth, the plenary actuality and the Spirit," which is the one and only Reality.

Thus we reach, or rather restore and confirm, the principle that Philosophy, the supreme form of self-consciousness, is the consummate form of experience, and because experience is all that is or is real, Philosophy is also the whole and sole Reality. Nought is or comes to be save what Mind has created or is creating *philosophando*, that is, in the process of making itself the knower of itself.

To some this doctrine may appear as the mere extravagance of a subjective Idealism, conceiving all Reality after the pattern of its own inward nature and activity, which it, as it were, projects outwards upon all other (so-called objective) being. Like the earlier draft of the system it is open even to caricature, and may be represented as a philosophy which bids us regard the Universe under the figure of a University in which all the faculties are branches of philosophy with only a relative independence of their parent and sovereign—Philosophy itself. But, after all, how shall Mind conceive its world save after the pattern of itself, and how best save after the pattern of its own highest and happiest activity ? Certainly we are bidden to read all our experience in the

light of that experience which is most truly experience, because it is superlatively self-clear. And where else shall we find this guiding and illuminating or interpretative experience except in that where mind enjoys the maximum of insight into its own glassy essence and self-transparent life? Towards this clue to the enigma of existence from this quarter and that, the currents of modern speculation have long been converging: let us take heart of grace and assume this as the clue, bending our energies to its use in the constructive work of our philosophizing. Here we stand on firm ground; here we have reached a *ποῦ στῶ*, from which we can view all that is or can be, here and nowhere else.

We seek for Truth (or the Truth), and looking ever outwards we seek it in vain. *Veritas habitat in interiore hominis*; seeking it there, we find it, and finding it, go forth with renewed confidence to seek and find it elsewhere, projected outwards from the inner source of illumination. Yet all we find in the apparently outward returns and enriches the inward content from which it flows, and so the inward truth advances in clearness and power without hindrance or stay. The nuclear or germinal experience is surrounded by a penumbra which shades illimitably into the utter darkness where there is nothing, but it irradiates its surroundings with beams which light it up and returning to their origin feed and quicken the central flame. Thus, what seems opaque to its light has yet its office in the whole economy, breaking the white light into infinite variegations of colour, which, reflected to the centre, stir it to a heightened activity of emission till the whole world is bathed in its effulgence. Such is the activity in which all that is, lives, and moves and has its being.

But, again, it may be asked how, even if this principle stand self-assured, shall we apply it? The answer, I repeat, is that, once accepted, it applies itself, prescribing by its nature the mode and method of its application, and we have but to submit ourselves to its direction and control. For the development

of its consequences, I can but refer you to Gentile's own exposition in his essay called "The Method of Immanence" (in the volume entitled *La riforma della dialettica hegeliana*), where he distinguishes it over against "The Method of Transcendence," tracing the history of the latter from its origin in Plato, noting the dawn of the former in Christian thought, and its struggles to supplant its rival or competitor in modern philosophy (its false dawn in Spinoza, the apprehension of its principle by Kant, the efforts of Hegel to disengage it from its involution with tramelling elements of the other). To-day and for us, he contends, it is disengaged and has achieved complete freedom. We are free of it, but we must use our freedom in order to possess it. In this new-won freedom, of which the method is the self-imposed law, we find not a new organon of knowledge, but a beginning and a desire for further knowledge. What it offers us is not a result, but a program of continued work.

All this is to some of us—not, I hope, to all—so strange and even paradoxical that a last endeavour may be here permitted to bring home its significance. We are all at one in the quest for some clue to the riddle of existence: we all seek the principle of a metaphysics, a principle which of itself will expand into the detail of a systematic account of ourselves and our world, bringing both at once and together into knowledge. And so far also we may be said to be agreed that the clue is to be found in experience or nowhere. Experience alone has a full title to be called real, everything else having a claim only in so far as it is an element or factor or moment in experience, or is a feature or presupposition of it, etc., etc. And the experience which has this title must be (a) present or actual, the past and the future only holding whatever measure of reality they possess in dependence upon the present; and (b) total or universal, each part or parcel of it being similarly dependent upon its complete or self-contained reality. Experiences owe whatever reality (and worth) they have to

their participation on the one and single Experience. Abating somewhat of the rigour of this doctrine (and abate it we must in order to appropriate it) we may say that Reality (which is Experience) is compact of experiences, which, however distinguished or severed, remain each an experience and repeat, each in its manner and degree, the structure of Experience. Each experience is experience, because and in so far as in its microcosm it mirrors the whole macrocosm of Experience, and is higher or lower in the measure in which it effectively does so. Now let us ask ourselves what we mean by saying of this or that parcel of Reality that it is "an experience"; what it is that makes it an experience. It is not merely that in it something stands face to face with something else (which it apprehends or appreciates or appraises), or again that something moulds something else to its heart's desire, or is mixed with it in alternate action and reaction, no nor that somehow they are twisted together like strands in a rope. Is it not rather our meaning that in such a fragment of the Universe there is somewhat that is self-begetting and self-begotten, a portion of that life which creates at once itself and its environment, no mere *élan vital* which adjusts itself to surroundings which dictate its form, but a free self-determining activity, the author at once of its world and itself? And where can we find a higher or better sample, so to speak, of what experience so regarded means, than in those supreme moments of spiritual life when Mind generates the problems in the solution of which it celebrates the high triumphs of its power and its worth? In such experiences—for in such we are privileged to partake—do we not find the archetype of all experiences, the open secret of their being and existence, their standard of their value? In them at last we know; know ourselves and our world not as for ever sundered and apart, but as rooted and grounded in an Experience which is ours but not ours alone.

Still it will perhaps be replied, such Experience is not and cannot be ours; each of us is confined to his own experience,

which is still *an* experience and not *the* Experience, at best and irremediably a part, and so mutilated, disordered, and distorted, no true mirror of the absolute Experience, or at least such that it is unserviceable to us as the clue for which we seek. To this final doubt I would rejoin that for myself I am persuaded that it is not so, and that by this doubt my assurance is in no way shaken. But I will only say, and that not in despondency or despair, that I know no better or more solid foundation upon which Thought can rear its structures, and that upon it rest most securely the pillars of the spiritual home which we build for ourselves. When in unguarded moments this final doubt assails us, let us remember that, while we at times say and must say "you and I," "you not I, I not you," we can also in unison say "we," each speaking for one and all like that celestial eagle which Dante saw in Paradise:

"For speak I saw and likewise heard, the beak
And utter with its voice, both I and My,
When in conception it was We and Our."

So speaking and so conceiving, we shall recover our assurance that we are not so severed from one another and the whole as our words imply, and that our experiences for all their multiplicity and differences are, though experiences, truly also Experience, the genuine and necessary forms which the one whole and single Experience creates in order to exist and be.

With these words I refer you to the works of the great leader of thought which have suggested them.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1,
on February 16th, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

V.—OF IMPULSE, EMOTION, AND INSTINCT.

By ALEXANDER F. SHAND.

1. THE ANALYSIS OF IMPULSE.

WE shall follow the ordinary meaning of the term "impulse," and not use it as a substitute of the term "conation." It is a common term, and connotes as clearly as the term "emotion" a concrete fact of our conscious experience and no abstraction from such fact, such as is conation.

If conation is the most conspicuous factor in impulse, impulse contains also affective and cognitive factors.* Impulses feel pleasant or unpleasant (1) according as they are furthered or obstructed, and (2) when we anticipate that the actions to which they lead will be pleasant or unpleasant, and (3) according to our bodily state.

Impulses are felt with certain sensations localized in the part of the body that we are about to exercise, but we can distinguish the impulse as a unique mental fact from these sensations. The affective tone of the sensations spreads to and affects the impulse.

There is also a cognitive element in impulse which carries the mind away from the present into the future. In the impulses that accompany the action of instincts this cognitive element may be extremely vague, and is supposed not to include the end aimed at, but it is still looking forward with an expectant or questioning attitude into the future. This questioning attitude seems to be the germ of curiosity.

* This was clearly stated in the *Foundations of Character*, on p. 459, but Dr. Drever, who apparently did not read it, and supposes me to analyse instinct into impulse and sensation, objects that "If there is not an affective element involved in all instinctive activity" he cannot see how the primary emotions could have developed. (*Instinct in Man*, p. 159.)

If impulses are conative, affective, and cognitive, how do we distinguish them from emotions, which we have also found to contain conative, affective, and cognitive elements?

2. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IMPULSE AND EMOTION.

(1) An emotion is more comprehensive than an impulse since it contains an impulse. (2) If impulse were some kind of emotion it ought to have a name, since all of our emotions have names, except their unstable combinations, which impulse could not be. No one of the species of emotions that have names can be identified with impulse. (3) Emotions are usually very different from one another; impulses feel very much the same. (4) There are a few impulses which, on account of the marked sensations connected with them, have a greater individuality than others. Under obstruction they become intensely felt and even violent; yet this does not lead to our confusing them with emotions. For over and above the differences between impulse and emotion that we can analyse there seems to be a specific difference that we cannot. This is in accordance with the general character of mental development, which gives rise to unique differentiations between one mental fact and another. (5) An impulse has a result or end, but no object distinct from this, though the end of the impulse is often called its "object." An emotion has both an object and an end. (6) An impulse is directed to a future event. It has a prospective attitude to this event. An emotion has both a contemplative attitude to its object as well as a prospective attitude to the future event which is its end. Impulse, then, is not emotion, however intensely it be felt; but it is a concrete fact of mind like emotion.

3. OF THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF IMPULSE AND EMOTION.

The primary forces of character include the primary impulses and the primary emotions. The primary impulses

are those that accompany and condition the operation of instincts. We here confine ourselves to these impulses and these emotions. If impulses are parts of the systems of instincts, why do we sometimes also need emotion? If impulses are also parts of the systems of emotion, why still do we need emotion? The ends of impulses are different from the ends of emotions, as the ends of emotions are different from the ends of sentiments. (1) The end of the emotion is more general than the end of the instinctive impulse organized with it:—the end of an instinct of concealment is to escape by concealment; the end of fear is to escape. (2) The instinct is limited by its more concrete end, and by the hereditary mode of behaviour for the attainment of this end. The emotion is not so limited. It may have several instincts organized in its system. It will then possess several different hereditary modes of behaviour for the attainment of its end. It also tends to acquire other modes of behaviour with the accumulation of its experience, and chiefly through the instinctive tendencies to experiment and to imitate which belong to its system. (3) The emotion through the instinctive and acquired tendencies organized in its system possesses a variability of behaviour making it adaptable to a great variety of situations. The instinctive impulse possesses an invariable mode of behaviour, in respect of its typical character, because this is common to all members of the same species. The intelligence of an animal serves to apply its instinct to the particular place or situation, but must follow out and cannot alter the specific mode of behaviour of its instinct for the attainment of the end. The same species of spider, however old and experienced, constructs his web after the same hereditary pattern, but adapts it through his intelligence to the bush or place to which it has to be attached. (4) It follows that the system of the primary emotion is a superior type of organization to the system of the instinctive impulse, because it is more adaptable to a greater variety of situations,

and is not, like the instinctive impulse, confined to a single hereditary mode of behaviour.

It is here, and in respect of its function, that we must estimate the superior value of the primary emotion over the instinct with its impulse. For emotion tends to be aroused when an instinct is not working successfully, but is checked or fails, bringing the resources of its plastic system to deal with the situation.* It has, however, defects of its own, and the full measure of its superiority to instinct is only shown when, organized in a sentiment, it obtains the self-control and reflection which it lacks itself; and this development is only fully exemplified in man.

4. WHY WE SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS AMONG THE INSTINCTS.

Neither the primary emotions nor the primary impulses† can be rightly regarded as instincts, but only at most as parts of instincts; because instincts exist in us when they are not active; it is only when they are active that we feel the impulse or emotion connected with them. We must take the instinct as a whole, as a structure of the mind and body, without which neither the impulse nor the emotion would produce the behaviour that we call 'instinctive.' Our question now is whether the systems of the primary emotions can be rightly regarded as instincts. They at least contain instincts. But some instincts are very simple, as 'sucking,' 'clinging,' 'shrinking'; others more complex, as the loco-

* See *The Foundations of Character*, pp. 189, 192. Dr. Drever appears so far to agree with the theory of emotion there outlined as to state that, "Biologically the function of emotion is apparently to reinforce impulse and interest," for (1) surmounting an obstacle, and (2) "where a more or less prolonged course of trying to find the appropriate reaction is necessary." See *Instinct in Man*, p. 161.

† "Now we are proposing to call the conscious impulse 'Instinct,' when and so far as it is not itself determined by previous experience. . . ." (James Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 88).

motory instincts of different animals, and instincts of concealment and flight; others still more complex, as the web-building instincts of spiders and the nest-building instincts of birds. The most complex contain simpler instincts,—as, for instance, the locomotory instincts. Why, then, should we not regard the systems of the primary emotions as complex instincts, seeing that they contain simpler instincts, have instinctive forms of behaviour, and are pre-determined to pursue ends which they cannot at first have foreseen through experience?

(1) We have taken as the chief functional difference between instincts and primary emotions the invariable type of behaviour which the one tend to produce as compared with the variable types of behaviour of the other, which in man become ever more numerous through the acquisition of new means. (2) There is a second important difference between them. The instincts are directed to biological ends; the systems of the primary emotions, while still pursuing biological ends, create other ends through their organization in sentiments. This supremely important fact Dr. McDougall appears to deny. "The instinctive impulses," he writes "determine the ends of all activities, and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends . . ."* With every new sentiment that man acquires he acquires a new fear. Loving himself, he fears the loss of his reputation, of his wealth or power, or the affection of those that love him; all which are ends of sentiments in him lacking in the animals. For these new ends man acquires new means. The end of some instinct often avails him, but not its instinctive means. Through fear man has to conceal many things. He has to conceal his evil thoughts and actions. No instinctive or acquired method for the concealment of material things is here

* *Social Psychology*, Sect. 1, Ch. 11, p. 44.

of service. He invents a new method of silence, deception or lies.

While then the original systems of the primary emotions are hereditary structures like the instincts, this amount of identity between them does not justify us in regarding these systems as instincts; because of their capacity to vary their means and to vary their ends, because they are not confined to the biological ends of instincts, nor, like each instinct, to one invariable type of behaviour. To call both by the same name would tend to obliterate the recognition of the functional difference between them.

5. HOW FAR HUMAN INSTINCTS HAVE THE SPECIFIC AND INVARIABLE CHARACTER OF ANIMAL INSTINCTS.

With regard to human instincts Dr. McDougall says, "the bodily movements in which the instinct finds expression may be modified and complicated to an indefinite extent."* With regard to the excitement of instincts, that they come to be aroused not only by their original objects, "but by ideas of such objects, and by perception and ideas of other objects."† We have, however, only maintained that the behaviour of instincts is substantially invariable, because it has a 'specific' character, and cannot therefore vary from one individual of the same species to another. This Dr. McDougall also appears to maintain: "some sense-impression" . . . he writes, "excites some perfectly definite behaviour" . . . which is the same in all individuals of the same species and on all similar occasions.‡

Now the question is whether purely instinctive behaviour varies: that in man, especially, it comes to be combined with much behaviour that is acquired is generally admitted. The animals, Dr. McDougall writes, "acquire and use hardly any other movement-complexes that are not natively given in their

* *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Ch. 11, pp. 25, 26.

instinctive dispositions.”* In man, it is only “the simpler instincts that ripen soon after birth” which are displayed in purely instinctive movements, such as “the instincts of sucking, of wailing, of crawling, of winking and shrinking from a coming blow.”† But most human instincts become active at relatively late periods when “considerable power of intelligent control and imitation of movements has been acquired.”‡

Under the impulse of hunger the infant cannot, like the young of many animals, find the way to the breast of his mother. He is helpless, and in place of their complicated instinct inherits only the simple instinct of sucking. The mother supplies the requisite movements for the attainment of this end. The instinct of the child is fragmentary and useless without her aid at first. Afterwards he may be able to acquire some of the requisite movements. But the instinct of sucking remains substantially the same, though combined with acquired tendencies that make it self-sufficing. Let us next consider his instincts of fear. There is one simple instinct manifested early, the shrinking or starting back from what arouses fear; also the clinging or clutching instinct, often shown when, in his mother's arms, some sudden noise is heard. Has he also a concealment-instinct? To conceal yourself requires either the power of locomotion, or the power of disposing the body so as to conceal it, which the child does not possess and only slowly acquires. But he appears to inherit the disposition to pursue the end of concealment though without any definite behaviour for its accomplishment. When he can walk, he may adopt some acquired behaviour as to hide behind his mother's skirt. But what is innate in this process—the end of concealment—appears to remain substantially unchanged, though a great variety of means to it, for use in different situations, come to be acquired.

* *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

† *Ibid.*, p. 41.

‡ *Ibid.*

It is much the same with the aggressive instincts of anger. The end of destruction appears to be innately given; the end also of breaking down opposition, and these ends remain substantially unchanged, but not being able to walk or to dispose his body as he pleases, the child can only hit out vaguely or push things away. This hitting out, if too vague to be regarded as an instinct, with experience and practice will become efficient as the child slowly acquires the modes of attack characteristic of man.

To sum up: the child inherits only the capacity for a few very simple forms of instinctive behaviour connected with his appetites and primary emotions; but he inherits all the biological ends of these systems. Most of these instincts are useless fragments until combined with other means, which the mother first supplies and the child slowly acquires. But these fragments, if sufficiently definite to be called instincts, appear to remain substantially invariable through life, together with their ends, though becoming expanded into more complex and efficient systems. The acquired parts of these systems retain the variability which they had from the beginning, though checked by the force of habit.

The primary emotions of man may utilize any of these simple human instincts with their acquired and variable factors, where serviceable to their ends. But the variability of their behaviour is, as we have seen, of a different nature. They are not confined to the end of any one of the instincts, where they employ more than one, as each one of these is confined to its end, but may follow some other, or an end acquired through experience.

6. WHETHER ALL INSTINCTS HAVE PARTICULAR EMOTIONS TO SUPPORT THEM WHEN IN DIFFICULTIES.

Although impulses are always, and emotions only sometimes involved in the operation of instincts, we may still enquire (1) under what conditions these emotions are aroused; (2) what

these emotions are; (3) whether each one of them is peculiar to the operation of a particular instinct. The operation of every instinctive impulse which is sufficiently strong, tends to arouse anger when it is obstructed, joy or satisfaction when its end is attained after difficulties, and sorrow when it is completely frustrated. No one of these emotions distinguishes the operation of one instinct from that of another. If again impulses of instincts were desires, as some may become with foresight of their ends, the operation of instincts, long obstructed and delayed, might be conceived to give rise to the prospective emotions of desire — to hope, despondency, anxiety, disappointment, confidence, and despair. But again no one of these emotions would be peculiar to any one instinct, no more than they are to one desire.

How comes it then that any instinct can arouse an emotion more or less peculiar to itself? Concealment-instincts are sometimes organized with the fighting instincts, as in the *felidæ*, but are more frequently connected with fear. Fear pursues the same end of escape in a more general form, and therefore may support the instinct when in difficulties. The instincts that may arouse emotions more or less peculiar to themselves would seem to be those for which primary emotions exist that pursue their ends in a more general form. There is no primary emotion peculiar to the locomotory instincts, which belong to all emotions, and no one whose end is a more general form of their end. This holds also of the most complicated instincts, — such as the web-building and nest-building instincts. These take such a long time to fulfill their ends, and may meet with so many difficulties, that we might suppose them to experience in turn all the common emotions to which we have referred, and all the prospective emotions, but nowhere should we be able to indicate the presence of any emotion peculiar to the instinctive process as a whole.*

* Dr. Drever, who knows that in such a case we must take the hypothesis that best explains the facts, yet to my former denial that we can point to any primary emotion as distinctive of the nest building

If we cannot accept Dr. McDougall's theory that the principal instincts, when in operation, elicit an emotion more or less distinctive of them,—which seems to be based on a confusion between emotion and impulse,—can we any more accept Dr. Drever's modification of it, that the "great instincts of human nature have all their accompanying and typical emotions"?*—although he admits that these emotions are only elicited under "tension."† If we begin by assuming that fear, anger, disgust, curiosity are among these great instincts, then it is easy to indicate their typical emotions. We have tried to show that these primary emotional systems are not instincts, though having many points in common with instincts.

instincts, says, "The obvious rejoinder is we are in no position to say whether there is a distinctive emotion involved" or not. (*Instinct in Man*, p. 159.) From this point of view we must say nothing about the emotions of animals, not even that they exist!

* *Op. cit.*, p. 161.

† P. 157.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1,
on March 8th, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

VI.—IS THERE A GENERAL WILL?

By MORRIS GINSBERG.

THE conception of a general will has played an important role in political philosophy since the days of Rousseau. It has, in the main, been used as a basis for what may be termed a monistic theory of sovereignty and law, but it is noteworthy that many of those who are now insisting on the claims of minor associations within the State do so on the ground that these minor associations possess a "real" or general will of their own.* The literature on the subject, and on the kindred problem of the personality of associations, is enormous, but there are not many attempts at a really systematic analysis. The object of this paper is to deal critically with some of these problems, and in particular with the doctrine of a real will, as worked out by Professor Bosanquet. The attempts referred to fall into five groups, which are more or less clearly marked off, though they are not mutually exclusive, and for convenience of discussion they will be dealt with separately.

In the first place, the general will is conceived as coming to be when every individual in a group or society, or a compact majority of such a group or society, has a conception or idea of the group as a whole and identifies his good with the good of that whole. This would appear to be the view of Dr. McDougall. Sometimes, as is the case with Novicov, the presence of such an idea of the whole is required only in the case of the social *élite* *i.e.*, the actual leaders (not necessarily the government) of thought and action in a community. In Novicov's view

* Cf. Gierke, *Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. 3, and *Das Wesen der Menschlichen Verände*; Maitland's Introduction to Gierke's *Medieval Political Theories*; Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*; and much of the literature of Guild Socialism.

(*Conscience et Volonté Générale*) society is a psychical organism, and the social *élite* constitutes for him a common sensorium, analogous to the brain of an individual organism.

In the second place, a will is said to be general when a decision is arrived at by deliberate discussion, aiming at a real integration of differences, *i.e.*, at utilizing the contribution of each constituent member of a group, and not at mere blending of individual wishes. This apparently is the view of Professor Mackenzie, according to whom the idea of a general will involves: (1) the concurrence of a number of people in a single decision; (2) the fact that the decision is taken with reference to the good of the whole group, and not merely by a balancing of individual wishes. The first of these conditions, however, is watered down to a mere vague desire or feeling, on the part of those by whom the decision is made, that it shall be in harmony with the point of view of others whom it affects. When this qualification is made, it is clear that the decision is really arrived at, in most cases, by a comparatively few individuals, although they may take into account the opinions and desires of the majority of the people for whom they are acting, in so far as these can be ascertained. In this sense the term is innocuous, but not particularly important. It is merely a rather confusing way of saying, *e.g.*, that governmental acts should be based on some form of consent, active or passive, on the part of the majority of the governed; and it has the defect that it hides the fact that in actual groups, especially States, action taken is often the result not of unanimous co-operative agreement, on the part of a majority, but only of a comparatively small number of people. In the hands of some writers, *e.g.*, Miss Follett, the integration of differences, spoken of above, may be connected with the doctrine of the "confluence" of minds or the compounding of states of consciousness, and in that case the general will is conceived as constituting an actual entity, the product or result of the interpenetration of individual minds, in what is called the social process.

In the third place, it comes to be recognized that society as a whole and the social good can only be common contents of consciousness in the very highest stages of social development.* It is, however, claimed that in all societies possessing a certain amount of continuity and independence there must be other common contents of thought and will, with the result that its members, when confronted with the same situation, or stimulated by the same objects, will experience the same inner reaction. There may be moments or periods in the life of a nation, it is admitted, when there is little community of thought, feeling and will, and then social self-consciousness is at a minimum. But this is the case, also, in individuals, except that for them the moments of conscious activity are more frequent and last relatively longer. According to this view, the individual self is regarded as a combination of certain temporary and transient contents of consciousness, with those which are more constant, such as certain enduring relations of the inner life, and certain experiences relating to the body. Through this combination or union the constant is set over against and contrasted with the variable, and becomes, as such, relatively clear and explicit, thus resulting in self-consciousness. So, too, in society there are certain contents of consciousness which are more or less permanent and constant, *e.g.*, the traditions and the consciousness of a common past, which are at the background of the common mind, and when over against these there appears a new experience, perhaps threatening them, society becomes self-conscious and is capable of self-conscious volition. Compare the Greeks against the Persians, the Germans against Napoleon, and the like.

In dealing with these views we must note, at the outset, two important distinctions. In the first place, we must distinguish the act of volition from the object willed. In the second place, we must distinguish definite acts of will from dispositions

* Cf. Barth, *Geschichte der Philosophie als Soziologie*.

or habits of will, *i.e.*, capacities to will when confronted with a certain situation. We may say that as a result of group-life, definite acts of will, or the more or less permanent systems of dispositions or habits of will of the individuals composing it, may be influenced and determined by an idea of the interest not only of the individual, but of the whole group. Where this is the case, in regard to every individual member of a group or a compact majority, we can speak of the will of such members as general, meaning by that not that they all aim at a universal object (which has not been shown), nor that there is a general will, as distinct from a number of wills, but merely that there is sufficient community of ideas and ideals to influence the specific acts of will of the individuals concerned, to induce them to take common action, or to arrive at joint decisions. We are not in such cases entitled to speak of a *will of the whole*, but merely of a *will of all*, determined by a sense of the *good of the whole*. The acts of volition must remain individual, concrete. The will of the people can only be a joint will, due to a concurrence of such acts, though the latter may resemble one another, because of the similarity of their contents, or because they are all influenced by an idea of the good of the whole, or rather by what is conceived to be the good of the whole.

Whether such a general will exists or not is a question of fact, to be determined with regard to each grouping by special investigation. Generally the psychological forces that ultimately issue in a public act would seem to contain little that can be called will in the strict sense of the word. They are rather an impalpable congeries of elements including blind impulses, dimly-foreseen ends, unconscious or half-conscious inferences, habits and prejudices. Even great political decisions are rarely arrived at as a result of clear co-operative thinking, on the part of all members of a group or even of a majority.*

* Cf. Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, Ch. 3.

If, with Dr. McDougall, we confine the collective will to those cases of group actions which are the result of a determination of the will of each member of the group, by a sentiment of regard for the group as a whole, and by an idea of the good of that whole, the sphere of collective volition is exceedingly narrow. It may exist, *e.g.*, in some families, or in some small groups working for specific objects; but in the large groupings of the modern world, the existence of such a will is a hope and aspiration, rather than a fact. The State in particular includes complex groupings with many divergent interests. Such groupings, moreover, develop a collective selfishness, often in conflict with the good of the whole. There may be, there no doubt is, present in the majority of the people a diffused sense of interest in the whole, a vague desire to contribute actively or passively to the maintenance of the social structure, but this can hardly be called a will. The reasons that determine the adoption of any one idea or plan of action, and the rejection of others, are often found in anything but a conscious recognition of their inherent truth or value; and in so far as there is such conscious thought, it is confined to a few persons who, in many cases, are high-minded and disinterested, but in others deliberately foster the spread of certain ideas, in the interests of certain classes, rather than of the people as a whole. Though, in some cases unconsciously, the process of selection is often biassed. In the case of complex groupings, we may say, therefore, that in so far as there is present self-conscious volition, it is not general, and in so far as the psychological forces operating in a society are general, they are not will. Similar remarks apply to Dr. Barth's treatment. The kind of self-consciousness of which he speaks can exist only at periods of great crises in the life of a nation, when the whole of society is in danger. It is only in such cases, when a nation feels that all its permanent possessions are threatened, that it will act as a whole. Even then it seems doubtful whether we get an example of really self-conscious volition. For it is during such periods that very often the

lower impulses and instincts of a mob get free play. It might, perhaps, be urged that in the case of individual volition, too, the existence of self-conscious volition has its basis in a precipitate of habits, instincts, and dispositions, but while in the case of the individual, the instinctive elements are fused with and overlaid by conscious ideas in the same personality, in the case of society, consciousness of society as a whole may be present in the minds of its most enlightened and public-spirited members, yet the majority of the people may remain at the level of habit or instinct, so far as their relation to the whole is concerned. Here again, therefore, in so far as there is will, it is not general, and so far as the forces operating are general, they are not will.

We can now discuss a fourth view of the general will, somewhat analogous to Dr. Barth's, but more thoroughly worked out—that, namely, of Wundt.* This view is based on an analysis of the mutual implications of presentation and will. Will cannot be bare activity, but implies presentation, as content and motive. On the other hand, presentation implies a presentative activity. Presentations, in fact, owe their origin, according to Wundt, to the action of one will on another. It follows that any concrete will pre-supposes other wills. This leads Wundt to the conception of reality as a series of will-unities—*eine Stufenfolge von Willenseinheiten*—which through mutual determination, or reciprocal action, viz., presentative activity, develop into a series of will-complexes of various extent. The unity which attaches to any concrete empirical will is only relative. The individual is really a general will, uniting within itself will-forms of lower grade, for bare individual activity is a limiting point, which is never actually met with in experience. Again, at the other extreme, we may conceive a general will of all humanity, uniting all its members and groups of members for common purposes, and finally the

* Cf. *System der Philosophie*, and *Ethik*.

religious consciousness postulates the will of God, which is the highest and last unity, at once the source of the common spiritual possessions of mankind, and the conditions of their realization. The general will (*Gesamtwille*), according to this view, is very complex, and includes within itself many forms of unity, varying in extent and power. But the reality which belongs to it, and, within it, to the wider and narrower forms of it, is not hypothetical but actual. The true reality of the individual self is not to be found in some underlying substance or substratum, but in actual spiritual life, in conscious activity—*Bewusstseinstätigkeit*—in the extent of its capacity to concentrate within itself, and give expression to the common spiritual possession of mankind, the will-directions or tendencies of the age. Once we abandon the view of the soul or self as a separately and independently existing substance or substratum, we are justified, Wundt thinks, in assigning to the general will a degree of reality not less than that of the individual will. The movements of civilization, the growth of cultures, are indications of a really common life which cannot be a merely fortuitous resultant of individual aims, related externally to one another. We must, however, Wundt warns us, beware of attaching too much importance to the general or objective will at the cost of individual wills. This is just as one-sided as the narrow individualism of the opposed theories of psychological and ethical atomism. There are individuals who have so mastered the ideas or feelings which move their community, and who are so gifted to give these effective expression, that they have come to be not merely the agents and creators of the aims of the general will, but are able to impose and impress features of their own upon the general will, and stamp with their own character the tendency of the time. This, however, is not incompatible with the reality of the general will, since the latter is essentially very complex and is really a series of will-unities.

Wundt's treatment has the merit that it does not involve

the conception of the general will as an entity independent of individual minds, and that it allows room for the existence of smaller units within the general will. At the same time, it is liable to dangerous misinterpretations, and fundamentally it suffers from the fatal ambiguity that attaches to the word presentation. This, of course, is not the place for examining the validity of the assertion that presentations are themselves will-activities. It will, at any rate, be conceded that, if they are of the nature of will or activity, the activity spoken of is not *the activity* in and through which they are apprehended. If this distinction be admitted, then the reasons for regarding higher complexes as having the same reality as the individual will fall to the ground. For the acts in and through which presentations are apprehended must always be individual specific acts, belonging to different individuals, though, of course, several individuals may unite, act as one body, have presentations in common, *i.e.*, be aware of the same objects and aim at the same ideals.

The distinction referred to is often ignored by Wundt himself. He speaks, for example, of presentative activity as being the same thing as presentation, and if this view is joined with his view that the reality of the self consists in activity, the door is open for the "mind stuff" theory and the theory of the group-consciousness, such as we find, *e.g.*, in Durkheim. By the latter, presentations are regarded as "partially autonomous" realities which have the power of mutual attraction and repulsion and of forming ever new syntheses. Thus there come to be, according to the latter, social or collective presentations which belong to the social mind, and are spoken of as "exterior" to the individual mind; and although Durkheim often makes it clear that the social presentations can exist only in individual minds, yet he also speaks of the social mind as an actual entity, over and above individual minds—a new creation *sui generis*. Thus he speaks of the collective consciousness as the highest form of the psychic life and as a "consciousness of

consciousnesses.* Now there is a sense in which contents of presentations have an independent being. Mythologies, *e.g.*, have a way of growing by a sort of inherent power of ideas to combine and re-combine. But this really means that an idea once having been thought out by an individual and communicated to others must necessarily modify the ideas of those others. There is no warrant, however, for speaking of collective presentations as constituting a mind, or soul, or consciousness.

We can now deal with the doctrine of the general will as it is worked out by Professor Bosanquet, and in a modified form by other idealists. In essence, this doctrine consists of the following three elements: In the first place, it is maintained, that both the particular acts of the will of an individual, and the system of volitional dispositions which we may call his character or his "standing will," imply a real will or a will of the true self. By this is not meant the actual character of a man, the permanent underlying nature or bent of an individual, but rather a supposed rational or good self, an ideal will based on "a fully articulated idea of the best life for man." In the second place, it is argued that the latter is essentially social in character, is, in fact, qualitatively identical in all individuals, and therefore constitutes one will. And, in the third place, that this one will, described as "real" or "general," is embodied in the State.

I propose to confine attention here to the first two of these propositions.

(a) In the first place then, the real will is contrasted with the actual will, or the will of the individual in the ordinary routine of life. The latter consists of acts which are incomplete, imperfect, "abstract and fragmentary," and they point beyond themselves to a system which would give them meaning,—a system of connected volitions or dispositions, which is held or bound together by organizing principles. Of such principles

* Cf. *Les Formes Elementaires de la vie Religieuse*, p. 23.

we may be conscious, but even where they are not consciously appreciated by the individual they are none the less, it is maintained, implied in his conduct. This so far may be granted, but from such arguments it would not follow that the real will is rational or good. Surely it will not be denied that the standing or permanent wills of most individuals are far from harmonious unities governed by rational principles. It would seem, then, that by the real will is not meant merely the standing or permanent will which actually belongs to individuals, but an ideal will,—in other words, the will as it ought to be. Such an ideal will is, however, it is argued, implied in the actual will. For no object of action is ever completely satisfactory, ever exhausts all that our full nature demands. At any given moment we do not know what we *really* want, what would completely satisfy our whole personality. To discover what we really want, we should have to correct our desires of the moment by a comparison with what we desire at other moments, and with what other people desire; we should have, in short, to institute a process of criticism and examination into the conditions of a good and harmonious life; and when this process had been gone through, our own will would come back to us in a shape which we should almost fail to recognize. This reconstructed will is, it is maintained, our real will. It is, therefore, the rational or good will, the will as it ought to be, the will as determined by an idea of perfection; and, though it transcends by far that at which we consciously aim, it is nevertheless implied in the latter, since it alone can give significance to the practical life.

The value of the argument seems to me to depend on two things: (1) upon the question in what sense a person may be said to will "what is implied" in his actual volitions, and (2) upon the meaning of the word "real" in this connexion. Firstly, then, if by the term will is meant actually conscious choice, it might be denied that a person wills anything except an object of which he is distinctly aware. This restriction of the

term will, however, may be inconvenient. Recent psychology has familiarized us with the fact that often our conscious motives are only a "camouflage" for deeper wants of which we may be unconscious, and it would be, in some cases, carping at words to say that these deeper wants do not represent our real will. Granting this, however, there is no reason for supposing that in any particular case, the discovery of such deeper motives and their complete enumeration would reveal a rational or good will. On the contrary, it may well bring to light deep and far-reaching conflict. Again, by what is implied may be meant all those courses of conduct, plans and aims which a man might admit were involved in any particular volitional act of his, if he reflected critically on that act. Here, too, in any particular case, there is no reason to suppose that such a scheme of life must necessarily be good or rational, though no doubt it would *appear* so to the individual concerned. It would seem, then, that for the purpose of the above argument the phrase "what is implied" must mean all those courses of action which a perfectly rational person would see were involved in any act or system of acts of an individual. In what sense, now, can this be said to be the real will not of completely rational persons, but of ordinary mortals? I think that what is in the mind of the thinkers who hold this view is that the sense of moral and political obligation cannot be explained unless we assume the presence in each individual of an idea, however vague and ill-defined, of a best and ultimate good. This is sometimes stated in a way which would seem to imply that when I say I ought to do this, I mean that I will do this. Thus Professor Bosanquet says:—"The imperative claim of the will that wills itself is our own inmost nature and we cannot throw it off. This is the root of political obligation." As against this, it must be said that though it might well be argued that what is ethically obligatory must be psychologically capable of being willed, ethical obligation does not consist in being willed any more than an object known consists in its being known. The fact that I will,

or that my real self or anyone else wills a thing, is not an adequate reason why it should or ought to be done, unless there is a reason to show that it is good that it should be done. The moral order, in other words, is something objective, and obligation consists in the claim which such a moral order has upon us, but neither the moral order nor the obligation consists in or is identical with, acts of will, human or divine.

Apart from the misconception referred to, we may admit that the sense of moral obligation and moral conduct do imply some sense of a possible perfection, some dim awareness of an ultimate good struggling to assert itself in the individual or in a society of individuals. But can this be rightly described as a real will in contrast with which the actual will is regarded as illusory or fragmentary? It is surely one thing to say that a conception of a possible good is implied in our will and quite another that such a good is really willed. The idea of an ultimate good, after all, is only a vague schema or assumption resembling the assumption of the principle of the uniformity of nature that is held to be implied in scientific investigation; and from this schema as such, nothing can be deduced as regards the details of conduct. By calling it real, however, more definiteness is ascribed to it than really belongs to it, and this has disastrous consequences when further it is identified with the general will as embodied in law, for the ground is then prepared for the argument that what is imposed on the individual by the general will is really imposed upon him by himself and in this way any amount of interference with him can be theoretically justified.

In the second place, the use of the word "real" in this connexion implies the idealist doctrine of "degrees of reality," which, of course, cannot here be examined. I should say that a thing is either real or not real, and that, therefore, the actual will is just as real as the "real" will, if by the latter we mean the permanent or standing will, though the former is relatively to it transitory. If, on the other hand, as seems to be the case.

by the real will is meant a completely rational will with a definitely articulate organic system of purposes, then such a will is not real at all, but ideal.

(b) *The General Will*.—The real will then, is the rational or good will, the will as it ought to be. Now such a will, it is argued, is in quality and content identical in all individuals. It is not merely a joint will or will of all, but is rather of the nature of a thread of connexion permeating all individual wills, or a universal in Bosanquet's sense of the term, *i.e.*, a scheme which realizes itself in particular wills, but is more permanent and greater than any actual will. The content of all rational wills, in other words, is a "concrete universal," an organic system of those ends and purposes which would completely satisfy the demands of human nature. From such identity of content, an identity of substantive unity and continuity of existence is inferred and the general will is then spoken of as a person, a *moi commun*, a will, an experience of which individuals are imperfect manifestations. Society thus comes to be conceived as a single experience, a continuous self-identical being of psychical contents. Particular individuals, in and through whom this "social universal" realizes itself, are organizations or connexions of content, more or less articulate, within this system. All have within them the active spirit or form of the whole, and as a result, they strive after unity and individuality, *i.e.*, completely articulate experience. To the extent to which they succeed, they become more and more articulate, and in the end, they would merge or become identical with the single articulate experience which is the whole. Separateness, therefore, is not an ultimate character of the individual, for in substance and content the minds and wills of individuals are universal, "communicable, expansive."

The argument rests on the assumption that identity of content involves identity of existence. Waiving the question how far all rational wills of finite individuals must be identical in content (though it does not seem to me that this has been

proved), we may note that Bosanquet himself has drawn attention to the distinction between ideas as psychical existents and ideas as contents; and, at first sight, it might appear that once this distinction is made the argument for the unity of minds in society, based on their community of experience, breaks down. For though ideas as contents may be common, ideas as psychical existents never can be. When two people are aware of the same objects, the acts of awareness considered as psychical occurrences cannot be the same, though they might be regarded as resembling one another. Professor Bosanquet himself seems sometimes to admit this. Thus, *e.g.*, he says:—
 “No one would attempt to overthrow what we have called the formal distinctness of selves or souls. This consists in the impossibility that one finite centre of experience should possess as its own immediate experience, the immediate experience of another.”* Yet it would seem that this formal distinctness is compatible with a fundamental sameness or identity. How is this to be explained? It seems to me that the root of the matter lies in the fact that Professor Bosanquet is not really serious with the distinction between psychical existence or immediacy, as he calls it, and content, and that he tends virtually to deny the reality of the former. Immediacy or psychical existence is taken to be not a part of the series of mental acts or occurrences which we call the mind. “It is a phase and not a stratum of experience.”† By this is presumably meant that it is a phase into which contents may enter, and out of which they may pass. Acts of apprehension are, as they are also described by him, forms which contents may assume. “Any content of apprehension or comprehension may become a state of our mind.” “All our objective apprehension is something which is capable of taking the shape of a mental state, *i.e.*, of becoming immediate.”‡ The content is taken to be a continuum, having

* *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 47.

† *Logic*, vol. 2, p. 301.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

an independent reality prior to the acts of apprehension, which latter are merely a limitation of it, a partition introduced into it, due presumably to the fact that they are dependent on different bodies. Thus we are told that different persons are "organizations of content which a difference of quality generally, though not strictly dependent on or belonging to different bodies, prevents from being wholly blended." In respect of content, however, it is maintained they are identical and confluent. •

It seems clear, from what has been said, that the whole argument in favour of the confluence of minds, or their inclusion in a larger mind, is based upon a hypostatization of contents and a denial of the reality of acts of experience. As against this whole position it must be urged :—

(1) Contents never *become* states of mind. The former are of the nature of universals and possess the kind of being that belongs to truth. The latter are temporal processes or occurrences.

(2) The contents cannot be regarded as having an independent existence prior to the act of apprehension or comprehension. They are rather the nature or character of acts of consciousness resulting from the direction of the latter upon an object. As natures or essences, the term existence cannot be properly applied to them.

(3) It follows that acts of consciousness, say of two persons or of the same individual at different times, directed on the same object, will resemble one another, and, if we like to sum up all such acts and include them under the term experience, we can say that experience is a universal in the sense that it is a class of objects (*i.e.*, acts), resembling one another or possessing identity of character. But two acts whose contents were exactly the same would still be two acts and similarly two minds.

(4) The question, however, might still be pressed :—Does not unity or identity of content, in the case of thought or will, so penetrate the existence of the separate acts of will or

thought as to convert unity of content into unity of existence? It seems to me that the thinkers who argue in this manner do so because they really regard contents or essences as themselves existents, and, in particular, if the problem is approached from the side of ideals and purposes, because of the belief they entertain that the ideals and purposes of human subjects are in a sense *already realized* in a Universal Mind. Thus Professor Bosanquet quotes with approval Green's statement that "when that which is being developed is itself a self-conscious subject, the end of its becoming must really exist, not merely for, but in or as a self-conscious subject. There must be eternally such a subject, which is all that the self-conscious subject, as developed in time, has the possibility of becoming, in which the ideal of the human spirit or all that it has in it to become, is completely realized." Similarly, Professor Muirhead argues that though actions belong to individuals, yet "their purposes, so far as they are harmonized, are included in the organic system of purposes which we have agreed can only be real in so far as they are the purposes of a Universal Mind;" and he makes it clear that in the supreme mind the meanings and purposes of finite minds must, *in some sense, be fulfilled** Now all this seems to me to involve a hypostatization of ideals and the denial of the distinction between truth and existence. Ideals are contents of thought and will, and I fail to see that the non-existential character which attaches to them is altered when the mind that entertains them or thinks them is the mind of God. I fail to see, also, what is gained for the religious or social life, by insisting on a unity of existence as between minds. Is it not enough if they can be shown to have common purposes and be striving after the same ideals? Professor Bosanquet argues that the standing will of each individual, the system of his connected volitions, implies and is implied in other similar systems of other individuals; and

* *Problems of Science and Philosophy*, p. 133.

hence he concludes that there is a single inclusive system of which all particular wills are limitations or parts.* Leaving aside the argument that such a complete system of wills is an ideal rather than a fact, it seems to me clear that the kind of unity that such a system would exhibit throws no light whatever on the problem of the confluence of wills. Granting that any will, having for its object a part of such a complete system, wills "by implication" the rest of the system, all that follows would be that all the particular wills would will the same object, but it would not follow at all that any particular will is existentially identical with any other will or with the will of society. The fact that the realization of my purposes is dependent on the existence of other human beings and the realization of their purposes on mine does not involve that they must be I, or I they; and the continuum of mental acts, which constitutes the phases of a self, does not lose its existential unity because their contents are identical in character with the contents of the mental acts of another self.

In yet another way, Professor Bosanquet tries to show that society and individual minds are really the same fabric or structure regarded from different points of view. The mind, it is argued, is made up of apperceptive masses or systems of ideas, each with its controlling or dominant idea. Social institutions or social groupings also consist of systems of ideas, held together by a dominant purpose which connects them in such a way as to render possible the fulfilment of the function of the whole. A social institution is the meeting point of many minds, is, in other words, "a system of apperipient systems by which the minds that take part in them are kept in correspondence." Further, social groupings, each with its dominant purpose, may aid or support one another, or again, they may be divergent or conflicting, but at bottom, they must be organs of a single pervading life, and cannot be ultimately

* *Mind*, January, 1920, p. 80.

irreconcilable. From this point of view, society is seen to be of the nature of a continuous or self-identical being consisting of activities which by their differences are made to play into one another and to form a thoroughly-welded whole or "world." Now, it is of course true, that society and individuals are made up of the same elements since society consists of individuals. But, in the first place, unless we believe in the compounding of states of consciousness or else deny the distinction between act and content, the argument does not prove that the social mind constitutes a unity of existence in the same sense in which the series of states of consciousness which we call a mind, constitutes a unity of existence; and, in the second place, the problem we have to face is, whether social acts, or deliverances of the social mind, the purposes embodied in social institutions, *exhaust* the character of the individual. Professor Bosanquet seems to start not with individuals and their purposes, but with the universal "human nature" as a kind of organic scheme of functions or purposes; and, theoretically, individual existence or "uniqueness of form" should be accompanied by uniqueness of matter or content; every finite individual ought to have one special function to perform in society—a function which would never be performed by any other individual. Such an individual would be "a true particular of the social universal." Were this the case, there would, in Professor Bosanquet's view, still be no ground for ascribing exclusiveness to selves, for individual minds would then have to be regarded as organic parts of a single whole, and these organic parts would *be* the whole, would be, *i.e.*, ways in which the Universal manifests itself, or assumes special modification. This latter argument clearly rests on Professor Bosanquet's doctrine of the "concrete universal," and it is open to anyone who does not accept that doctrine to maintain that the parts never are identical with one another or with the system that includes them. In point of fact, however, the theoretical "one mind, one function," is never realized in society. The capacities

of individuals are "arbitrary and contingent." One mind may repeat, overlap, and comprehend the experiences of other minds. The contents of a mind may vary "from what just suffices for a function like that of an ant to a self which possesses the frame-work and very much of the detail of an entire society." Yet does not the fact of repetition and overlapping prove that the universal "human nature" is wrongly conceived as an individual, does it not prove that particularity is more than an appearance and refuses to be swallowed up in the whole? Is there not here a confusion between the universal "human nature" or "human capacity or potentiality" which does not consist at all of particular existents, and society, which does consist of a number of particulars related to one another in various ways, and which, though it possesses a kind of unity of its own, cannot possibly have the kind of unity that belongs to a concept? What is meant by the "true particular of the social universal" depends on the meaning of the latter phrase. If the reference is to society, then any actual individual is a member of it. If, however, the reference is to an organic scheme of purposes or to human capacity, then the true particular is not an individual at all. Further, the "true particular," in the former sense, is never exhausted in the social relations in which he enters. He possesses a kind of self-determination, a substantive unity and continuity, which is never merged in these relations. He is the centre of a rich diversity of relations which are but imperfectly expressed in social institutions, and so far from saying that the individual is an expression or reflection of society from "an unique point of view or special angle," we should say that society is an expression or reflection of individuals from an unique point of view or special angle. The apperceptive systems which constitute the common material of individuals and society contain in the case of each individual elements of feeling, emotion and bodily sensation which are exclusively theirs and incommunicable. It must, I think, be apparent that the real weight of

the argument in favour of a general will rests, not on a psychological analysis of *de facto* states of mind, or even of human purposes as conceived by the generality of actual individuals, but upon an inferred real will in which all human purposes are unified and harmonized. Now, Professor Bosanquet himself argues that a general will of Humanity as a whole, Humanity as an ethical ideal, is a "type or a problem rather than a fact." So long as we confine ourselves to facts, may not the same be said of the general will of any existing state? If, on the other hand, the real will is the ideal will; if, especially, we have in mind a rational system of purposes in some sense already fulfilled in the Universal Mind, does not then a greater reality attach to the general will of Humanity, in which the wills of existing states would be harmonized and unified, than to the general wills of the several states which, in relation to Humanity, can only be regarded as particular?*

Summing up this discussion, we may say:—

1. There may be something in each individual, and, therefore, in a society of individuals, which responds to a conception of an ultimate good or idea of perfection. This, however, is badly described as a "real" will. The actual wills of individuals contain many elements which are not in correspondence with such an ideal of perfection, and these elements are quite as "real" as the "real" will. If, on the other hand, by the latter is meant a fully articulate scheme of organized purposes or ends, this is, strictly speaking, an ideal and not a real will.

2. The crux of the problem, however, really lies in the identification of this ideal will with the general will. This seems to rest on a confusion between content and existence; and breaks down utterly if we insist on keeping that distinction clearly before our minds. Even if all wills be shown to aim at a universal or general object, they would still as psychical existents remain distinct.

* Cf. Rousseau, *A Discourse on Political Economy*.

3. Since there is no such thing as a general will, the question whether it is embodied in the State does not arise. This does not mean that the State and other forms of community do not exhibit a kind of unity, but only that the unity which they possess is a relation between the individuals constituting them, based on community of purposes and ideals, and that such a unity need not be hypostatized and spoken of as a person or will.* For the purposes of social theory, what is required is not a common self but a common good. It is not at all necessary to prove that individual minds have a unity and identity of existence, but merely that they have a oneness of spiritual content in the sense that they must strive for the same common good and be animated by the same ideals. When we speak of society as a kind of absolute being of which individuals are expressions or reflections, or as a kind of thread of connexion running through all its members and the same in all of them, we are really dealing with a conception or general concept which may have logical meaning, but which cannot be said to be an existent fact alongside of other existent facts. The unity that belongs to a concept cannot possibly belong to the mass of individuals to whom the concept refers.

With a view of bringing together the results of this paper, it will be useful to emphasize the following points. In the first place, we may refer to the distinction already noted between a particular, definite act of will and a disposition or habit of will (*i.e.*, a capacity of willing under suitable circumstances), or systems of such dispositions. Both the particular act of will and the dispositional will are essentially individual, and can never be anything but individual. In the second place, from both of these must be distinguished that which is willed, the object of will. The latter may be individual or common to many acts of will, whether of the same

* Cf. E. Barker, "The Discredited State," *Political Quarterly*, 1915.

individual or of many individuals. In the third place, from that which is willed we must distinguish that which ought to be willed and which we may call the Good, the nature of which does not consist of being willed and which may or may not, in point of fact, be willed. Now, it might conceivably be proved that the acts of will of individuals and their permanent dispositional wills have a common object, *e.g.*, the maintenance of the social structure. Whether this be so, or not, is a question of fact, and if will involves the presence of a clear idea of the object aimed at, such a will would appear to exist only in the case of a few enlightened individuals. In the case of the majority of people, all that is present is a mild interest, ranging from tacit acquiescence to blank indifference. Further, supposing a will for the maintenance of the social structure be proved to exist in all individuals, it would still be merely a joint will for a common object.

The acts of will, and the systems of dispositions referred to above, need not be, and are not, completely rational or harmonious, either in the individual or in the community. The belief that they are would seem to be due to a confusion between that which is willed and the Good. It is tacitly assumed that that which ought to be willed really is willed by a supposed real self of the individual or by an Absolute Mind. Since that which ought to be willed is presumably rational and harmonious, the real will is conceived as a rational system of purposes, of which particular wills are imperfect manifestations. Here, again, supposing that it could be proved that individual wills are rational and therefore aim at a harmonious good, they would still not constitute a general will, but merely a joint will for the good. The belief that they do constitute a general will is due to a confusion between content and act. Now, acts are always individual and neither the object of will nor the good constitutes existential parts of the individual consciousness, since they are either objects which exist and whose continuance in existence is willed, or else objects which do not exist but

which we think ought to exist. In neither case do they form parts of the individual unless the whole distinction between subject and object be invalid. There would seem, therefore, to be no real sense in which unity and continuity can be ascribed to the general will.

In all that has been said, it has not been implied that individuals are isolated beings, independent reals, containing within themselves all that is needed for their development. It is obvious that both for content and mode of experience the individual is largely indebted to the social milieu, and that the forces which govern action are products of social connexion and arise from the interaction of personalities in society. But the tissue of psychological forces operating in a society is not unitary in character, though in their highest phases those forces crystallize into unity within unity.* In the lowest phases of a people's culture, when conditions are very much alike for all the members, and when there is little or no class differentiation, the members are very homogeneous in character and their feelings, ideas, interests are of a very uniform kind. In the more advanced stages of culture, though at bottom the same essential influences remain to determine the character of all members of a society, and though their common influences are strengthened by the growth of language and the spiritual possessions of a civilized community, yet differentiations take place and we get a number of groupings each with its own atmosphere, moulding the life and action and thought of its members. Individuals may and do belong to more than one of these groupings. Moreover, the latter are in constant motion and transformation and produce collective powers which determine changes in the social, economic and religious life. Some of these collective powers may become crystallized in enduring institutions but others have only a vague, formless kind of

* Cf. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, and G. Schmoller, *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*.

being, and may receive expression in social class-differentiation, political parties, in judgments of value which gradually become standards of conducts, in codes of honour, public opinion. When all this has been admitted, we are yet a long way off the doctrine of an objective mind and will. The tissue of psychological elements referred to has not the kind of being which belongs to a person or self, nor can the kind of influence it exerts on the individual be described as a general will. There need be no mystery about the complex of ideas operating in society and embodied in its institutions, books, laws, etc. Their significance lies in the fact that they are interpreted, modified and sustained by individual minds from generation to generation. Further, the unity which community of ideas gives to associations varies enormously, according to the closeness of the ties that link a member to his group. There is nothing sacrosanct about social organizations. Even states are subject to change and transformation, as recent events show: and as to cultural influences it is surely common experience that individuals often can and do withstand them, abandon, *e.g.*, the language and religion of their race and choose others. No association or associations can ever embrace or exhaust the entire life of man. Men do indeed share in a common life and contribute to a collective achievement, yet nothing but confusion can result from hypostatizing this life and ascribing to it a reality, over and above the reality of the lives which individuals live in relation with one another.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1,
on March 22nd, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

VII.—OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY, AND THE COMMON GOOD.

By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

WHEN some time ago the Secretary pressed me to fulfil an overdue promise to do my duty after a lapse of (I fear) some fifteen years by offering the Society a paper for discussion, I set down as my subject "Obligation, Autonomy, and the Common Good," because the problem of the mutual relation of these three conceptions, which play so large a part in the discussions of moral philosophers, was much in my mind at the time; but, now that I come to put on paper what I have to say about them, I fear that it may prove partly so trite and partly so inconclusive as to be scarcely worthy of the Society's attention. I shall be asking you to consider the familiar contrast of ethical systems which dwell upon what is "good" rather than upon what is "right" with those which dwell upon what is "right" rather than upon what is "good"; to examine well-known phrases of authors so often discussed in the schools of British philosophy as Aristotle, Kant, and Green; and only, as it were, to peep at the significance of what we may discover by this consideration and examination for those occupied with the not less familiar but more burning problems associated with such expressions as "authority" and "democracy," "divine right" and "general will."

In mentioning the "general will," I may say that my remarks about will have nothing to do with the question of its relation to the wills of the individual members of the community, which has been so prominently brought before our notice of late by papers in our *Proceedings* and in *Mind*. I may perhaps, however, be permitted, before coming to close

quarters with the subject which I am now proposing for our consideration, to express my view that no theory is satisfactory which either, on the one hand, falls into an error akin to that attributed by Aristotle to the Platonists of *Χαρισμός* or the ascription to the universal of a separate existence alongside of its particulars, and speaks of the "general will" as *another* will or of the personality of the State or other community as *another* personality over and above the wills or personalities of the citizens or members of the community; or, on the other hand, fails to do justice to the undoubted facts of common life, wherein we feel pride or shame at the acts of our family or of our nation, or even for the deeds of kinsmen or fellow-countrymen, although we may have no individual responsibility for them. It is not enough in order to explain the phenomena which have suggested the doctrine of the "general will" to say that the object willed is common and not the will, just as we might speak of the common perception by several people of the same object, where all we mean is that each of them perceives it. This does not allow for much that is involved in the actual consciousness of willing as a member of a society. But I do not intend to pursue this subject. I have attempted to discuss some aspects of it in a book just published. For the present I leave it and turn to the problem with which I have undertaken to deal to-night.

I conceive that Kant was in the right in finding the essential feature of our moral consciousness in the sense of obligation. I do not propose to discuss here the well-known difficulties which arise from his description of the Good Will as willing nothing in particular, but only the form of universal legislation; nor to do more than touch upon another question, more relevant to my present purpose, namely, that of the explanation of our sense of obligation as due to the presence in us of a recalcitrant sensibility alongside of the Practical Reason. Concerning this latter point I would only observe that, while it may fairly be said that the opposition between

the moral law and our desires which characterizes so much of our moral experience no doubt depends upon the presence in us of such a recalcitrant sensibility, there seems to be in the recognition of a supreme authority and the correspondent sense of self-surrender involved in morality something which need not disappear even if we should imagine our desires brought wholly into accord with the moral law and the service of God felt as no bondage, however legitimate, but as a joyful freedom. The tendency which we note in Kant not only to illustrate the authoritative character of the moral law by its opposition to our desires but to identify that authoritative character with that opposition does, I think, to some extent, mar his exposition of the truth (as I take it to be) which it seems to me that he has grasped more firmly and maintained more consistently than any other thinker, the truth that the sense of obligation is the essential feature of the moral consciousness.

When from Kant we turn to Green, we find him—and here he is representative of not a few thinkers in the English-speaking countries who, as regards the principles of their ethical and political philosophy, may be said to be more or less of his school—on the one hand making his own the teaching of Kant respecting the “categorical imperative” of morality (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, §§ 196, 202), but also representing the sense of obligation as flowing from the acknowledgment of a “common good,” the conception of which is put forward as the central or fundamental moral idea, while the position that the sense of obligation in “a nature such as ours” is directly consequential upon the acceptance of this idea is treated throughout as too obvious a truth to stand in need of any argument in its defence (see, *e.g.*, §§ 7, 202, 203). It is interesting to observe how in the chapter on “Pleasure and Common Good: Virtue as the Common Good,” and in that on “The Moral Ideal and Moral Progress,” apart from an occasional and incidental use of the word “duty,” all reference to “obligation” or to a “law” is absent; but without, I think, any indication of a suspicion

that it might be missed by any who had followed with agreement the endorsement of Kantian language in the earlier part of the book.

Now this assumption that the notion of a common good, when entertained by beings whose private desires may impel them to acts inconsistent therewith, leads necessarily and directly to the notion of obligation or of a "categorical imperative," appears to me to be an assumption which we are not entitled to make.

In saying this I do not, of course, intend to ignore the fact that, as a matter of history, the sense of obligation no doubt originates as a sense of *social* obligation. Although Kant begins with the consciousness of obligation as present in the soul of the man already morally cultivated, and reaches the notion of the ethical community, the so-called "kingdom of ends," by subsequent reflection on this experience, and, as a well-known remark in his *Nachlass*, informs us, was well aware that this was not the *historical* order, to which the procedure of Rousseau (which he calls "synthetic" in contrast with his own "analytic" method) aimed at conforming, he saw, however, no reason why the one should not be as well adopted as the other. But we need not therefore deny that out of an experience originally stimulated by a certain environment and relative to it has been developed one in which we reach an apprehension of reality to which consideration of this original impulse is no longer relevant. We may remember Martineau's striking comparison of the development of the moral consciousness to that of the sense of sight. More directly to our purpose is a comparison of the evolution of our recognition in philosophy of principles of thought or rather of fundamental features of reality. The doctrine, with which the name of Durkheim is associated, of the social origin of our categories contains, I make no question, an important truth. Although it cannot, I think, be accepted as it stands, because social arrangements and institutions presuppose a perception of temporal succession

and of spatial extension for which they therefore cannot account, yet there is no reason to doubt that our notions of Time and of Space, of the World and of God, are first presented to the human mind in a context of social interests from which their absolute, or at least objective, value (for I do not wish to involve myself, by the use of the word "absolute," in controversies which would be irrelevant here) was only gradually disentangled. But unless we permit this fact to make us sceptical of this absolute or objective value as acknowledged in Science, Philosophy, and Religion,—and of course it is by some permitted to do this in one or other of these spheres—we may allow that we may acknowledge our acquisition of a consciousness of obligation to be conditioned by our membership of a community without necessarily holding that the recognition of a common good *explains* the consciousness of obligation.

We may perhaps trace the influence of Rousseau, an influence to which, in respect of his doctrine of the primacy of the Practical Reason, Kant himself has called attention, in the choice of the expression "autonomy" by the latter to describe the status of the Good Will. I have lately discussed this point elsewhere at some length in connexion with the question of the relation of the Kantian ethics to theism. Kant no doubt desired to exclude by his choice of this word any view which placed duty in obedience to the arbitrary will of God, through whatever channels it might be revealed. As such sovereignty was vested by Rousseau's political theory in the General Will, which was yet not to be identified with the *volonté de tous*, so, according to Kant's teaching, the authority whose command was conveyed in the "categorical imperative" of morality was that of the Reason which is common to us all, though we may any or all of us choose to follow the guidance of desires which conflict with what it prescribes. As, in the sphere of theory of cognition, it is only by counting that we can come to know the necessary truths of arithmetic (which are therefore *synthetic judgments a priori*), and yet we can only count one way (for to

reckon wrongly is not, strictly speaking, *counting those numbers* at all), so in the sphere of practice we can only be aware of the moral law by willing in accordance with it. For our knowledge of morality is not and cannot be purely speculative; and when we will what is contrary to our duty, we can only do so by what we perceive to be a contradiction in our will; since in recognizing that we *ought* not to do what yet we choose to do we are actually *willing* its contrary as what *ought* to be done, or, in the Kantian phrase, as law universal. And, as we can only be said in the proper sense to know *e.g.*, a mathematical truth when we see and understand its proof (or its self-evidence) *for ourselves*, so we can only recognize the obligation of a moral duty—which, again, as we have seen, means (even when we disobey it) *willing* it—when we recognize it *for ourselves*. But, on the other hand, we no more make the latter our duty by willing it than we make a mathematical proposition true by knowing it.

Now for Kant himself there was certainly not implied in his use of the word "autonomy" any denial of the authoritativeness of the law which yet (in a sense) we ourselves enact. A profound sense of this authoritativeness is, on the other hand, evinced throughout his account of the nature of morality; there is indeed nothing in his teaching which is more characteristic and distinctive. Nevertheless, since words are even less amenable to our control than Humpty Dumpty in the fairy tale was ready to admit, I strongly suspect that Kant's description of "autonomy" to express what was for him the supreme or rather the sole expression not merely of human freedom but of divine authority has eventually contributed to promote the widespread tendency actively present in contemporary thought upon moral and social problems, to repudiate altogether the conception of *authority* as in any sense primary or irreducible.

In England, at any rate, the first stage in the progress from the Kantian doctrine towards what may be called the anti-authoritarian ethics and politics now so much in vogue is represented by the teaching of Green. It might indeed seem

more natural to affiliate these not to the Kantian tradition at all, but rather to the Utilitarian, which could never find a place for a genuine "ought." I am not, however, denying the influence exerted by the latter; but only attempting to trace a less obvious, but perhaps not less important, line of descent connecting the ethics and politics in question with the great German philosopher in whom the "ought" had found its doughtiest champion. I have already pointed out how Green treats the notion of Obligation as flowing directly from that of a Common Good. The influence of Hegel may no doubt count for something in the divergence from Kant involved in making the latter rather than the former of these two notions primary in ethics; but what probably counted for more in an Oxford teacher was that of Plato and Aristotle, the intensive study of whose philosophy is the characteristic note of the Oxford philosophical course. It may also be regarded as in some sense a reversion from Kant to Rousseau, between whose doctrine of the General Will and Kant's doctrine of the Categorical Imperative there is, as I have noted above, a close kinship as well as an important difference. In recent English writers who may be said in a general way to belong to the school of Green in political philosophy, the doctrine of the General Will is often treated as fundamental; but I shall venture to urge that it is, despite its historical importance, less illuminating than is often supposed. For, after all, it is not because it is *general*, but because it is *right* that the *volonté générale* is really authoritative; it is only thus indeed that it can be distinguished from the *volonté de tous*, which we do not allow to be "general," though it is the will "of all," just because we do not approve it as that which all *ought* to will. Thus we may recognize that, if Kant's "analytical" method of procedure leads him to present, at any rate at the outset, too individualistic a conception of morality, owing to his consideration of the consciousness of moral obligation in abstraction from the social medium in which it arises and is maintained; on the other hand those who take

the "general will" for their watchword, by considering it in abstraction from the consciousness of obligation and treating that consciousness as explicable by reference to the "general will," miss what alone gives to that will any ethical significance.

But if the modern doctrine derived from Rousseau of a General Will is open to the charge of insufficiently emphasizing the notion of obligation, so also is the teaching of Aristotle, and possibly even that of Plato. Of Aristotle it must, I think, be admitted that he for the most part regards morality, as it were, from the outside, and not unfrequently seems to confound the phenomena of moral conduct with those which have only, as Croce might say, an economic character. This is pre-eminently the case with his celebrated doctrine of "habit" expounded in the second book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he speaks as if a certain kind of action could acquire a moral value by mere repetition, and appears to make no distinction of principle between moral education and the training of an animal to do tricks. Not only, however, in particular passages, but in his ethical teaching as a whole, there may be observed a failure to grasp the distinctive character of the moral experience. Thus, though he rightly lays it down that the virtuous man wills the action in which he displays his virtue δι' αὐτό, for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, yet with scant consistency herewith he regularly makes προαίρεσις, which is the will exerted in moral action, to be "of the means" and not "of the end." This inappropriate use of the category of means and end is bound, in the sphere of morals as of that of art, to lead to confusion; and Aristotle's whole exposition suffers from it. Εὐδαιμονία or "Happiness," which is the "end," being thus excluded from the "means" in dealing with which the moral life is, according to him, mainly, if not solely, concerned, inevitably tends, in consequence, despite his efforts to distinguish it from ἡδονή, "Pleasure," to be eventually confounded with it. Of course Aristotle does not

altogether ignore the obligatory character of morality; the frequent occurrence of the word *δεῖ* bears witness to the facts which were before him as they were before Kant; but, as I have tried to show, it is not grasped by him, as it is by Kant, as the distinctive feature of moral experience.

Of Plato, with his profounder insight into the facts of moral experience, these criticisms do not hold. His doctrine, which Aristotle so emphatically rejected, according to which the knowledge of the Supreme Good was the true foundation of social and individual morality, however in certain respects open, as stated by himself, to the criticisms brought against it by his famous pupil, does, I think, assign to morality that absolute value which it has for Kant, but not for Aristotle. Nevertheless, we may, I believe, safely admit that Kant in his insistence upon the "categorical imperative" of morality has supplied us with a description of the moral experience which we shall not easily find matched in clearness and decisiveness whether in Plato or in any other of the ancients.

I do not think that we can dissociate the tendency conspicuous in contemporary social and political thought at the least to lay no stress upon—and often to repudiate—the idea of *authority* (except may be in the sense in which we ascribe "authority" to expert opinion) from the acquiescence of those among the thinkers that have directly or indirectly moulded the minds of the present generation who have most earnestly upheld a spiritual interpretation of human life in the notion that such an interpretation can be satisfactorily based upon the conceptions of a General Will and a Common Good. Although such thinkers may themselves have so closely associated these conceptions with others derived from a different source that they did not realize the possibility of dissociating them from those, yet they have facilitated by subordinating the correlative conceptions of authority and obligation to those of a general will and a common good, a practical and even theoretical elimination of the former from the social and

political ideals of their successors. The philosophers of whom I am thinking were in their sympathies what is generally nowadays called "democratic." But the principles of a "democratic" society, if so worked out as not to secure to the idea of authority its primary and independent position, must ultimately cease to be what they are described as being in the title of Green's well-known lectures—"principles of political obligation." If I may here quote words of my own which I have used elsewhere: "One may quite well admit or even insist that only where the members of the community freely choose or accept for themselves the person or persons in whom the sovereign authority is reposed is there an adequate security that this person or these persons, since they are not of different clay from those that are to be in subjection to them, will be able to appeal to a sense that the government *has* authority and can claim loyalty and obedience from its subjects. In other words, the true ground of preference of free or popular institutions over despotic lies not in this, that no one is really under *obligation* to obey any authority but one which is ultimately *his own*; but in this, that only where he has himself a say in appointing or accepting the vehicles of that authority can he be counted upon to acquiesce in their authority as—not his own—but the best representative he can find of God's. The one-sided doctrine of the divine right of kings, that is to say, embodied one-half of the true doctrine of political obligation, while the one-sided doctrine of the rights of man embodied the other. In the process of reaction from the error which invested certain particular modes of selecting the supreme authorities in the community with a religious sanctity it is apt to be forgotten that there is a sense in which authority is not really authoritative at all unless it be essentially God's and not *our own* in any sense in which we can at all contrast our own with God's."

It is noticeable that Kant, while, as I observed before, he was probably, in part at any rate, induced to insist as he does

upon the "autonomy" of the Good Will by his desire to exclude any such reference to the will of God as the source of obligation as would introduce an element of arbitrariness into the moral law and open the door to the equation of positive enactments supposed to be "revealed" with rules genuinely apprehended as valid by the moral consciousness, yet not only admits that it is legitimate to represent moral laws as divine commands, but regards it as natural or even inevitable that we should do so. His language, moreover, about "personality" as the proper object of that reverence which yet is pre-eminently due to the moral law, though I do not say but that it is patient of an interpretation which would avoid a conclusion that Kant certainly fought shy of reaching, nevertheless points in a direction which I will here do no more than indicate because I have dwelt upon the subject elsewhere at some length. I will only hint my own conviction that a recognition, such as we find urged by Martineau, that in the consciousness of obligation there is implied not only a factor which we may call "autonomy," but one which, if we may adopt an expression already used by certain writers in this connexion, we may call "theonomy," would be contrary rather to the letter than to the spirit of Kant's doctrine; so long as we are prepared seriously to take to heart the principle involved in Kant's own treatment of theism as a "postulate of the practical reason" and to renounce any attempt to attain such a knowledge of the will of God in other ways than through the moral consciousness as would contaminate with arbitrary precepts the purity of the moral law. This can be done, as I venture to think, without refusing to acknowledge the possibility of such a personal intercourse with God in religion as Kant, in his dread of superstition, would never allow, but without which religion must cease to be religion, and become (as with Kant it tends to become) a mere symbol of morality.

Without, however, urging now the legitimacy of such an

advance as I have just outlined from Kant's position to one less hesitatingly theistic than his, I will only repeat my conviction that the notion of obligation cannot be directly derived from that of a "common good"; that, on the contrary, the notion of a "common good," as also the closely connected notion of a "general will," derives its significance for ethics and eventually for politics from its connexion with the notion of obligation; and that this makes it necessary for any truly ethical conception of the State to retain the idea of "authority," as ascertained, indeed, through the general will, because only thus can it be recognized as authority by the community for itself, but not as in itself merely the result of the generality of the general will, but as the expression of an absolute factor therein, which may perhaps be best described as the sovereignty of God.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street,
London, W. 1, on April 12th, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

VIII.—SYMPOSIUM: IS THE “CONCRETE UNIVERSAL” THE TRUE TYPE OF UNIVERSALITY?

By J. W. SCOTT, G. E. MOORE, H. WILDON CARR and
G. DAWES HICKS.

I.—*By* J. W. SCOTT.

No theory which professes to be knowledge can hope to stand if its truth would render knowledge itself an impossibility. We must know. There seems to be no getting away from at least this minimum of certainty.

There is left in the hands of the metaphysician, in consequence, one problem from which he cannot escape. What commentary is made upon the nature of the universe by the fact that knowledge arises in it? I believe that the presence of knowledge in the universe carries with it an affirmative answer to the question at the head of these papers, in the simpler form to which that question, I think, reduces itself, and to which I propose here to reduce it, namely, Is the universal concrete? The fact of knowledge seems to me to carry with it the consequence that the universal is the real, and so that it is concrete. Such, shortly stated, is the thesis which I should like to support in this paper.

In indicating how I seem to be brought to such a view, I shall give the position first quite crudely and summarily, and after that attempt some detail.

The fundamental point is a fairly simple one. It seems to me that if I know, then what I know is always someone else's. It is not simply mine. It is always other-than-mine; other-than-mine whilst mine.

And herein I find the answer to the question, Why is it, or How comes it, that that which I know presents itself to me

as real-and-objective? It presents itself thus, inasmuch as presentation precisely consists in the state of things where something of mine shows itself to be also, and at the same time, other-than-mine.

Finally, what appears in this state of things is universality, and concrete universality.

If I had to knit the three points together I should say:—*Someone else's and so objective, if there is to be knowledge at all.* And I should reckon that as amounting to the statement:—*Universality, and concrete universality, if there is to be knowledge at all.*

In attempting to interpret this statement in detail, it will be well, perhaps, to begin with the last-mentioned notion, universality. I take it that universality is simply the characteristic of being not mine alone but also other people's.

We may here recall the fact that this appears to have been the object of search in at least one famous enterprise in the history of philosophy which we all agree was a search for the universal; I refer to the dialectic of Socrates. His thirst for the Idea plainly has its spring in the sense that what is ours must be other people's too; that our meaning for Temperance or Justice cannot be allowed to be ours only. So long as what is just for the Athenian people does not hold at Sparta or elsewhere, discussion must go on. The situation is still present which keeps the dialectic in motion. The process comes to rest only in agreement; where what is just for me is also just for Thrasy-machus and you and everybody. In this context at least, we find a search instituted for that which exhibits the characteristic, if I might so express it, of being found by all.

There is a search still, I think, for the same thing, the found-by-all-minds. And, although it would probably not be so readily agreed to be a search for the universal, I think it is so. I refer to the work of natural science.

That the quest of modern science is for the universal would

not be so readily granted, perhaps, as that the Socratic dialectic was. Very little reflection, however, should be enough to convince us that is so. In trying, say, to define a circle, I am surely trying to say what it is-always, or what you meet every time you meet one. That, surely, is a process of seeking the universal. And it consists in trying to state what logically could be stated by anybody whomsoever regarding the circle now in front of him. In trying to describe imitation or play, to take an instance from another quarter, I am still after the universal. I am surely trying to say what play is-always. And that consists, again, in trying to express what anybody might see in the particular set of gambols of the particular animal or human being which he witnesses. In trying to settle the true paths of the planets I am similarly trying to settle what the planets are always-doing; and that, once more, is the attempt to say what they might be found engaged in, by anyone whomsoever. There is thus still a striving on the part of men to reach the universal in the sense of something which is not theirs alone, but which might at the same time be anybody's.

There is a point, then, where ancient dialectic and modern science meet; a standpoint from which both the ancient dialectical sifting of human opinions and the modern scientific observation of natural facts, can be seen to have had one and the same aim. They are a search for the universal in that both are a search for what x or y or z is-always. (That if they are the latter they are also the former should, I think, go without saying. What else can the universal be? How can I ask for the universal "white," for instance, or for the universal "upon," except in one way, namely, by asking to be told what "white" is-always, or what "upon" is-always? And the "always," as we are now contending, involves a reference to other minds which is as essential to the modern scientific procedure as to the ancient dialectical. It is only more clear in the latter than in the former.)

The universal, then, is that which is common to more than

me. The next point is that this of others', which I find and cannot be a knower without finding, this of others' which I meet on the door-step every time I seek as a knower to emerge from my own privacy into the great public world, this universal—is the real.

It was so to Socrates and Plato. The Justice and Beauty which might be all men's, were alone, to them, the real Justice and the real Beauty. Even by us, it is clearly presumed that until we have found what any one might find—until we have found the *definition* of the circle, the *law* of the planets' courses, etc.,—we have not found the real. We do not very naturally, however, go beyond this negative commitment. We usually allow that it is possible for us to have found this universal while yet the real escapes us. I think the larger presumption is justified. I think that when we have found the universal the real is indeed present to us. The universal, in fact, contains those parts of the real which we sometimes fancy may escape ; and in knowing it we know them.

What are the parts of the real which seem to be capable of wholly escaping one, even when he knows the universal? They are, of course, the universal's particulars. Now, the universal appears to me to contain its particulars.

We may test this thesis in more than one way. I think, for instance, that we may take it to the bar of common sense and find it justified there.

At the standpoint of common sense, what I am after when I seek to know, is not to apprehend the object as it is to me, but to apprehend it as it is to me and everybody. To some extent I succeed. What does such success imply? When do I see the object as it is to me and everybody? Surely when I see it as containing all possible appearances of itself.

Common sense does not consistently take the very first appearance to be what the thing is—always and what it is—to-all. Common-sense has its little search to make. And its search terminates upon that appearance which is the container of the

rest, as the front view of a façade contains all the perspective views, or as the circular aspect of a hoop contains all the elliptical aspects which it presents from different angles. What the object is-always contains what it momentarily seems. It is the real, therefore. When it is present the real is verily present.

But the best proof that the universal contains its particulars and so is real, lies in seeing that were it otherwise there could not be knowledge. Concrete universality must be, if there is to be knowledge at all. The reason is that except the particular were in a containing universal, nothing could present itself as other-than-me. And this independence of the object is essential to knowledge.

That other-ness is essential to knowledge hardly needs to be proved. Knowledge, to be at all, must be of something; and of something which is not me or just-mine, but is, on the contrary, common to others than just-me, to numerous others, in the end, infinitely numerous others. The question is, how what is mine can be others'. Its being theirs is the problem. This is its objectivity, this is its independence, this is its being on-its-own, and being no part or creation of my mind. Now what gives it this independence, what makes mine others' is, so far as I can see, just the concrete or containing universal. Let me try to state this crux of the position a little more explicitly.

The universe is compatible with there being knowledge. When its features, its form and colour and motion, decide not to remain dark but to appear in knowledge, it is in *knowledge* that they appear. What appear, in other words, are the features themselves in their authentic independence, not anything merely created by the contemplating point of consciousness. If I ask,—How can this be? How can I have to do with what is not just myself? How can I break the charmed circle of my own privacy and reach what is outside?—the only possible answer lies in the concrete

universality of the object. I contemplate what is not-myself simply because the fact that I have begun to contemplate involves already the fact that the object before me has ceased to be just-myself. I can break through the circle of my privacy simply because, as conscious, I am never in it. To be through the charmed circle of my own subjectivity is to be in the presence of what is others's; and I am always there when I am conscious. For as conscious I *am* others; I am many men in one. The object before me is consequently, on its side, many objects in one, many particulars in one containing (concrete) universal. Deepening my hold on any reality consists in letting more of that universal into consciousness, multiplying my points of contact with it through mobilizing my available points of consciousness. To encounter something independent is to have to do with something which is infinite others'; or is infinitely other-than-just-mine.

One effect of the realistic philosophy of the present has been to push into the foreground the idea of independence. In terms of this conception I would attempt to draw together what I have said in my paper into the following formula: *The necessary and sufficient condition of that independence of the object by which the possibility of knowledge stands or falls, is its concrete universality.* Ergo, there is concrete universality.

It will readily be remarked that I want to go the whole way, in insisting that knowledge must be of the independent. And it is quite true that I do. But the only independence which I can conceive of as characterizing a thing that is anything to me, consists in its being something to others too. If it is not theirs as it is mine, if it is not some such rest to their eyes as it is to mine, then whatever the independence attaches to, it does not attach to that object which, in the language of the familiar metaphor, swam into my field of vision and across it and out again. The object must have independence. True. But this means that something of what the object is to me

must independently be. The independence must attach to something I see.

On the other hand, if this be what must be found independent, then there is no difficulty in finding that it is so.

There is no difficulty in my really finding what yet is genuinely not-mine-only. This is because of what we have pointed out. It is because of the internal multiplicity of each individual personality. That each of us should be many men in one is a curious fact (though biology may have some light to cast on it), but it would seem to be a fact. There is no more insuperable difficulty, therefore, about you and me being in touch with the same independent objects and so being in the same world (what subjectivism denies to be possible) than about me being in contact with the same objects and being in the same world from time to time. If it is absurd to say that I am literally in the same world with my twin brother now, then it is also absurd to say that I am now in the same world with the child who went to school under my name, or with my self of ten years ago, or with myself of last year, of last week, or last hour. Whatever I find at all is common to many. It is already others'. And so it is independent.

To sum up:—Man's search, as a knower, is a search for what is others' or universal. To Socrates and Plato this of others' is the real. And they seem to be justified. Because it is the sole conceivable independent, of the sort requisite for the possibility of knowledge. It is the only independent which can conceivably be, at the same time, something-to-me. And the independence it has, consists precisely in its containing all it has to offer to others who could contemplate it; or, in other words, in its being concretely universal.

II.—*By G. E. MOORE.*

I propose to confine myself to discussing Mr. Scott's paper, although it seems to me to have hardly anything to do with the question we were asked to discuss. And I may as well begin with that one among his theses, which, owing to the form in which he has chosen to express it, might seem at first sight to be the most directly relevant to our question.

He tells us at first that he believes that "the universal is concrete," by which he ought to mean that *all* universals are concrete; while at the end of his argument he seems to confine himself to asserting that "there is concrete universality," by which he ought to mean that *some* are concrete. And, if he were using words in their proper senses, then either of these two assertions would, I think, have *some* relevance to our question, though obviously the second would have very little; you are giving no answer to the question whether universals are the true type of universality, by merely asserting that there *are* concrete universals. The assertion that *all* universals are concrete would, I think, have more relevance, though I cannot agree with Mr. Scott that our question can be reduced to the question, "Are all universals concrete?" That it cannot is, I think, clear from the fact that a person might consistently answer our question in the affirmative, while denying that all universals are concrete.

But, in fact, what Mr. Scott seems mainly to mean by the expression, "Some universals are concrete" is: Some things which are both mine and others' contain their particulars. And it seems to me quite plain that this is an utterly different proposition from the proposition that there are concrete universals. I do not for a moment believe that those philosophers who have used the term "concrete universal," and have been anxious to insist that there are concrete universals, have ever meant by this assertion merely that there are things which are both mine and others', and which contain their particulars. I think,

therefore, that this proposition of Mr. Scott's, as well as the universal proposition (if he means to make it) that *all* things that are both mine and others' contain their particulars, are wholly irrelevant to the question we were asked to discuss; but since they seem to be one of the things which Mr. Scott is anxious to maintain, I will give my reasons for dissenting from them.

One point is, I think, worth insisting on with regard to the meaning of the expression "*x* contains *its* particulars." Obviously it cannot be properly used to express the tautologous proposition "*x* contains those particulars which it does contain." What it ought to mean is that those things which have to *x* some relation *other* than that of being contained in it are *also* contained in it. And if the expression "universal" be used in what I venture to think is its most proper sense, namely, as equivalent to "characteristic," "property," "predicate," "attribute" (all of which can be properly used as synonyms), it is obvious enough what relation you are asserting to hold between any given thing A and any universal P, when you say that A is one of P's particulars. You are asserting of A simply that it *has* the characteristic P—that P can be truly predicated of it; so that if, *e.g.*, P be the characteristic of being red, the particulars of P will be all the things which are red. With this meaning it is obvious enough that, in general at all events, a universal does *not* contain its particulars. But if the term "universal" be used in the extraordinary sense in which Mr. Scott has thought proper to use it, as meaning "what is both mine and others'," it is no longer obvious what can be meant by saying of a given thing A that it is one of the particulars *of* a given universal. And, in fact, so far as I can gather, corresponding to his new use of the term "universal," Mr. Scott has adopted a new use of the expression "*x* contains *its* particulars." One such usage is clearly indicated in the case of the two solitary instances which he gives of so-called "universals," which, according to him, do "contain their parti-

culars." He implies that we have an instance of something which is both mine and others' "containing its particulars," whenever we have one "appearance" of a thing containing all the other "appearances" of the same thing, "as the circular aspect of a hoop contains all the elliptical aspects which it presents from different angles." That is to say, the new arbitrary definition of " x is one of y 's particulars," which he implies, is: x is an appearance of the same thing of which y is an appearance.

Now with this definition of " x contains its particulars," I doubt whether what is both mine and others' *ever* contains its particulars, for the simple reason that I doubt whether anything whatever ever does so. I doubt, that is to say, whether any appearance of a thing ever contains all the other appearances of the same thing. Mr. Scott tells us that the circular aspect of a hoop does contain all the elliptical aspects which it presents from different angles. Does he mean to say that a hoop never presents more than *one* circular aspect? The more natural use of language is certainly to say that it presents many, *e.g.*, a circular aspect of one size, when viewed from one distance, and a circular aspect of another size, when viewed from another. And if Mr. Scott is using "aspect" in this natural sense, in which the same hoop may present many different aspects, all circular, he would not have proved his point that there is any one aspect which contains all the other aspects even if he were right in saying that there is a circular aspect which contains all the *elliptical* aspects; since he would have to maintain that there is a circular aspect which contains all the other circular aspects as well as all the elliptical ones. If, on the other hand, he is using "aspect" in such a sense that a hoop never presents more than one circular aspect, this throws an important light on what he means by an aspect or appearance. He must in that case, I think, mean by *the* circular aspect of a hoop, *the* characteristic which a hoop appears to have when it appears to be circular—namely, circularity itself. In that case,

when Mr. Scott maintains that the circular aspect contains the elliptic aspects, he must mean that the characteristic "circularity" contains the characteristics, "elliptic of such a shape that the major and minor axis are in the proportions 2 to 1," "elliptic of such a shape that the major and minor axis are in the proportions 3 to 1," etc., etc. . . And it seems to me quite evident that the characteristic "circularity" does *not* contain these other characteristics; nor can I think of any case whatever in which one characteristic of a thing contains all the other characteristics which that thing may appear to have.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Scott is using "aspect" in such a sense that there are many different circular aspects, there are two different views as to what may be meant by any one circular aspect. Some people hold that the expression, "This hoop looks circular to me now," means "The sense-datum *of* this hoop presented to me now *is* circular"; and on this view, every different sense-datum which is *of* the hoop can be naturally called an aspect or appearance of it; and there will be as many different circular aspects of it as there are circular sense-data which are sense-data *of* it. Others hold that the meaning of the expression "This hoop looks circular to me now," cannot be analysed in this way: that it does not imply that anything whatever which is presented to me now really *is* circular; but only that something presented *appears* (in an ultimate sense) to be of a circular shape of some particular magnitude. On this view, no sense-datum would be an aspect or appearance of the hoop; there would only be as many different circular aspects of it, as there are circular shapes of different sizes, which it appears to possess; and it would be natural to call the different characteristics "having a circular shape of *this* size," "having a circular shape of *that* size," etc., the different circular aspects of the hoop. But, whichever of these two analyses of the facts be correct, it seems to me quite plain that in no case does any circular aspect of the hoop contain any elliptic aspect of it.

In short, in whichever of these three senses Mr. Scott is

using "aspect," it seems to me that his assertion that a circular aspect of a hoop contains its elliptic aspects is a sheer mistake; due, I think, to his confusing this assertion with the obvious fact that if you take a circular *area* of any particular magnitude of diameter, that area will contain elliptical areas such that every possible proportion holds between the lengths of their major and minor axis. This obvious fact by no means implies, as I suppose he must think it does, either that any elliptic sense-datum contained in a circular one is ever identical with any elliptic sense-datum of the same size and proportions which the same thing may present on another occasion, or that the characteristic "circular" ever contains the characteristic "having an elliptic shape of the proportion 2 to 1," or that such a characteristic as "having a circular shape of *this* size" ever contains such a characteristic as "having an elliptic shape, with major axis of *this* length, and with *this* proportion between major and minor axis."

For these reasons, if by "*x* contains its particulars" Mr. Scott means "*x* is an appearance which contains all the other appearances, which are appearances of the same thing of which *x* is an appearance," I should deny that anything ever contains its particulars, and therefore that anything which is both mine and others' ever does so.

In another passage, however, Mr. Scott seems to give a different meaning to "*x* contains its particulars," though he does not seem to notice that he is doing so. Immediately before the passage just referred to, he suggests that he means "*x* contains all possible appearances of itself." And with this meaning I am willing to admit that it *may* be true that *some* things which are both mine and others', in *some* of the senses in which Mr. Scott seems to use that expression, do contain their particulars. *Some* material objects seem to me to be both mine and others', in the sense that they are known both by me and by others, and *all*, I should say, are both mine and others' in the sense that they *might* (conceivably) be known by all minds; and I am willing to

admit that (as some seem to hold) it *may* be true that every material object contains every possible appearance of itself, in the sense that it contains all the sensibilia which might be sense-data *of* it ; though I cannot possibly be expected to discuss on this occasion whether any sense-data are sense-data *of* material objects in the required sense, or whether, if so, the material object *of* which they are sense-data contains them. If, however, by his statement, "The universal is concrete," Mr. Scott means merely to assert that *some* things which are both mine and others', namely, those which are material objects, contain, in this sense, all possible appearances of themselves, I am willing to admit he *may* be right, though I am surprised that he should seem so certain about it. But I should still protest that there is no sort of ground for the assertion, which he seems to mean to make, that *everything* which is both mine and others' contains all possible appearances of itself ; nor for the assertion which seems to me plainly false, that in knowing anything whatever I know all its particulars.

But how about his arguments in favour of his proposition that what is both mine and others' (always or sometimes) contains its particulars ? Perhaps they prove that he is right.

I can find only two arguments.

He tells us, to begin with, that his thesis "The universal is concrete" follows from the premiss "The universal is the real." And he seems in fact to use one argument, which does employ a premiss about reality. He tries, if I am not mistaken, to prove directly that every *known* real thing is (in one of his senses) both mine and others'. And he seems to assume, as self-evident (what I should not dispute), that some known real things have parts which are particulars. We thus get an argument having the two premisses "*Every* known real thing is both mine and others'" and "Some known real things contain particulars," which, of course, yield the conclusion "*Some* things that are both mine and others' contain particulars." But, of course, this argument does *not* yield the con-

clusion that anything whatever contains *its* particulars, except in the tautologous sense that it contains those particulars which it does contain ; and hence it seems to me that this argument entirely fails to prove even that *some* things which are both mine and others' contain their particulars, far less, of course that *all* do.

But there is another argument, if it can be called so, suggested by Mr. Scott, which uses no premiss with regard to reality, and which, if sound, would yield the conclusion that *everything* which is both mine and others', in the sense that it is known both by me and others, must contain several particulars. This argument, so far as I can see, simply consists in laying it down as a self-evident principle that, in order that a given object A may be known to both of two different subjects, S^1 and S^2 , it must contain both of two different objects, O^1 and O^2 , one of which belongs in some sense exclusively to S^1 and the other exclusively to S^2 . And with regard to it, I have only to say, first, that it again would not yield the result that any such object contained any of *its* particulars, but only that it contained *some* particulars : in order to yield the result that it contained *its* particulars, it would have to be further assumed either that O^1 and O^2 were both appearances of A, or that they were both appearances of the same thing of which A was an appearance. And, secondly, I cannot see the slightest ground for regarding the principle as true. I can only suggest that Mr. Scott may have been led to suppose it self-evident, owing to what seems to be an empirical fact : namely, that when two subjects, S^1 and S^2 , perceive the same *material object* A, it always does present to each of them an appearance which it does not present to the other ; and owing to his making the further assumption that these two appearances are both contained in A. I cannot see the slightest ground for supposing that, even if this is true of material objects, it is true of *all* objects known by several minds. Indeed, in order that I may know that it is true of material objects, it is obvious that I

must, in a sense, be able to know the appearance which a material object presents to you, though that appearance is not presented to me. Does Mr. Scott hold that in order that you and I may both know this appearance, it must, in its turn, present different appearances to you and me, and so on *ad infinitum*?

I have only space for one more remark on Mr. Scott's paper. So far as I can see, he is quite as anxious, if not more so, to maintain the thesis which he expresses in the form "The universal is the real," as to maintain that with which we have been hitherto concerned, and which he calls "The universal is concrete." And by the form of words "The universal is the real," he means, so far as I can make out, principally the proposition: Every real thing that is *known* is both mine and others'.

Now in order to consider whether this proposition is true, we have to ask what he means by "both mine and others'." And he himself identifies the meaning of this expression with at least three entirely different conceptions, without appearing to be at all aware that they are different. He tells us (1) that by "*x* is both mine and others'" he means: *x* is found by all minds; he tells us next that what he means is (2) *x* might be found by anybody; and he tells us, finally, that what he means is (3) *x* is what some sort of thing *is-always*. I should like briefly to define my attitude to each of the three propositions which will result from understanding "is both mine and others'" in the statement "Every known real thing is both mine and others'" in each of these three senses:—

(1) As for the proposition that Every known real thing is actually found by all minds, I have only to say that I see not the slightest reason for believing it. On the contrary, it seems to me highly probable that many real things that have been known to each of us have never been known in any sense to any other mind.

(2) On the other hand, the proposition that Every known

real thing *might* be found by anybody, seems to me to be true but absolutely trivial, if it means only: There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that what is known by me *might* have been known by anybody else; and false, if it means anything else.

(3) The proposition that Every known real thing is something which some sort of thing "*is-always*" seems to me certainly false. In order that *x* may be what some sort of thing, *e.g.*, a circle, "*is-always*," *x* must be a characteristic, *i.e.*, a universal in the proper sense of the term; since to say "A circle is-always *x*" means merely "*Every* circle possesses the characteristic *x*." And it seems to me absolutely certain that not all known real things are characteristics; *e.g.*, no event is a characteristic, no material object is one. That Mr. Scott should suppose the opposite seems to me only explicable on the hypothesis that, as has often been done, he has confused the "is" of predication with the "is" which expresses identity, and has supposed that when I assert "A is red" I am asserting that A is identical with the characteristic of being red.

III.—By H. WILDON CARR.

Dr. Moore has submitted Mr. Scott's thesis to a critical logical analysis, but prefaces this by expressing a doubt whether the thesis has anything whatever to do with the question we are asked to discuss. Whether it has or not I find the thesis of great interest, and propose, as Mr. Moore has done, to take my lead entirely from it. My interest, however, is in the metaphysical import of the argument rather than in the formal consistency or inconsistency of the logic.

The "concrete universal" I take to mean the theory of those who, following the Hegelian principle, the real is the rational, hold that it is possible to give a consistent account

of experience, subjective and objective, internal and external, without resorting to the notion of an extra-mental object of knowledge, existing independently, confronting the mind and exercising upon it an influence to which it is purely passive and receptive. The expression "concrete universal" conveys to me in its very terms the self-sufficiency of mind and the inclusion within its activity of the object of knowledge: for the term *universal* can only apply to concepts, not to intuitions, and the term *concrete* can only be descriptive of that which possesses within itself the ground of its existence. The question propounded to us—is the "concrete universal" the true type of universality?—means for me the problem of the nature of the concept. Is a concept an abstraction from particular reals, a convenient mental device for classifying the passively received revelation of experience, or for making an inventory of its contents? Is it only the naming of classes in order to facilitate intercourse? Or, is it a comprehensive and self-sufficient and inclusive apprehension by the mind of its own activity in the definite stages or moments of its life? In affirming that the pure concept is a moment of developing mind-life, by which I mean a stage or degree in the outward expression of an inner mind-energy, and in denying that the pure concept is an abstraction which the mind makes from particular independent reals, assumed or inferred to be presented to it, I suppose myself to be answering the question in the affirmative.

Mr. Scott also answers the question in the affirmative. The reason he gives for his answer, however, implies an entirely opposite meaning in the terms, and the difference between my view and his is only concealed by our identical answer to the question. Mr. Scott's argument is a striking one, but it is not new—it is practically the common-sense reply which Reid proposed to the scepticism of Hume. Also its revival is not novel, for it is substantially the position of the new, or as it is now more often called, the critical realism. I do not think

the argument is sound, either against Hume, or against modern idealists. It declares concrete universality to be the fact that the "object" of my knowledge is not mine alone, or simply mine, it is also someone else's, just as Reid said that when ten men look at the sun, each sees the one object of common-sense. I dispute the fact. Nothing is plainer to me than that the "object" of my knowledge is not someone else's, and that when ten men look at the sun each man's "object" is different.

It does not seem to me that the two positions are to be resolved by argument. If anyone tells me that he believes the "object" of his knowledge to be identical with the "object" of mine, at the same time that he acknowledges (as surely he must) that the image in his mind is totally different from the image in mine, I cannot think of any way of disproving it. I can only wonder that he should suppose such a hypothesis necessary (for such I understand to be the argument) in order to explain intercourse. This is at any rate the crucial point with Mr. Scott. All I can do, therefore, when presented with such hypothesis is to point out that if there exist a common object of two minds, independent of the individual image in each mind, then in so far as it is universal it is not concrete but abstract, and in so far as it is concrete, it is not universal but particular. And I challenge Mr. Scott to show me how his universal can become concrete save by becoming particular, and how, if it be supposed concrete, its universality can be anything but a pure abstraction?

I admit, however, that in concentrating attention on the problem of intercourse Mr. Scott does good service, for he enables us to see very clearly the essential difference between the two principles. He shows, in fact, how both have their origin and take their departure from the critical philosophy. I agree with the realist that it is impossible for the mind to construct the object of knowledge out of sense-data, Kant's intuitions, by means of concepts belonging to the original nature

of the mind, Kant's categories. I understand the critical realists to insist that an *a priori* condition of the possibility of knowledge is the existence of the object of knowledge. If this be their position (I have to be cautious for I am generally charged with misunderstanding them), then I agree to this extent that they are pointing to a hiatus or deficiency in Kant's theory of knowledge. (I mean, of course, Kant's theory as it is generally understood.) I hold in opposition to the realists that there is no need to go outside the mind to make good this defect. What Kant has not seen is that the image, which is the immediate object of knowledge, is not a construction nor an agglomeration of manifold sense intuitions or sense-data, it is a *sui generis* work of the mind.

My theory turns upon this point. There are images, that is, mental objects, which are not constituted of, nor analysable into, sense-data; and it is images, not sense-data, that our concepts relate. It seems to me that this fundamental principle, or at least that its full significance, has been unnoticed until our own generation. The merit of having called attention to it belongs to Benedetto Croce. I refer to his æsthetic theory.

The concrete universal is Kant's principle of the synthesis *a priori* carried to its complete logical conclusion. It is not a fact to which we can point and say there it is. It is a principle which is called for by the negative results which have followed and which must follow all attempts to deduce the possibility of knowledge from the assumption that the antithesis between mind and matter, subject and object, which common-sense accepts as fact, is original. It is impossible to conceive any way by which dual existences could severally or mutually generate the knowing relation. Descartes, who wrestled hardest with the problem, had to fall back on faith in the veracity of God.

When the idea of this original synthesis is presented in such terms as *élan vital*, activity, mind or spirit, life or consciousness,

we are at once reminded that we are borrowing from our ordinary experience figurative expressions which have in experience no substantial reality. We never, it is said, experience movement, life or thought, but only things that move, beings who live, minds which think. The reply is that this is true and also that it is the ground of our appeal to the principle of the concrete universal. The polarization of the subject-object relation which characterizes actual experience must have its ground in an identical nature. Extension, which gives the universe its aspect of externality, has its correlate in tension. The principle is grounded in the very nature of conceptual thought.

I conceive, then, the ultimate reality of the universe on the analogy of the individual mind. Mind is the only real existence which I know, or at any rate might know, directly and without mediation. In my developed experience I distinguish minds from the bodies to which they are attached, and the actions of these bodies seem to contrast as *reality*, with mental action—thoughts, desires, purposes and ends—as *ideality*. The bodily actions which express the life of the mind have a beginning and end in time and boundaries in space, and they are therefore a finite part of an external universe, but when I integrate these bodily actions in my full concept of mental activity the limitations alter their character. The restrictions which circumscribe the activity of the individual mind are not the spatial and temporal limitations which circumscribe the activity of the body. I cannot in fact conceive mind as I conceive body as pure actuality. I have to duplicate actuality with virtuality. Whenever an action is presented to me which I interpret as the expression of a mind, interpretation means that I duplicate the expression with an intuition. The concrete universal means that I cannot cut expression from intuition, ideality from reality, actuality from virtuality.

Now the challenge to such a position which is usually put forward, and which, if I am not mistaken, Mr. Scott in particular would make, is: "Very good, but you are now

intrigued into the solipsistic *impasse*. Your theory makes intercourse an illusion." It is therefore the fact of intercourse which appears to the realist to demand as the *a priori* condition of its possibility the positing of the object of knowledge as independent real. How, it is asked, can there be common knowledge unless there be independent objects common to the knowers? What else is a common object but one which is presented indifferently to individual minds for their discernment? The reply of the idealist is that this is completely to misunderstand the nature of intercourse and actually to misinterpret its mode. It is not possible to divide the world into entities which are active (minds) and entities which are passive or inert (objects), because passivity is a limit the attainment of which is simply extinction. What does nothing is nothing. There exists no mode by which anything can manifest quality save by exercising activity. The activity must fall on the mental side. Activity cannot be expressed as a property of the inert, that would be a plain self-contradiction. There is no way of conceiving the purely inert, of distinguishing it from pure nothing. This disability does not attach to the concept of activity simply because that concept is directly given to us in life, mind, consciousness itself. Mind or spirit is activity, activity which unfolds or develops. The intuition which is expressed in the image, the image which reveals the intuition is concrete ideality. Images and concepts are all the mind possesses and these are the products of its activity. In intercourse the mind does not project its images or concepts into another mind (as those who believe in telepathy for example appear to hold) but the actions which are the outcome of one mind's activity evoke the expression by another mind of its intuitions. Intercourse does not depend on common objects but on responsive actions. That common objects, if we suppose them to exist, should manifest themselves by a chaotic multiplicity of sense-data is to me simply unintelligible. The mind and its world is one and

indissoluble. This, in my view, is the theory of the concrete universal.

Let me now set against the view of Mr. Scott my own scheme of the activity which finds expression in intersubjective intercourse, in order directly to challenge the theory that at any stage whatever it is necessary to introduce the notion of independent common object. In my view so far from simplifying the problem of intercourse such a hypothesis would complicate it. I prefer, however, simply to challenge the fact. I say that as a matter of fact we communicate by sensibility, by emotion, and by imagery and not by the mutual recognition of independent objects. The living being, man or animal, enters on individual existence with the lines of objectivation, or the articulation of reality, determined in advance. Consider then the mind in its development? Is it a fact that sense stimuli cluster together to form objects? Clearly not, such clusters would not be objects in the sense required. Sense stimuli call into activity imagination; intuitions find expression in the images formed; images frame themselves in perceptions; perceptions are virtual actions, they present to the mind the outline of its actions as well as being the condition of them. A mother kisses her child,—where and what is the “object” such intercourse is supposed to require? Each no doubt feels the impact, each, let us suppose, experiences the emotion, each may create a wealth of imagery,—imagery of one another, imagery of their several worlds. There is clearly sensibility, emotion and imagery,—where and what is the common object identical for each and of which each is a passive discerner. Intercourse between minds depends wholly and at every stage on mental activity, and this self-sufficiency of mental activity is my theory of the concrete universal.

IV.—By G. DAWES HICKS.

"The key to all sound philosophy lies in taking the concrete universal, that is, the individual, as the true type of universality." In these words Dr. Bosanquet gives expression to what he would probably not hesitate to call the fundamental principle of his *Gifford Lectures*. He explains that by individual in this context he means "a system of members, such that every member, being *ex hypothesi* distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities which constitute its distinctness." An individual of this character he usually identifies with a "concrete universal," although sometimes he speaks of it as a "true embodiment" thereof. And he contrasts universality with generality: the latter he characterises as "sameness in spite of the other," the former as "sameness by means of the other." Dr. Bosanquet has given us, in fact, an independent presentation and elaboration of Hegel's argument in the third book of the *Logik*, and has raised an interesting issue for discussion.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Scott was prevented, by the restrictions of space imposed upon us in this Symposium, from showing the way in which he conceives his thesis to be connected with that just indicated. When he finds that Dr. Carr has taken his argument to be identical with the "reply which Reid proposed to the scepticism of Hume," I imagine his feeling will be not unlike that of the eels that were skinned by the fair Molly,—a feeling, namely, of being lost between pain and astonishment. For, unless I am greatly mistaken, so far from wishing to recommend the doctrine of Reid, Mr. Scott is taking his departure, as, indeed, Hegel likewise did, from the familiar contention of the Kantian philosophy that objectivity is identical with universality, that it is the function of thought to be productive of that peculiar component in the content apprehended which constitutes it, apart from its special sensuous clothing, an object at all.

"An object," said Kant, "is that in the notion of which the manifold of a given intuition is combined"; in other words, the sense manifold was, so to speak, fitted into a framework of universal notions, and these subjective notions then presented themselves to us objectively as part and parcel of every externality of sense that can come before us. Not only so. The universality of the object had as its necessary correlate the universality of the subject; and for such subject the object was an object of possible experience, and might, therefore, be said to be a common object (*das All-Gemeine*) for all individual subjects. I do not, of course, suggest for a moment that Mr. Scott is desirous of committing himself to the details of the Kantian analysis. But I have little doubt that in laying the stress he does upon presentation consisting in "the state of things where something of mine shows itself to be also, and at the same time, other-than-mine," he has been largely influenced by the leading ideas of that analysis. And I gather from what he has written elsewhere that he does intend to imply, after the manner of Hegel, that the universal, which in his view is the real, and therefore concrete, is at once a self-constructing activity, and at the same time (up to the limit of our apprehension of it) "a construction of ours; none the less our construction for its being the Absolute's."

In a curious passage of the first edition of the *Critique* (A. 385), Kant talks of the presentations of outer sense as having the appearance of "detaching themselves from the soul and hovering about outside of it"; and in a manner it would not be unfair to say that the whole armoury of the categories was called into requisition in order to account for the alleged fact which is thus paradoxically described. Somewhat similarly, Mr. Scott states the problem of knowledge, as he conceives it, in the form: "How can I break through the charmed circle of my own privacy and reach what is outside"? The implication apparently is that an object first of all presents itself to me as "just-myself," and then somehow "ceases to be

just-myself," and becomes other than myself. And the brunt of the problem would seem to lie in finding a mode of explaining this extraordinary transformation. I am bound at once to say that I think the problem thus presented to be an entirely fictitious problem; and Mr. Scott himself virtually admits it to be such when he proceeds to answer his question by saying, enigmatically enough, "I can break through the circle of my privacy simply because, as conscious, I am never in it."

It is not, however, difficult to see why, in the Kantian and post-Kantian theories of knowledge, objectivity should have been brought into such close and intimate connexion with universality. Whether when ten men look at the sun they are each of them seeing different suns or the same sun, certain it is that when they are thinking of the law of gravitation or judging, for example, that "similarity is a relation" (presuming, of course, that they *are* thinking about these things and not about something else), what each is thinking of is not different from what the others are thinking of, but is identical with it. If, then, all objects of sense-apprehension either involve as part of their structure *a priori* determination by universal factors (as Kant held) or *are* syntheses or "meeting-points" of universals (as was Hegel's view), there would appear to be at once suggested a mode of explaining what unquestionably both Kant and Hegel took to be a fact that an object of knowledge is a common object for individual minds.

But obviously the two notions—the notion of universality and of that which is common for different individual minds—cannot be forthwith treated as coincident. Whatever else the term "universal" may signify, it signifies at least this—a property or attribute or predicate that characterises two or more so-called things. What, then, is the connecting link between "common to different objects" and "common for different minds"? It is to be found, so far as Kant is concerned, in the thought of *Bewusstsein überhaupt*,—in the thought, namely, of the universal consciousness, of which, in its relation

to the manifold of sense, the categories are the ways of expression. It is to found, so far as Hegel is concerned, in the thought of the notion or concept as "the principle of all life, and thus possessing in every part a character of concreteness," as "an infinite and creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the plenitude of all it contains."

Neither mode of effecting the transition can be pronounced successful. As regards the first, while an object is declared only to be an object in virtue of its *a priori* factors, yet it remains nothing short of miraculous that these, if not intrinsically characterising empirical contents, should be somehow imported into them from the outside. As regards the second, with which we are mainly concerned, it seems to me to be based upon a number of erroneous assumptions to some of which I will briefly refer.

One has to remark, at the outset, upon the woeful confusion between a universal and the conception of a universal. Two of Hegel's most competent interpreters, W. T. Harris and William Wallace, agree that he ought never to have employed the term *Begriff* with the significance which he here attaches to it, the former asserting that his having done so has given rise to more serious misunderstanding of his system than any other cause. That may be; but more is evidently involved in such procedure than the mere misuse of a term. It involved, in fact, the failure to recognise a two-fold distinction, the neglect of which is fatal to clear thinking. It is essential, namely, to distinguish the act of cognising a universal both from the universal itself and from the way in which that universal, in and through the act in question, is cognised. A mental state of *conceiving* is undoubtedly a concrete event or occurrence, a "moment," if you will, "of developing mind-life"; but it is as such neither a concept nor a universal. It is characterised, of course, as every other concrete fact is characterised, by a plurality of properties which it has in common with other mental states, whether of conceiving,

or of perceiving, or even of willing; but in itself it is as definitely *particular* as any fact in nature can possibly be. If it were, in truth, all that Hegel says it is—a self-determining activity which supplies its own matter or contents—still that would not in any way convert it into a universal in the sense in which he, like every one else, is perpetually using the term. Again, a concept is the way in which a universal is conceived, the mode in which it is grasped or apprehended by thought, and obviously is not to be confounded with the act through and by means of which it has been attained. A concept, as Mr. Bradley puts it, does not happen, neither can it possess a place in the series of events. And, lastly, although it is usual roughly to identify concepts and the universals to which they refer, and although for ordinary purposes no serious misunderstanding is thereby occasioned, yet it needs but little reflection to realise that the identification is in strictness illegitimate and may readily lead, in dealing with a question of the kind we are now discussing, to downright error. A concept is a product of thought—of thought exercised doubtless upon a world of objects which are found to exhibit certain identities of character. Its manner of formation can be more or less psychologically traced, and its actual nature determined. It is reached by a process that is at once analytic and synthetic; a process, on the one hand, of singling out what is imbedded in a matrix of reality, and, on the other hand, of bringing together what is presented in numerical difference. The universal to which it refers is a quality characterising a number of particulars, often widely removed from one another in time and space,—a “pervasive character of things,” as Alexander expresses it; although what precisely the pervasiveness implies is a vexed metaphysical problem.

Mr. Scott would solve that problem in Hegelian fashion*

* “The universal,” says Hegel, “is identical with itself, with the express qualification, that it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual.” Or, again, “the universal is that which permeates and includes in it everything particular.” *Et passim*.

by insisting that the universal contains its particulars. I agree entirely with Dr. Moore's criticism of that contention, and there is no need to reiterate what he has so lucidly said. I will only add that the instance which Mr. Scott gives of his thesis seems to be unfortunately chosen. Even though there were one 'appearance' of a thing which contained all the other 'appearances' of the same thing, yet that would surely not entitle us to describe the former as a universal. If I fill a tumbler with a number of smaller tumblers, each one fitting into another, I do not thereby change the nature of the containing tumbler; it remains still just the *particular* entity that it was when it contained nothing but air. And so likewise with respect to the containing appearance. In what sense can the appearances which it contains be said to be 'its particulars'? If the reply be that the containing appearance is not a mere indiscriminate collection of other appearances, but a unity, more or less systematic, of specific contents, an individual with a variety of characteristics, then clearly the same might be said of any one of the contained appearances, and what the contention really amounts to is that there are no such things as particulars at all.

Indeed, in whatever way the doctrine of 'concrete universals' be formulated, it seems inevitably to involve the abandonment of any distinction between universal and particular. The true universal, it is maintained, is the individual; a system of members, such that each member contributes to the unity of the whole, and the unity of which permeates the whole, so that the members are related to the unity, as its adjectives or attributes. And inasmuch as each of the members is declared to be a system of like nature, one seeks in vain to discover anything which can be said to be particular. The individual, in the sense of an independent substantive existent, vanishes, and in its place is substituted a phase in some universal, which in its turn is a phase in another, and so on, until ultimately the culmination is reached in the Absolute.

As against this view, I would urge that the unity of the universal *in* its particulars is totally different from the unity of the individual as a unity *of* its attributes. Colour, for example, as a characteristic of material things, may no doubt possess some kind of unity, but most assuredly it is not *the* kind of unity exemplified by what is ordinarily called an individual. Appearing, as it does, here, there and everywhere, under the most varying conditions, there is amongst colours simply nothing corresponding to the unity and continuity of an individual object. The idea that there is a correspondence only seems plausible, as Professor Hobhouse has recently argued, because the universal is confused with the concept of it. The concept colour we can, as he points out, picture to ourselves, with some show of reason, as a sort of scheme, which in order to be realised must be filled in in certain definite ways, but which as a scheme maintains its unity through all its differences of fulfilment. And then to describe a thing as having a particular colour will seem to be tantamount to placing it in the scope of this scheme; "colour," we can say, "is a spirit upon things by which they become expressive to the spirit." But the conceptual system is one thing and the reality to which it refers another; and, whatever the relation between them may be, it manifestly is not a relation of identity. "The universal," so Hegel affirmed, "is the ground and foundation, the root and substance of the individual. Caius, Titus, Sempronius, and the other inhabitants of a town or country are all men. That they are so is not merely something which they have in common, but something without which these individuals would not be at all." They are individuals, that is to say, only as included in and controlled by a superior individual. The passage illustrates with sufficient clearness the confusion which Hobhouse is concerned to exhibit. Caius and Titus are each of them individuals, and each as a physical and thinking being has a unity pervading his different characteristics resembling in some measure the way in which colour pervades red and

blue. Each of these men has, however, an unbroken continuity of temporal existence; and, although both of them possess the common character of manhood, that common character is quite other than substantive continuity. It is true that Caius and Titus may belong to a family or clan, the members of which are in intimate relations with one another, and such a family or clan may be said in a sense to form an individual whole. But as such this family or clan would not like manhood be a universal, but essentially an individual, though an individual of a type different from that of a physical and self-conscious individual. To represent the individual as a universal because it is a unity in the diversity of its constituents and qualities is an error at once in logic and in metaphysics.

My main point, then, is that there is a fundamental difference between a universal and an individual, and that no universal, however complex, can become an individual. An individual is a substantive in the sense that it can neither be predicated of, nor inhere in, anything else; in a significant predication, it can be referred to only as subject and never as predicate. And the reason is that it can never be exhaustively determined by the universals that characterise it; it can be adequately determined only by the unique position it occupies in the world of existent fact. The individual, in other words, is never a mere combination or "meeting-point" of universals, simply because universals are not individuals, and no synthesis of any number of them could ever yield of itself the concrete existence of an individual thing. One is not of course intending to deny that whenever we characterise a substantive by an adjective we are thinking of the adjective as capable of characterising a plurality of instances. But that is never the whole of our meaning. We cannot think of adjectival predicates without at the same time thinking of them as exemplified in instances which are ultimately concrete individual things. "Wandering adjectives" can be, at the most, but concepts; a

universal is to be found not apart from but as qualifying particulars, while it is equally true that particulars exist only as qualified by universals.

I return now to Mr. Scott's paper, in order to elicit information regarding a contention upon which considerable weight appears to be laid. "Concrete universality must be," he says, "if there is to be knowledge at all. The reason is that except the particular were in a containing universal, nothing could present itself as other-than-me." Why not? If we had any ground for supposing that each individual mind were so constructed as to be quite unlike any other, and that no one could direct his apprehension upon an external object without casting over it a film "created" by peculiar eccentricities of his own, there might be cause for the scepticism suggested, although in that case I am at a loss to understand how the fact of the particular being in a containing universal would have the smallest tendency to mend matters. I can, however, find no justification for any such supposition. Intelligent minds are, I take it, concrete individuals characterised, as all concrete individuals are characterised, by common attributes. There is nothing, therefore, in their structure to countenance the surmise that their modes of apprehending concrete objects must deviate from one another in any considerable degree, and nothing, so far as I can discover, to lead us to imagine that such modes of apprehension are ill-adapted for discharging their function. Why, in order to apprehend as other men do must I, in some admittedly "curious" way, be those other men in one? To have a dozen eyes instead of two, or half a dozen centres of consciousness instead of a single centre, would surely make rather for baffling bewilderment than for mutual harmony.

I have only space for a brief concluding word on one topic touched on by Dr. Carr. When I found him identifying "critical realism" with the "new realism," I too felt like those eels skinned by the fair Molly. I believe I am responsible for coining the phrase "critical realism," at least in this country. I

explained carefully that it was introduced for the purpose of designating a theory of knowledge diametrically opposed to the "new realism"; and, so far as I know, no adherent of the latter has ever had the slightest wish to adopt the name. Latterly it has been made use of by a certain school of American philosophers; but, although I gather their position is different from mine (their book of Essays is announced, but has not yet appeared), they are no less opposed to the realism that is called "new." One of the chief positions of the critical realists is that in the act of perceiving an object there is no "image" in the mind, and in that respect I should imagine Mr. Scott is at one with them. Again, they have never insisted that the existence of an object is "an *a priori* condition of the possibility of knowledge." They have tried to show that in perception the presence of an existent object can be empirically established. Once more, so far as I am aware, no one has ever imagined that the world is divided into "entities which are active (minds) and entities which are passive or inert (objects)." No existent object, I should say, can be passive or inert, simply because it forms part of an interconnected causal system, and moreover is a source of bodily stimulation when standing in relation to a percipient individual.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street, W.1,
on April 26th, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

IX.—BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS IN CHINA AND JAPAN.

By WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN.

It is interesting to note that both Occidental and Oriental philosophy started with a similar problem, and having answered it in different ways continued thereafter to diverge. The speculators of Greece and India both began with the antithesis of Being and Becoming, or the Unchanging and the Changing, with which we may, in these days associate the conceptions of Space as opposed to Time.

Plato and Aristotle attempted to compromise between the Eleatic school and the teaching of Heraclitus, but their compromise was essentially in favour of the school of Being. According to Platonism, the phenomenal world is in a state of constant flux, is a Becoming, but behind it is the static world of reason, the unchanging noumenal world. The importance and value of this standpoint is obvious. It has been the rational basis of dogma, whether scientific, religious, or philosophical. Two and two are forever four; a is always a ; a thing is, or it is not; there is an Absolute or there is not an Absolute.

1. *Primitive Buddhism.*

In India, when an age of metaphysical inquiry arose after the decay of the primitive faith of the Vedas, the system which for a number of centuries secured predominance was Buddhism. This philosophy insisted upon the theory of change, of impermanence, of the eternal becoming. The noumenal and static aspect of the system, *Nirvāṇa*, was never developed from the logical point of view.

The body was considered a living, complex, mutating organism, possessing no self-nature. The nature of the "soul" was supposed to be analogous. The percipient consciousness was no fixed entity having a direct insight into truth through a stable and transcendental reason, but a compound effected by the chain of causation, and conditioned by its environment.

In its earlier stages this philosophy resulted in a curious form of agnosticism. Our minds being finite, we can obtain no definite information as to whether the world is infinite or not. We can not know the ultimate nature of external reality. We can only deal with facts and data of which we are immediately conscious; with states of consciousness; with an analysis of the emotions; with the universe as perceived, as opposed to the universe as it is.


Primitive Buddhism was built upon this psychological basis. The three "marks" or essential features are constructs arising from perceptual or emotional experience. "(1) All is impermanent. (2) All is sorrowful. (3) All is lacking a self." This last phrase refers not only to the soul, but to the universe as a whole. It consists not of simple or self-existing things, but of complex, caused, conditioned things. The fourth "mark," *Nirvāṇa*, is no less psychological. By means of contemplation certain forms of *samādhi* trance or ecstasy were experienced. Magnify the experience, consider it permanent, associate with it the abolition of sorrow, sin, and ignorance, and the theory of *Nirvāṇa* is formulated, for it must be remembered that originally *Nirvāṇa* is purely a state of mind.

The so-called Four Noble Truths are derived from the same basic ideas. Transformed from an ancient Indian medical rune, they are:—(1) Suffering exists. (2) The cause of suffering is desire (and ignorance). (3) There is a possible end of suffering—*Nirvāṇa*. (4) This end may be achieved by following the Noble Eight-fold Path. The first and third "truths" are the same as the second and fourth "marks." The fourth is purely a point of ethics and does not concern us. The second is the

most important; and contains the seed of a very complete phenomenology, for at a very early stage "suffering" became, in this instance, synonymous with life, and this "truth" was supposed to explain the origin of the experienced world—the *experienced* universe let it be noted, for early Buddhism had no interest in the origin of the external universe.

Primitive Buddhism was probably realistic. It believed that there is an external universe closely corresponding to our sense-data, but it realized that in its present form the world as we see it is subjective, the result of the action of the percipient consciousness (*Vijñāna*) acted upon by external stimuli.

The theory of the origin, awakening, and development of the *Vijñāna* is explained in the obscure *Pratitya Samutpāda* or the twelve-linked chain of causation. A more lucid account is contained in the much later *Prajñā Pāramita Āstra*, viz. :—



The commentary states that the elementary mind substance (*Citta*), coming in contact through the five sense organs with the five sense objects gives rise to *Vedanā* (sensation or perception). This, in turn, gives rise to *Vijñāna* proper (here equivalent to self-consciousness), which again results, in *Samjñā* (conception, ratiocination, here equal to consciousness of externality), and so the fully developed experienced world (*Samskāra*) comes into being.

The origin of the percipient consciousness is ignorance and desire. Without these the individual consciousness would

disintegrate, and though the experienced universe cannot exist without object, it equally cannot exist without subject. Consequently when an *Arhat* (one who has attained *Nirvāna*) dies, the experienced world for that personality comes to an end.

Such was early Buddhism, or so Japanese scholars suppose, and we are not at present concerned whether or not they are historically correct.

2. *Hīnayāna Buddhism.*

This philosophy became crystallized in Hīnayāna Buddhism, the Orthodox branch of the faith which, though long ago driven out of India, maintains itself in Burma, Ceylon, and Siam. Though it calls itself *Theravāda* (The Way of the Elders) and attempts to keep to the letter of the law expounded by Gautama Buddha, it has added several important features. The most important point is that it has abandoned the agnosticism concerning the external world of the earlier faith, and depending upon the fidelity of sense impressions proceeds to systematize objective phenomena. Thus, for example, it has accepted in a slightly modified form the ancient cosmogony of India, with its geography, astronomy, and account of the integration and disintegration of the material (*i.e.*, external) universe.

The metaphysical analysis of the parts of being was also vigorously developed. Early Buddhism had taught that instead of an ego-entity, the personality consisted of five constituent parts (*skandha*), viz.:—*Rupa* (Form, *i.e.*, the body), *Vedanā* (sensation), *Samjñā* (conception), *Samskāra* (here meaning various mental qualities), and *Vijñāna* (consciousness). The later Theravāda school divided Form, the material world, into 27 parts; sensation into 3 or 5; conception into 6; mental qualities into 52; and consciousness into 6 or 89 parts.

These divisions were the result of introspective analysis, but they were considered absolute and final. They constituted the elements of existence from which all things are compounded.

Another, and in ancient days even more powerful, school of

Hīnayāna Buddhism, the *Sarvāstivādin* Sect, classified these elements objectively, for by this time the fact that Buddhism was supposed to ignore the real nature of the external world was forgotten, and these elements of existence were thought to constitute the objective as well as the subjective world.

According to the *Abhidharma Kośa Śāstra* these elements are 75 in number, classified in the following way:—

- I. *Simple Elements (Asaṃskṛita Dharmas)* so called because they do not enter into combination with other elements. They are three in number of which Space or Ether, and *Nirvāṇa* are two.
- II. *Compound Elements (Saṃskṛita Dharmas)* so called because they enter into combinations, though themselves simple and permanent. Their compounds constitute the phenomena of the universe. These elements are 72 in number, divided into:—
 1. Material Elements, 11 in Number.
 2. Mind, 1 in Number.
 3. Mental Qualities, such as love, hate, etc., 46 in Number.
 4. Miscellaneous Elements, such as life, decay, etc., 14 in Number.

These elements are permanent and unchanging, as were the physical elements of the scientists of the generation ago. Accordingly in their present state all phenomena are changing and unstable, but they are composed of stable and unchanging rudiments.

3. *Mahāyāna Buddhism.*

At this point Buddhism almost abandoned its essential spirit of insistence upon change and becoming, and approached the standpoint of Western philosophy. The root instinct of the religion was too strong, however, and in the new Mahāyāna system which arose in India about the Christian Era a return was made to the principle of eternal transience and imper-

manancy. This Mahāyāna school took root in China and Japan and after Buddhism was expelled from India continued to flourish there.

The basis of early or undeveloped Mahāyāna is *Ājñā* (literally emptiness, or the void). This doctrine has frequently been totally misunderstood in the West and taken to mean the theory of the non-existence of the universe or pure idealistic Nihilism. It is only recently that the conception has been properly expounded in Yamakami's *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, and Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*.

Ājñā is simply an insistence that all things have no self-essence, that they are compounds, unstable organisms even in their elemental stage. The science of the present generation believes that the supposedly rigid physical elements are not necessarily permanent; that they may be broken down; that the elements may themselves prove to be compounds possessing the essential qualities of transformation and decay. In like manner the *Ājñā* school, represented by the *Mādhyāmika* sect of Mahāyāna supposed that the *Dharmas* (elements) are impermanent, and have no existence-unto-themselves; that they may be broken down into parts, parts into sub-parts, and so on eternally. Accordingly, all phenomena have a relative as opposed to an absolute existence. In a word all of life was once more reduced to a single underlying flux, a stream of existence with an everlasting becoming.

The next stage of doctrinal development was a very important one, and resulted in the formulation of a remarkably complete system of idealism. The stream of life was supposed to be the Essence of Mind, a fundamental mind-stuff that was permanent yet ever changing like the ocean. From this all elements (the 75 elements became 100 in this school), and therefore all phenomena are derived. It was called *Alaya Viññāna*, Repository Consciousness, yet it was considered to be neither matter nor mind, but the basic energy that was at the root of both.

It would be easy to exaggerate this doctrine, and to falsely identify it with many more developed systems, but undoubtedly it has many points of contact with certain phases of modern Occidental philosophy. The *Alaya Vijñāna* is like the *Élan de Vie* of Bergson, the Energy of Leibniz, the Unconscious of Von Hartmann. Like the last, though it is the essence of consciousness, it is not itself conscious in its early stages. It is mental yet there is a certain objective reality about it. Each unit of life may be regarded as a vortex in the sea of mind-essence. The action and interaction of these units, one with another, and with the common stream brings about the phenomenal appearance of the universe.

Accordingly the *Alaya Vijñāna* is regarded in three aspects, viz. :—(1) as active, or the seed of percipient consciousness; (2) as passive, as the sensibilia of consciousness, and as receiving the influence of all things; (3) as the object of false belief in as much as being the root of self-consciousness, each person comes to regard himself as an eternal ego entity.

We may, perhaps, better understand the nature of this Essence of Mind, and its development of the universe by enumerating its four faculties, which are :—

- | | | |
|----------------------|-----|---------------------|
| 1. Form ... | ... | Outer-objective. |
| 2. Perception ... | ... | } Inner-subjective. |
| 3. Ratiocination ... | ... | |
| 4. Reflection ... | ... | |

In Hīnayāna the external world is taken for granted and we start with the percipient consciousness fully developed. In Mahāyāna we are told that both the external world and consciousness are ultimately reducible to the *Alaya Vijñāna*. The *Alaya Vijñāna* in its yet unindividuated stage is the energy behind inanimate life, the world of minerals, etc., it is also the life force behind the vegetable world. As such it is *Form* or the essence of the objective world. Eventually this life force attains the power of sensation or perception. It is

latent in the vegetable world and fully developed in the animal world. It becomes aware of the other currents in the stream of life, or, if you please, the other phases of the *Alaya Vijñāna*, from which we understand why this essence is both subject and object.

As this sensory or perceptive faculty develops there arises the ability to retain impressions, to compare and associate them. So it is that the third faculty, thought or normal consciousness comes into being. This is to be found only in the higher animals, etc. This in turn develops into self-consciousness or reflection, making man and the other possessors of this faculty capable of metaphysical speculation.

This may be called the cosmic development of the *Alaya Vijñāna*, or the development of the universe itself, or the universe as it really is, as opposed to the experienced universe. In order to comprehend the latter we must examine the eight-fold division of normal human consciousness as taught by this school. These are known as the eight *Vijñāna*.

The first five *Vijñāna* may be called the sensory aspects of consciousness. They are co-ordinated with the five sense organs and serve as recipients of the stimuli given by them. The sixth *Vijñāna* is normal waking consciousness, is similar to the rational faculty, and correlates the data presented by the first five *Vijñāna*. It functions through memory and reason. The seventh *Vijñāna* is the focus of self-consciousness, distinguishing itself from the general stream of consciousness. The eighth *Vijñāna* is the *Alaya Vijñāna*, or the individualization of the essence of mind containing potentially all aspects of existence.

From this it is easy to see that from the relative point of view the first five *Vijñāna* lead to an acquaintance with phenomena, as they are presented by the senses, the sixth by means of comparison builds up the mental constructs, and from the confused mass of sense data such as colour, form, etc., formulates and recognizes the ejective ink-pot. The seventh

Vijñāna seeks to find the real nature of the ink-pot, and its relationship with other phenomena, while the eighth *Vijñāna* is the real basis of all this psychological action, is the root of all the other seven *Vijñāna*, and contains within itself a microcosmic replica of the macrocosm, being in fact the only reality behind all the seeming complexity of the phenomenal world.

This may be said to represent the idea of the school concerning the everyday activity of consciousness, but we are concerned with how this individualized experienced world came into being, and the *real* relationship between the eight *Vijñāna* and external reality. We are told that the stages of the formation of the microcosm are as follows:—

1. Before the development of the other *Vijñāna*, the *Alaya Vijñāna* in its active aspect, acting as the seed of life interacts with the passive or external *Alaya*, and so produces the essence of the world as perceived, the basis of the empirical universe, which is still faint and free from distinguishing characteristics.

2. In the meantime the seventh *Vijñāna* or self-consciousness, that which firmly distinguishes between the subjective and objective having developed, it is fecundated by the *Alaya*, and becoming aware of the nucleus of the external world proceeds to take it into its comprehension and so gives to it form and shape, which are, needless to say, secondary or subjective qualities, and not inherent in the external world.

3. The sixth *Vijñāna* or that which discriminates between the various phenomena of the universe then develops and, fecundated by the *Alaya*, adds to the gradually developing germ the concept of like and dislike, associating with it other objects with reference to cause and effect.

4. There then develop the remaining five *Vijñāna* corresponding to the five sense organs. When these have been impregnated by the *Alaya*, they give, on coming into contact with the germ of objectivity the final touches of the external world. Thus, for example the first *Vijñāna*, visual consciousness, gives the sense of colour and presents the phenomenon in

question in the form which our ordinary sense impression makes familiar to us.

This doctrine of the Essence of Mind has played a very important part in Mahāyāna philosophy, and in the later schools has received much further development.

In China and Japan the doctrine of Being is known as *Ke*, the doctrine of Becoming as *Ku* (*Çūnya*). In contrast to them both, the later Mahayanists offer the doctrine of *Chū*, the Middle or the Mean. In later Mahāyāna the Essence of Mind is known as *Bhūtatathātā*, literally Suchness—the Suchness-of-things-as-they-are. This they conceive to be like the ocean. The waves are life's phenomena. The ocean is always changing. Waves are always arising, and no two waves are alike. So does the stream of life ever go surging past, never remaining the same. Yet there is in a sense a certain stability, a certain Being, a fixity, a changelessness in this very changeability. This is the doctrine of the Mean.

This Essence of Mind soon received all the attributes of the Occidental Absolute. It was conceived as identical with *Nirvāṇa*, and as the waves and the ocean are the same, so was the world of life and death and *Nirvāṇa* the same. The goal was not to be gained by transcending the phenomenal world, but by the expression of the noumenal world in ordinary life.

Later a religious phase followed, and the Absolute was conceived as the Universal Buddha immanent in the hearts of all sentient beings. It was frequently symbolized as *Amitābha Buddha*, or the Buddha of Infinite Light. It was considered to be possessed of three bodies (*kāya*) or aspects, similar to the Sabellian heresy concerning the Trinity. All human Buddhas or sages were supposed to be the embodiments of this being, corresponding to the doctrine of the Incarnation.

All these points, however, belong to comparative religion rather than to philosophy, so that we must leave them untouched.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street,
London, W. 1, on June 7th, 1920, at 8 p.m.*

X.—THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND EXISTENCE AS TREATED BY ANSELM.

By ALBERT E. DAVIES.

In the history of philosophical thought, Anselm's name is associated mainly with his famous proof of the existence of God. His treatment of the problem of truth and existence in that argument, its special interest for modern philosophy has, it seems to me, been generally misunderstood. The proof is commonly regarded as purely ontological, and this, notwithstanding the obviously empirical implication of the terms in which it is described by Anselm. In the Preface of the *Proslogium* he represents his attempt, by a "single argument," itself self-evident, . . . "to demonstrate that God truly exists," as that of "one who strives to lift his mind to the contemplation of God and seeks to understand *what he believes*." The treatise he originally entitled *Faith seeking understanding*. The emphasis on "understanding" clearly implies confidence in logical thought. It is also no less clearly implied that the function assigned to "thought" in the attempt is that of the verification of a specific form of experience termed "faith." "Lord give me," we find him desiderating, "to understand—*intelligere*—that Thou art as we believe." Such understanding, such attainment of truth, he explicitly asserts, is conditioned by "faith"—"*credo ut intelligam, nam et hoc credo, quia nisi credidero non intelligam*" (*Proslogium*, Chap. I). And by "faith" he understands "rather an experience than a mere acquiescence in authoritative dogmas" (Webb. *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, O.S., Vol. 3, No. 2, 1896). So also Weber interprets Anselm's use of the term faith. "In religion faith plays the

part played by experience in our understanding of the things of this world."

The argument so viewed ceases to be strictly "ontological"; it is *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*. It has, however, an ontological aspect, when viewed, that is, in abstraction from the experience from which it takes its origin and which it is intended to verify.

My purpose is to show first, the dependence of the argument on experience, and secondly the implications of that dependence as to the relation of thought to existence.

1. Let me note at the outset that the argument depends for its starting-point on *experience*. "And, indeed, we believe, that Thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived." So Anselm begins his reasoning. The basal premise, the conception of God as the "greatest conceivable being" is clearly represented here, not as a creation of the understanding, not as a mere thought-product, but as an apprehension of God obtained in and through the experience which he terms "faith." The language of much of the criticism of the argument seems to represent this basal conception of God as a mere product of thought, in complete abstraction from, and independent of, experience. Its first critic, Gaunilo, founds his criticism on such an interpretation. The conception of God from which Anselm starts is regarded as an idea that might originate in thought, that is, in total independence of any single experience, just as one might frame a mental picture of a beautiful island. Indeed, the point of the objection lies in that supposed abstraction. It is contended the argument involves an unwarrantable transition, namely, from essence to existence. Kant's well-known illustration that it is one thing to have a hundred thalers in thought, and another to have a hundred thalers in one's pocket, though perhaps barely expressive of the full force of his criticism, is yet eminently indicative of the same tendency, the tendency to view the argument as entirely isolated from experience. But surely the

author's starting-point: "*credimus te esse*" suggests that the reasoning is not from essence to existence but rather from a particular experience of existent reality to a fuller apprehension of the meaning of such experience.

Significant also in its bearing on this point is the difficulty Hegel found in reconciling the "form" of the argument with his interpretation of the basal notion, "the highest conceivable," as the "merely conceivable." Of Anselm's reasoning, he remarks, "the content indeed is right, but the form faulty." His objection, it is worth noting, is that the "subject" is a mere "thought of the Highest." It brings out the opposition between thought and being, but without clearly showing that here in the subject, that is, in God, the opposition does not obtain, that in God as the Infinite, the Absolute, thought and being are united. And so he finds that the statement of the proof "lacks the perception of the unity of thought and existence in the Infinite." Now this lack is all-important. It is no mere slip or oversight. As I understand it, the absence of an explicit expression of that perception is from Anselm's standpoint inevitable, and, far from being a "lack," it is, as I hope to show, essential to his argument. This is what Hegel has evidently failed to see, and so is able to read into it his own theory. As Weber puts it: "What the theologian (Anselm) aims to prove is not the existence of the God-idea of Plato or Hegel, but the existence of the personal God," the God with whom he has personal communion.

2. The real nature of Anselm's argument I have described as the verification of a specific form of experience. Let me now explain more fully what I mean by that. Anselm, we have seen, describes this effort of his as "faith seeking understanding," and by "understanding" I take him to mean logical clearness and certainty, or, as it has been put, "to make explicit to one's reason that which is implicit in faith." Then by "faith," as I have said, we may assume Anselm intends a mode of experience,—that is to say, a mode of direct

or immediate apprehension; and, in the statement I have just quoted, his awareness of God, a state of consciousness in and through which God is immediately apprehended. In his polemic against Roscellinus, *De fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi*, Ch. 2, Anselm writes: "He who believes not cannot experience, and he who has not experienced cannot understand." It follows, then, that Anselm's proof does not require to be the "salto mortale" from thought to existence, which Caird takes to be the gist of Gaunilo's criticism.

If the proof is of the nature of progress in the apprehension of existent reality, then there is no need to suppose a break with existence. The "immediacy of the relationship,—namely, between the act of knowing and the real object,"—must still obtain, even though the activity itself becomes more specialized. That verification consists in clearer apprehension means, does it not, a progressive realization of that immediacy? Again, the fact that the proof is of the nature of verification through fuller apprehension accounts for the terms of the argument. It is not in terms of faith but in terms of speculative reflection that Anselm reasons. "We believe," he begins, "that Thou art a Being than which a greater cannot be conceived," and his argument is that we cannot think of this "greatest conceivable being," or *ens realissimum*, without self-contradiction except as existing. There is thus explained a difficulty which the view of faith as a mode of immediate apprehension raises. If faith is awareness of God, why does it demand a proof of his existence? I agree "that just as the æsthetic consciousness is sufficient evidence of the existence of the æsthetic object" so the existence of God "so far as we mean by God no more than the object of religious consciousness is not really doubtful at all." The demand for proof, however, arises from the fact that faith is aware of its object not merely as its object but, so Anselm puts it, as the "summum cogitabile," or *ens realissimum*. Anselm's experience, that is to say, seems to illustrate Mr. Webb's contention

that "the religious sentiment is a sentiment for an object which is regarded as not merely its object but as somehow the fundamental or ultimate reality." Such a demand is implied in the "worship" and "trust" which characterize the attitude of religious faith towards its object. Whether or not it is a conscious implication in every stage of religious development, it evidently is so where the development has attained the stage represented by Anselm. And have we not here the reason why the proof sought should be of the nature of clearer apprehension? Faith is essentially a cognitive experience. It is cognition in its earlier stage when as yet the discrimination of its object is consciously incomplete. The conscious need for further differentiation occasions the doubt and explains its character as that not of the sceptic who refuses to believe in the possibility of knowledge but that of one who has absolute confidence in thought and seeks the solution of his doubt in understanding.

I can now bring out more clearly perhaps what I mean when I speak of the dependence of the argument as stated by Anselm on experience. I will put it in this way, that the proof Anselm sought was not a proof through experience or by appeal to experience in the way Kant meant when he spoke of a "confirmation from sense." No one could be more convinced than Anselm of the impossibility of such a verification of the idea of a Being whom "no man hath seen at any time." Nor does he in the argument as such, as it relates to the fool, appeal even to the specific mode of experience he terms faith, though, as I shall try to show he does so when he comes to apply his proof to the particular case he has in mind—that of the existence of God as God is experienced. To repeat, the argument is intended to verify the specific mode of experience he terms "faith." Is my experience of God true?

The appeal to thought or understanding accounts for what one may describe as the dual character of the argument. We may distinguish two stages in Anselm's reasoning. He

begins by proving that the "summum cogitabile" exists, but his ultimate aim is to prove that the God of his religious experience exists. The former proof is entirely an appeal to understanding. The criterion of truth is found in the laws of thought. It is there the principle of identity or non-contradiction serves. In this portion of his reasoning he argues that the fool is convinced that "that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in his understanding, because he understands it, but the greatest conceivable Being cannot exist in the understanding alone, for such a Being can be conceived to exist in reality." Again he proceeds: "It is possible to conceive of a Being which cannot be conceived not to exist, and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist." Hence the contradiction involved in denial. "There is then," he concludes, "so truly a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot be conceived not to exist." But mark the words that follow, "and this Being, Thou art, O God." Here we have the transition to the second stage. And here the appeal is to experience. The first portion, the appeal to understanding, has proved *that we must think of ultimate reality in terms of existence*. He has now to prove that this ultimate Reality is his God. "For if a mind could conceive of a being better than Thou," he goes on (note the ethical term now used, "better" not greater,—it is clearly the personal God he has in mind)—"the creature would rise above the Creator." This is the line of argument which he has pursued in the *Monologium*, and which is avowedly *a posteriori*.

My point is that in completing his proof, in showing that "the greatest conceivable" whose existence he has proved in the first stages of his reasoning, is the God in whom he believes, he appeals to experience. So much is borne out by his reply to Gaunilo, where we find him actually appealing to his opponent's individual religious experience in proof of his position that "God is certainly a Being than which a greater is inconceivable." "Or else he is not understood or conceived and

is not in the understanding or in concept. "But" adds Anselm, "I call on your faith and conscience to attest that this is most false."

3. To some extent I have already anticipated what I now turn to consider—the bearing of Anselm's argument, as I have interpreted it, upon the question as to the relation of thought to existence. There seems to be, as I have indicated, some ambiguity in Anselm's use of the term "existence." He speaks of "*esse in intellectu*" and "*esse in re*." It is clear, however, that the latter is the "*esse*" he intends to prove of the greatest conceivable Being,—that, namely, which, as the antithesis implies, constitutes the reality of external objects. Existence, that is to say, is viewed as a kind of reality distinguishable from that which appertains to the contents of the world of thought. It is *esse "in re."*

The language of Scholasticism shows a keen sense of the distinction between concrete existence and the contents of thought. "The contrast," says Professor Royce, "between what belongs to the *mind*, to the process of knowledge, to ideas, to the reason, and what belongs to the external facts, to the *world*, divine or created, *beyond* the human mind receives rich expression in scholastic doctrine" (*Dictionary of Philosophy*, I, p. 636). In their use of the term "*ens*," for example, the Scholastics distinguish between *entitas rei* and *entitas quæ significat veritatem propositionis*. And if *ens rationis* be taken to mean that which is a pure product of thought, "a fictitious object, real, not without, but only within the mind," then I think we may say that, although we find the term reality often used synonymously with existence, existence was not identified with reality, as being, that is, the *whole* of reality. Like *ens* the term *esse* has a variety of significations. When, however, employed with an ontological reference,—i.e., not merely as a copula,—it usually denotes existent reality, *esse in re*. Even when it is used as Anselm uses it in the phrase *esse in intellectu*, or as St. Thomas uses it in the phrase *esse intentionale*, the

qualification in each case suggests the more common significance of the term, nor has it in these cases the purely subjective import of *ens rationis*. "To sum up the important features of this collection of terms for existence," says Professor Royce in the article above quoted, "an object is said to be *real* (i.e., existent) in scholastic usage, in so far as it is viewed as outside of the knowing mind, and so as in contrast to a mere idea." That it is existence understood in this sense that Anselm seeks to prove of the greatest conceivable Being would probably be generally admitted. But herein lies the problem. It is just this that has occasioned difference of opinion as to the value of the argument. By some it has been supposed to vitiate the argument; by others to constitute its value as a valid contribution to thought. By Gaunilo and Kant, as we have seen, the argument is taken to be invalid because it involves, as they say, "crossing from thought to existence." By Hegel it is held to have a value, in substance at least, because it presupposes, according to his view, the ultimate unity—really identity—of thought and existence. It seems to me that the import of the distinction I have indicated in its bearing upon Anselm's reasoning has in both cases been missed. The tendency has been to regard Anselm here as making existence *qua* existence a part of the content of an idea. There is an illustration of what I mean in Ueberweg's interpretation. For while Ueberweg shows that Anselm intended to distinguish between thought and existence he yet thinks he has confused the literal and metaphorical meanings of "esse." By taking *esse* in its literal sense in the phrase *esse in intellectu* he thinks the conditional clause on which the argument depends, namely, if God exists, is left out of view, and the conclusion of the argument escapes meaningless tautology only if it is regarded as denoting not the *fact* of God's existence but the manner of His existence—that "so surely as God exists so surely does He exist not only in the mind but in nature." "That which is demonstrated to be absurd is in reality not the belief entertained by the atheist

that God does not exist and that the idea of God is an objectless idea, but the belief which he neither entertains nor can be forced to entertain,—namely, that God himself (assumed as existing objectively in the mind) is an objectless idea. This appearance is maintained so long as it seems to give the argument a plausible basis. But in the conclusion which pretends to contain as a result of the argumentation not merely the manner of God's existence, but the fact of this existence, the original sense of the antithesis between *in intellectu esse* and *in re esse*—namely, exist ideally alone in the human consciousness and exist in reality, is assumed" (*History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 383).

Weber also seems to take the same view of Anselm's statement. "Indeed," he says, "the ontological argument would be conclusive only in case the idea of God and the existence of God in the human mind were identical." This would be a strange identification, and if the interpretation were correct, one would need to inquire how Anselm came to make it. For nothing would seem to be more remote from his intention. Ueberweg admits that Anselm was fully aware of the distinction between "real" and "merely ideal" existence (as he puts it), and that it is this distinction he intends by the antithesis between *in intellectu esse* and *in re esse*. But it seems to me that the full significance of the distinction implied has been generally overlooked, and the argument in consequence misunderstood. What, I would urge, Anselm's reasoning presupposes is that the distinction is an ultimate distinction, that existence is never the content of a thought, and that the content of thought is never an existent. In other words, I would maintain the argument implies that truth and existence are two ultimate forms of reality, ultimate—if I may borrow Dr. Hicks's statement of the distinction—in the sense that "neither can be regarded as a product arising from or evolved out of the nature of the other."

Much confusion in the attempts to interpret Anselm's

argument is due, I think, to a tendency to regard "existence" and "reality" as identical. According to the view I am taking, existence is not identical with reality. Existence is, as Lotze puts it, "the reality which belongs only to things," whereas the reality which belongs to a content of thought, regarded in abstraction from the mental activity of thinking, is the reality of validity. Anselm, it seems to me, had virtually this distinction in mind in framing his basal conception—namely, "that than which a greater cannot be conceived." He is here thinking of what it has been customary to speak of as ultimate Reality. So much is asserted when the "greatest conceivable" Being is described as *ens realissimum*. What the argument proves, as I have urged, is that we cannot think of ultimate Reality without contradiction except in terms of existence. In his reply to Gaunilo he points out that his opponent's objections are due to his not having fully apprehended the *ultimate* nature of the subject of his argument. He finds the argument inconclusive because he persists in applying it to other contents of thought, *e.g.*, a lost island. "I promise," says Anselm, "that if any man shall devise anything existing either in reality or in concept alone except that than which a greater cannot be conceived, to which he can adapt the sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that thing and will give him his lost island not to be lost again."

Again the ultimateness of the distinction between the content of thought and existence is presupposed in the pre-eminently logical character of the proof. It anticipates Lotze's well-known contention that whether with idealism we deny the existence of an external world of things and regard the contents of our ideas as alone reality, or whether we maintain the existence of things outside the mind which act upon it, in either case knowledge can only be knowledge. As little on the latter theory as on the former can existing things pass into our knowledge: the utmost extent of the power possessed by an apprehending subject could not enable that subject to do more than to know as perfectly as possible.

That, I think, is the background of Anselm's procedure. His aim is to "know as perfectly as possible"—to apprehend more fully the object of his faith, to "understand that Thou art as we believe." Validity is our only criterion of reality. We know existent reality only in so far as our thinking is valid. And his contention is that you cannot think validly that the greatest conceivable Being is non-existent. No one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist.

The point Ueberweg discusses in his interpretation of the argument raises the question whether Anselm intended his reasoning to conform strictly to the formal method in vogue in his day. Caird thinks Anselm's reasoning has suffered by the adoption of the syllogistic form which he considers is inadequate for the purpose. But Ueberweg, as we have seen, holds Anselm's argument only avoids meaningless tautology by a confused assumption which brings it into line with the demands of syllogistic reasoning. Recognition of the essential distinction between existence and the contents of thought throws light, I think, on the point. We have seen that in replying to the question, how it is possible for the fool to say in his heart or to think that there is no God, Anselm insists upon the difference between the mere thinking of a word, or the being conscious of an idea, and the cognition of the reality which the word denotes, and to which the idea corresponds. For the purpose he has in view, what Anselm seeks to make clear is the meaning of the terms the fool employs, to help the fool to know more perfectly that of which he is thinking. If in the very act of denying the existence of the greatest conceivable Being he contradicts himself, then all Anselm has to do is to exhibit that self-contradiction.

In his reply to Gaunilo, his own account of his reasoning is: "I was attempting to prove what was still uncertain and contented myself at first with showing that this being is at least understood, in some way, and is in the understanding. It was my

intention to consider on these grounds whether this *being* is in the understanding alone, like an unreal object, or whether it exists in fact, as a real being." And the conclusion he comes to is, it can only be understood as existent. The example of the picture in the artist's mind he also points out is intended not to suggest any analogy between the two meanings or contents, but "to show that what is not understood to exist can be in the understanding." "The artist does not suppose the picture to exist. But that than which a greater cannot be conceived can have meaning only as it is understood to exist." In this line of reasoning we detect the theory of knowledge involved in mediæval realism, on the basis of which, as Dewey—whose representation of it I think is misleading—points out Anselm works. "The universals are the reals; and since there are grades and degrees of universality there are all grades of reality. The most universal God is the most real—*ens realissimum*."

As I have said, I do not think Dewey's language does full justice to the Scholastic position, especially as represented in the argument. It suggests, however, the point I want to emphasize in this connexion,—namely, that the universal was regarded as real not in the sense that it is as such an existent, but that it is valid. It is real not because it shares in, but because it represents, the real nature of the object known. Not that the object as an existent is a universal. Knowledge, as Lotze rightly urges, is not a process of mirroring. But that the coherence which is essential to validity, and which constitutes the universal, is representative of some coherence or inter-connexion found in existent reality, and that it is only as an object is apprehended in its essential relations that its real nature is known. That is to say, it is only through universals that the nature of the particular can be known. Lotze has pointed out that Plato's theory of Ideas has suffered misinterpretation because the Greek language had no terms to express the distinction between existence and reality—*οὐσία* being used for

both, with the consequent confusion of the reality of simple validity with the reality of existent fact.

But the reality which Plato ascribed to universals is not that which Anselm predicates of God. It was the absence in Ideas of what is an essential characteristic of existent reality,—namely, the element of change—that led Plato to attribute to Ideas reality. In contrast to the temporal succession in which presentations occur in our experience, the contents of knowledge are timeless. Because of the static character possessed by the contents of thought as contrasted with the Heraclitean flux of the world of sense, they are named eternal. “The reality of being (concrete existence) indeed they have not . . . but that reality which consists in validity which is a reality all their own remains untouched by all this change” (*Logic*, Book III, Chap. 2, p. 441). Mediæval realism, it is true, got its doctrine of universals in part from Plato, but the moderate realist was Aristotelian in his view of existence. “To Aristotle,” says Lotze, “the only genuine *οὐσία*, existence, is the individual thing, and there we must certainly agree with him: to the individual alone belongs the reality of existence.” And “to the moderate realist,” says Rickaby, “everything that exists is individual” (*Scholasticism*, p. 5). Though there seems to be difference of opinion as to whether Anselm was a moderate or an ultra-realist (Rickaby thinks he inclined to ultra-realism while Perrier* regards him as having anticipated moderate realism), there is no doubt that it is the existence we ascribe to individual particulars he predicates of God. So, for Anselm God was not a universal as the passages I have quoted from Dewey might suggest. Ueberweg understands Anselm to predicate of God that form of existence we find “in rerum natura.” Gaunilo certainly so understood it, hence his applica-

* “Aristotle,” he says, “having supplanted Plato as the inspirer and the guide of mediæval thinking, there appeared a modified form of realism, which had been already foreshadowed by St. Anselm” (*Revival of Modern Scholasticism*, p. 23).

tion of Anselm's reasoning to such objects as a lost island ; therein also lies the force of his objection that the argument involves an illegitimate transition from thought to existence.

Existent reality can, of course, only be known in terms of knowledge. There must be "in the understanding" a content of thought if existent reality is to be a subject of thought. And "generality" or "universality," as it has been said, "is one of the coin-marks of the activity of thinking." The "existent does not become something different from what it was when it enters the relation which is involved in its being known. Its real nature is apprehended by the knowing act; it is not influenced by that act." It seems to me so evident that Anselm was working on this assumption that I find it difficult to suppose the possibility of his falling into any such confusion in his use of the term as Ueberweg suggests.

I am aware that the ultimateness of the distinction between existence *qua* existence and the contents of thought is the very ground on which Kant rests his rejection of the ontological argument. In his criticism of the argument, Kant insists that existence is never a part of the content of an idea. "Whatever," he says, "our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside it, in order to attribute to it existence." This he claims can only be done within the sphere of perceptive experience. "With objects of the senses," he says, "this takes place through their connexion with any one of *my* perceptions, according to empirical laws ; with objects of pure thought, however, there is no means of knowing their existence, because it would have to be known entirely *a priori*." So Kant's objection is practically Gaunilo's, that the argument involves an illegitimate transition from thought to existence. "The existence of the subject is included in the mere notion of the subject, the 'is' of the copula in a judgment of logical necessity is confounded with the 'is' of existence." And Anselm's reply to Gaunilo that God is something different from a "lost island" applies also to Kant, as Hegel saw. God is

something different from a hundred thalers.' Kant's position that knowledge is limited to phenomenal existence, and that such existence can be affirmed only when the material of sense is given necessarily involves not only the rejection of the ontological argument, but also that of the possibility of any knowledge of ultimate reality.

According to the interpretation I have given, the view of the cognitive relation involved in the argument is more consistent with the recognition of the ultimate distinction between thought and existence than is Kant's doctrine of "sensibility and thought." As against Kant's doctrine it holds that the most elementary processes of cognition involve an activity which is in nature akin to thought; that even the crudest sense-presentation would not be possible apart from the discriminating activity which is throughout characteristic of cognition. It is true that the relations which constitute things are in the more elaborate processes of reflective thinking recognized as such, but the differentiation without which there could be no presentation at all implies the presence of a discriminating or relating activity of a more rudimentary kind in which there would be no consciousness of self and consequently no recognition of relations *qua* relations. Thus, even in perceptive experience, we are dealing with contents of knowledge which can as little admit within them existence as the contents of "pure thought," and which as processes of knowing are subject to the same criterion of validity for their verification. As Lotze has said, when we investigate the meaning of an individual thing, "in its nature and its workings with any prospect of a result, we invariably proceed according to universal principles." According to this presupposition,—namely, that the difference between existence and thought is ultimate,—Anselm's procedure, that of subjecting the content of a specific experience to the test of logical thought, is, then, not only consistent, but is the only method possible for the acquisition of knowledge.

Dr. Caird, in the article to which I have alluded, contends that Anselm's proof presupposes "the ultimate unity of thought and existence." "This," he says, "is concealed from Anselm by the fact that he has not perceived, as Descartes had, the necessity of the idea of God and its priority to the consciousness of self; or, in other words, by the external way in which he conceived of the relations of God the world and the self." Anselm, he admits, starts with the absoluteness of the opposition between subject and object, but he contends that this position is not maintain throughout. "The defect of this argument, as Anselm states it, is that it seems to start with the opposition of subject and object, as if it were an absolute opposition, in which there were mere ideas on one side and pure realities on the other: and then goes on to bring in a consciousness of the unity which transcends this opposition as if it were one of these ideas. But if we hold to the opposition we cannot make a bridge from thought to existence by means of the mere thought of existence. In other words, existence can neither in this, nor in any other case, be added on to thought by any extension of its content." Here, again, we find what I have described as a common tendency, —namely, to regard Anselm as including existence as such in a content of thought. Caird represents Anselm as replying to Gaunilo's objections by maintaining that "there is an essential distinction between the idea of God and all other ideas, that it is the one and only idea which over-reaches the distinction between thought and reality"—"that in this one case thought analytically contains existence." Now it seems to me that in this criticism there is a confusion of standpoints. Anselm is represented as at once a realist and an idealist. He begins his argument as a realist, with an absolute opposition between subject and object, in which there were mere ideas on one side and pure realities on the other. But he goes on to bring in a *consciousness of the unity* which transcends this opposition as if it were one of these ideas. As

a realist, that is to say, Anselm insists on the dualism of thought and existence, yet to prove that God is not a mere idea—a phenomenon of our subjectivity—but an existent reality, he must renounce his realism and become an idealist. He must find an idea in which this dualism disappears or is superseded by an identification of thought and existence. Now, if I understand aright Anselm's answer to Gaunilo, he agrees with Caird that "if we hold to the opposition we cannot make a bridge from thought to existence." He would say you never can bridge the gulf, if, that is, the bridging means that a content of thought becomes an existent, or that existence becomes a content of thought. He seems to me in his reply to be very conscious that he is here concerned with logical values, with validity. He says, for example, in Chapter 2, "I have said that if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be *conceived* also to exist in reality, which is greater. If, then, it is in the understanding alone, obviously the very Being than which a greater cannot be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived. What is more logical?" Then he adds, "for if it exists even in the understanding alone, it can be *conceived* also to exist in reality." According to the view I am combating, we should expect to read, "if it exists in the understanding alone, it exists in reality," because existing "in the understanding" here is identical with reality. "He assumes," says Caird, "that an addition to the *content* of thought will make it more than thought, and will break through the opposition which he started by assuming between thought and reality." But in the words I have quoted, Anselm has carefully framed the question: "Can it not be *conceived* also to exist in reality?" So I cannot agree with Dr. Caird when he goes on to say, "to admit such a transition we must assume the very unity we seek to prove, and that is just what Anselm does." What I have been trying to show is that this is just what he does not do, that, on the contrary, the standpoint he assumes is that of the dualism of thought and existence.

"Dualism," Rickaby insists, "is one of the common characteristics of Scholasticism. Modern philosophy is idealistic, monistic, pantheistic, such, eminently, Scholasticism was not." And what Anselm seeks to prove is that this dualism obtains in regard to God. He certainly does not assume that an addition to the content of thought can make it more than a content of thought, or will break through the opposition he started with between thought and existence. It would rather, I think, be true to regard him as saying that the "reality of God's existence compels me to *think* of Him as existing, to add the *thought* of existence, *i.e.*, to the content of my thought of Him." Or as Descartes puts it, "from the fact that I cannot conceive God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and therefore that He exists; not, indeed, that my thought can cause it to be so, or impose any necessity upon things, and so make the ought more or other than thought, but contrari-wise the necessity that is in the thing itself, *i.e.*, the necessity of the existence of God, determines me to have this thought." The necessity of so conceiving of God, or of the *ens realissimum*, in Anselm's case, so far at least as the first portion of his argument is concerned, would, of course, be logical rather than psychological.

Anselm's reasoning, I have tried to show, presupposes that the distinction between existence and the content of thought is an ultimate distinction, in consequence of which our quest of truth must inevitably be in terms of logical thought. But the question as to the transition from the *ordo cognoscendi* to the *ordo existendi* raised by the foregoing criticism still remains. I am, of course, concerned with this issue only in its bearings on Anselm's statement. What I have said of Anselm's theory of knowledge as regards his own saying that there can be no knowledge without experience has relevance here. Let me, however, first deal with a more strictly metaphysical aspect of the matter. While presupposing a distinction of nature that is ultimate between thought and existence the argument presupposes also

(or asserts) between them an ultimate connexion or inter-relation.

We may distinguish a twofold implication of such connexion. The first is in the contention as to the nature of existent reality. If validity is the criterion of reality, if I know the ultimate Reality to be existent because I can think validly of it only as existing, I am assuming that the real nature of existent reality is as such ultimately knowable. Notwithstanding the fact that it is fundamentally distinct from the content of thought, it is yet capable of being perfectly apprehended by thought. It was just this assumption which he saw to be at the root of the rationalist position that called forth Kant's challenge. We know things to be, Kant grants, else they could not appear to us; but we only know them as they appear. The average Schoolman would not have been troubled by such a fundamental misgiving as this. "The most pronounced feature of all Scholastic treatises" is their pronounced objectivity. The Scholastic mind was bent on '*being*,' not on '*forms of thought*' or constraining '*needs*' of believing. The difficulties raised by Berkeley, Hume and Kant were not difficulties to Albert or Thomas" (Rickaby. *Scholasticism*, p. 44). Whether or not Anselm was apprehensive of Kant's problem, it is clear that his argument assumes the very position which Kant attacked. And herein lies the value of the argument. While it assumes that the relations that constitute thought are distinct from the relations which obtain in existent reality, that for example there is no exact equivalent in existing fact to the relation of general and particular implied in the concept, yet that these two aspects of reality, existence and the content of thought are so related that some agreement or correspondence obtains, such that the relations of thought validly represent the real relations of things, and that knowledge is fundamentally knowledge of existent reality. Of course the Scholastics would have been helped here by their theology. Such fundamental agreement and its ground in God Anselm brings out in his

Monologium, where "he insists on the implication in all of our knowledge of a reality which is the object and, therefore, not the creature of our apprehension and which must possess in its fullness what we find only imperfectly present in each particular" (Webb. *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*). Professor Pfeiderer's statement of this fundamental agreement, which he urges is "the proper sense and abiding truth contained in the so-called Ontological Argument" is certainly in accord with Anselm's theory as expressed in the *De Veritate*. "The laws according to which the human understanding thinks and calculates, arranges the given phenomena and anticipates future ones correspond to the laws according to which things hang together and work upon each other in the real world. How is this correspondence between the laws of our thinking, which are not given to us from without, and the laws of being, which are not made by us, explained? So far as I see, only from this that the two have their common ground in a Divine thinking, in a creative Reason which manifests its thoughts partly in the order of the real world and partly in the thinking of our understanding as it copies that Order." (I think the term "copies" here is unfortunate.) "The agreement of our thinking," Pfeiderer proceeds, "with the being of the world rests on the fact that it is the reproduction of the creative thoughts of the Infinite mind, a reproduction which is always imperfect according to the measure of the finite mind. The truth of our cognition is a participating in the truth which God essentially is" (*Philosophy of Religion*, p. 146). Such he thinks is the view of Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, according to whom, "we see and judge all things in the light of God, in so far as the natural light of our reason is a participating in the Divine Light," and he claims that this thought is distinctly found in Anselm's *Proslogium*. As I have said, it accords with the theory of truth which is set forth in the *De Veritate*, and which seems to anticipate Malebranche. We see truth, Anselm there maintains, in God.

"Truth is the accurate perception of the archetypal ideas in the mind of God,"—the "*summa veritas per se subsistens* is God." While his statement of the ontological argument, involving, as it does, the assumption that validity is a criterion of reality, implies "our thinking and being are indeed different," it implies also that they "are constituted for each other" (Pfleiderer).

This, I think, is further illustrated in the second, which we may distinguish as the psychological, implication of Anselm's statement as to the connexion of thought and existence. Here I am concerned more particularly with what I distinguished as the second stage in Anselm's reasoning, that in which he asserts that the greatest conceivable Being is the God in Whom he believes. I have tried to show that at this stage the appeal is to experience, that the reasoning is avowedly *a posteriori*, and assumes some such religious experience as his own, *e.g.*, his appeal to the faith and conscience of Gaunilo. Anselm's explanation of how, since to understand what God is, is to understand that he exists, the fool could deny his existence, seems to suggest he was conscious that the argument, in order to be finally convincing, depended upon direct personal experience of God. "There is," he says, "more than one way in which a thing may be said in the heart or conceived. The word signifying the thing may be thought of or we may think or understand the thing itself. In the former sense God can be conceived not to exist, but in the latter not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are, can conceive fire to be really water, though he may have this conception so far as the words go. Thus in like manner no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist" (*Proslogium*, Chap. 4). Is it not implied here that the fool, who represents for Anselm the atheist, lacks that relation with the object signified in consequence of which he is thinking is invalidated? And that when Anselm speaks of "experience"—"without which there can be no knowledge"—he is assuming

the connexion between thought and existence which is implied in the immediacy of the relationship,—namely, between the act of knowing and the real object,—and which is popularly conceived as “direct contact,” whereby the occurrence of the contents of thought is determined? The transition, that is to say, from thought to existence does not for Anselm need to be made in the process of reasoning as the criticisms I have dealt with seem to imply. Thought, when its thinking is valid, starts from existence in the sense that its content is occasioned by existent reality and is not, *i.e.*, to say, a subjective construction which has to be verified by “a leap from idea to reality.” The process of knowledge is that of discriminating, comparing and relating, by which features in the real object come to be more and more clearly and distinctly apprehended. The following quotation from *Contra Gentiles*, 75, bears on this point. Rickaby quotes it as representing the Schoolman’s psychology “whose metaphysics,” he says, “went with his psychology” and to whom Man’s invincible belief that he sees a world which is no part of himself, was an axiomatic truth. “In the process of understanding the intellectual impression received in the potential intellect is that whereby (*quo*) we understand, as the impression of colour in the eye is not that which (*quod*) is seen, but that whereby (*quo*) we see. On the other hand, that which (*quod*) is understood is the nature of things existing outside the soul, that are seen with the bodily sight; for to this end were arts and sciences invented, that things might be known in their natures” (p. 45). “The distinction here drawn,” says Rickaby, “between *quod* and *quo* forms the standing reply of Scholasticism to Idealism. My consciousness is not the object but the instrument of my cognition.” Such expressions as that of “impression received” recall the long exploded “*tabula rasa*” theory of Locke, but the distinction here made suggests that an idea was regarded rather as a way in which the real object was apprehended than something which stood between the knowing mind and

the known, that it was not a "tertium quid" but a "quo." And is not this distinction implied in Anselm's contention that "an unreal object is in the understanding alone and does not exist in fact as a real being" (Anselm's Reply, Chap. 6)?

If I am right in this, then the terms in which Dr. Caird states Anselm's reply to Gaunilo's objections "that there is an essential difference between the *idea* of God and all other ideas" may mislead, and the idealism of the statement that follows is perhaps not surprising—"it is the one only idea which overreaches the difference between thought and reality." In his summary of the reply Dr. Caird has an expression which is truer to Anselm's realism. "Everything can be thought not to be except that which is supremely . . . That alone cannot be thought not to be . . . which no thought ever *finds* except always and everywhere whole" (*Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. I, p. 24). It is of a Being "*thought finds*" Anselm reasons, not of an idea and certainly not of an idea conceived as a bridge between thought and existence. The object is itself an existent, the "most real." Anselm, it seems to me, would agree with Lotze that "it is never possible, starting from mere conceptions of thought, to prove the actual reality of that which is contained in them." A mere conception of thought he would regard as "*an unreal object*," whereas he would assert that "all our knowledge strikes in at a point *in a reality which it finds* as a matter of fact given to it." It is true that Lotze regards the Ontological Argument as committing the kind of fallacy he has mentioned. And his account of the intelligibility of the temptation, as he puts it, in this case, seems to fit in with the occasion of Anselm's argument. "The conception of God as a necessary consequence following from a reality other than Himself, and given in perception, contradicted our idea of Him, for this very idea demanded that He should be conceived as the grounds of all consequents" (*Logic*, III, p. 499). Ueberweg also finds the occasion of the argument of the *Proslogium* in dissatisfaction with the relativity of the argument in the

Monologium. "For Anselm had been disquieted," says Ueberwäg, "by the circumstance that in the proof attempted in the *Monologium* the demonstration of the existence of the Absolute had appeared dependent on the existence of the relative" (*History of Philosophy*, Vol. I). But, as both these statements imply, the conception of God on which the argument in the *Proslogium* is based is not a mere "conception of thought," a mere subjective product; it is that arrived at by the *a posteriori* argument of the earlier treatise. Moreover, that treatise Anselm describes as an Example of meditation on the Grounds of Faith—*de ratione fides* (*Proslogium*, Preface), a description which implies that he regarded it as a rational verification of the content of his faith—the conception of God in the conclusion is already a deliverance of his own religious experience, and so is not merely "a necessary consequence following from a reality other than himself."

Again, the fact that Anselm's basal conception of God—namely, as the greatest conceivable Being—is pre-eminently an ethical conception (he speaks, for example, in his Preface of the purpose of his argument as being to demonstrate that God truly exists and is the Supreme Good) proves it on Lotze's own showing to be more than a mere product of subjectivity. "Such beliefs," says Lotze, "as that in a Supreme Good, rest upon an extremely broad, though unanalysed, foundation of perception. They start from the fact of this actual world as it is given in experience." That, I think, is the presupposition Anselm intends when he says that knowledge is not possible without experience. If the specific content of thought is not a subjective creation, and if, as we have seen, existence *qua* existence is never part of that content, then the content itself contains no ground for its own appearance. That is to say, "knowledge presupposes a mode of reality dissimilar from itself."

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1,
on June 21st, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

XI.—MEMORY AND CONATION.

By BEATRICE EDGELL.

“Where art thou, storehouse of the mind, garner of facts and
fancies,—

In what strange firmament are laid the beams of thine airy
chambers?

Or art thou that small cavern, the centre of the rolling brain,

Where still one sandy morsel testifieth man's original?”—TUPPER.

THERE is no problem of mind which is so provocative as that of memory. To unfold its complications would be to disclose the threads which form the warp and woof of mental life. It is a problem that is accorded very different treatment at the hands of different writers. The purpose of this paper is to outline and compare the treatment which it receives at the hands of three writers who approach it from the diverse paths of philosophical psychology, biology and psychiatry, viz., Professor James Ward, Dr. Richard Semon and Dr. Sigmund Freud.

The comparison undertaken has in view the question: Does the faculty of memory imply the existence of conation as a specific mental function? It will be convenient to consider first a writer's account of the development of memory and, secondly, his treatment of the various phenomena which fall under that faculty. It is to be noted that the term “faculty” is used descriptively. To quote Professor Mitchell: “Most of the faculties . . . of which we ordinarily speak are merely descriptive; they are faculties for this or that experience of the same name. As it is useful to have a scheme in terms of which to analyse all experience, so it is useful to have it for analysing and describing minds in a systematic manner” (*Structure and Growth of Mind*, p. 116). In the question stated above,

"faculty" belongs to the scheme of terms for analysing and describing minds, "function" to the scheme for analysing and describing experience.

No English writer on psychology has given a fuller account of the generation of the memory-continuum than Professor Ward in his *Psychological Principles*. Though he approaches the problem from a philosophical standpoint, Professor Ward follows a biological method. Ideas of memory are "free" ideas which have individuality and chronological position. In order to trace the evolution of such ideas he outlines the progress of an imaginary "psychological individual," who shall owe nothing to heredity. Starting from a *totum* of undifferentiated sense impressions, the individual advances to the level of sense perception where he is aware of a world of real things and can preperceive and preadjust his actions to, the immediate future, *i.e.*, a level whereon representative images occur in conjunction with sense impressions. From this stage of the "tied" idea he advances to "free" ideas which are neither "sense-bound" nor "sense-sustained." From them arise the trains of memory which are referred to the past.

What presuppositions as to mental life does Professor Ward require for the development he thus outlines? Persistence of the old alongside the new in a changing whole, and progressive blending of the new with the old,—these features Professor Ward terms "plasticity," and one may say they are implied in the very conception of life. Such plasticity pertains to presentations, the objective side of that duality into which experience is analysed. But mental life for Professor Ward is the life of a subject who acts as a real agent, whose one capacity is feeling, whose one power is that of "variously distributing that attention upon which the effective intensity of a presentation in part depends" (p. 57).

One may try to discern the office of presentations and the office of this subjective activity, called attention, in the generation of the memory-continuum. Presumably all that figures as

"subjective selection," a term which occurs frequently in the *Principles*, is the exercise of "the one power." It is subjective selection which guides the differentiation and integration of sense impressions, but it is the plasticity of the presentations which makes such differentiation and integration possible. It is persistence or retention of presentations which produces "after-images" and "recurrent sensations," but it is attention which brings about the "primary memory-image." "It is not a mere residuum of changes in the presentation-continuum: it is a distinct effect of these changes, but only when there has been some concentration of attention on them." "Provided that was sufficient, the faintest impression may be for some time retained; and without it very intense ones leave no appreciable trace" (p. 176). Such an image is a "tied" idea, "sense-bound" and "sense-sustained," and figures in preperception. The repetition of similar situations and the retention of the issue of those trial and error processes which attention initiates, result in an alternation of preperceptions; such as Professor Ward dramatically simulates by the cogitation, "It may be a weasel, if so, I back; it may be a rabbit, if it is, I spring" (p. 187). From such alternations emerge "free" ideas, which become more frequent as life becomes more complicated. The advance from sporadic "free" ideas to a train, the memory-continuum, wherein the members have individuality and chronological order, appears to be due to the work of attention. "Thus the most important peculiarity of this continuum is that it is a series of representations integrated by means of the movements of attention out of the differentiations of the primary or presentation-continuum, or rather out of so much of these differentiations as pertain to what we know as the primary memory-image To them it is proposed to look for that continuity which images lose in so far as they part with the local signs they had as percepts and cease to be either localized or projected" (pp. 196-7).

It is clear that, however important the intensity of pre-

sentations in reference to non-voluntary attention, and however great the part assigned to the plasticity of the presentation-continuum, it is the activity of the subject which is the explanatory principle in the generation of the memory-continuum. The rôle of the subject is manifested even more plainly in that synthetic survey of mental life (Chap. XVII) with which Professor Ward completes his account of psychological principles. He there repeats a statement made by him in *Mind*, to the effect that Presentationism will account for nine-tenths of the facts, or better for nine-tenths of each fact. "The presentationist's services to psychology have, however, been greater than he knows. The more he has succeeded in making the structure of the nine-tenths clear the more he has unintentionally brought to light the fact that this presentational structure implies a subjective function" (p. 411). "From first to last the growing structure . . . is the work of the subject so surely as feeling or attention, or in one word, interest, is essential to mental synthesis in any form" (p. 414). In the case of the "actual," as distinguished from the "psychological" individual, the "formative" action of the subject is facilitated in so far as the individual inherits a "psychoplasm," i.e., a plastic presentation-continuum, wherein the formative work of its ancestors is latent as "peculium." Certain lines of differentiation, retention, assimilation are predetermined, others not. "The young rabbit begins by being indifferent to mice and interested in carrots, the young cat by being indifferent to carrots and interested in mice, while both are alarmed at the sight of a dog" (p. 183). This doctrine of heredity by no means lessens the necessity for postulating the activity of the subject as the explanatory principle in development. On the contrary, it requires such a principle for its own justification.

In passing on to consider various phenomena of memory, one must in the first place notice Professor Ward's view of subconsciousness. He declines to recognize any fixed boundary to the field of sense presentation. In respect of attention

there is the focus and the margin of the field, beyond such margin he would postulate the subconscious wherein differentiation cannot be effected. It is a penumbra of potential presentation, an undifferentiated *totum*. A subconscious presentation can only pass into the field of the differentiated when there is some increase in its inherent or absolute intensity, or when there is a change in the distribution of attention. Distinct from these subconscious presentations *beyond* the range of attention are the subconscious ideas, and it is subconscious ideas with which memory is concerned. The conception of mental life implies the persistence or retention of sense impressions. The "after-image" and the "recurrent sensation" may be regarded as phases in the life history of a sense impression. So also the "primary memory-image" for whose production attention is essential. When no longer attended to it continues its life story in sub-consciousness as a psychical disposition. It may subsequently be assimilated with some fresh impression like itself or it may function as a "representation." In this latter case its assimilation with the new situation is accompanied by the reinstatement of those attendant circumstances which were integrated with it by attention on a given occasion. The psychical disposition is to be conceived as a mental function correlate with physiological function. Professor Ward protests against the attempt to explain function by structure. "If a given functional activity entirely ceases it does not 'leave behind it' a structural plasticity that survives independently. On the contrary, when the function has completely lapsed the molecular structure has no longer any 'power' to facilitate its recurrence" (p. 99). The functional disposition is a potential process. "What is requisite to the realization of a given potentiality is sometimes a condition to be added, sometimes it is one to be taken away. . . . Now presentational dispositions we assume to be always of the latter sort. . . . These dispositions are processes or functions more or less

inhibited, and the inhibition is determined by their relation to other psychical processes or functions" (p. 97).

What it is important to notice here is that psychical dispositions and representations are processes and as such possess the activity of mental life, but this activity of a process is not to be confused with that activity which was stressed in the previous paragraph, viz., the activity of the subject.

Although Professor Ward styles Herbart's statics and dynamics of presentations a "wild dream" and would deprecate any view of presentations or representations as *forces* attracting and repelling each other, he accepts the Herbartian terms "evolution" and "involution" to express the rising and falling of representations from, and into, subconsciousness. Professor Ward compares the subconscious images with a concordance. The same image may figure in various connexions. In the schoolboy's knowledge of the first book of the *Aeneid* the one verbal image, "Æneas," may figure in different settings. An image only serves the purpose of representation in so far as it reinstates some particular setting, i.e., a complex whole into which it has been incorporated by attention. All "representations" may be termed ideas, and in this sense a psychological disposition is an "involved" idea. It is *evolved* when the reinstatement takes place.

It is difficult to understand to what extent Professor Ward identifies images and ideas. In speaking of memory he more frequently uses the term "image" than the term "idea," but even in the case of memory one may question whether images represent all that is remembered. To quote Professor Stout: "The image is only one constituent of the idea; the other and more important constituent is the meaning which the image conveys" (*Manual*, p. 529). Would Professor Ward assert that the meaning is conveyed by those images which form the setting of the main image, and which may vary from clear prehensible particulars to flickering, elusive fragments?

Reduplication of the memory train and the dying out of

some of its members are the conditions which give potential generality to representations, and so to the formation of what is termed, in distinction from the memory-continuum, the "ideational" continuum. The "concordance" serves for the "tissue" of intellection as well as for the "thread" of memory. What is difficult to appreciate is how far the spinning of the thread and the weaving of the tissue is due to subjective activity, and how far it is determined by the life of those processes, which are the filaments constituting the threads. Professor Ward tells us we rarely experience "the flow of ideas" undisturbed; "even in dreams and reverie it is continually interrupted and diverted. . . . It is not difficult to ascertain that, so far as it is left to itself, such flow takes a very different course from that which we should have to retrace if bent on reminiscence and able to recollect perfectly" (p. 201). Does this refer to the activity which belongs to the filaments as mental processes? Is the flow of ideas just the working out of the life-story of the threads when these are free from superintendence?

Professor Ward draws a distinction between the inhibition or conflict due to the significance of ideas, *e.g.*, the idea "rectangle" inhibiting the predication of any idea which conflicts with "rectangularity," and the inhibition due to the struggle of rival presentations to secure attention. This distinction seems ultimately to depend upon the difference between an activity concerned with the manipulation of ideas and the activity which is inherent in ideas themselves as mental processes.

The same contrast is apparent in the distinction of "judicious" and "mechanical" memory. In discussing Ebbinghaus's experimental work on "mediate" associations between members of a series of nonsense syllables, *a, b, c, d*, etc., Professor Ward regards the so-called mediate associations, say, of *a* with *c* and *b* with *d* as cases of interrelation. "After several repetitions, when the primary associations have begun

to be familiar, the subjects' attitude may change; and it does, and does so with some persons sooner and more frequently than with others. It is then possible to note various relations between the members of the series besides their serial order" (p. 236). Professor Ward agrees with Professor Müller that the subject's activity in relation to the series "displays far more freedom and spontaneity" than merely linking item to item as each files past. "The point is that unless such further subjective initiative is present nothing more is achieved. As a result of that initiative, however, a supplementary process of 'interrelating' comes into play. . . . This secondary interrelating is the distinguishing feature of Kant's 'judicious memorising' and implies the more complex process of redintegration" (p. 237). Such interrelating is surely to be attributed to subjective activity. It is a part of that one-tenth which cannot be explained by Presentationism.

Professor Ward's explanation of so-called "regressive association" follows the same lines. In so far as association depends on movements of attention, and attention can only move forwards, there is no "regressive" association. What appears like it is in reality redintegration and not pure association.

It is possible to regard the life story of the filaments as the explanation of the facts cited in regard to the age and strength of associations. Experiments by Dr. Jost, and still more convincingly the experiments of Dr. Ballard, show what one may term the ripening or maturing of associations with age. Repetition effects more in the case of old associations than in the case of more recent ones. Reproduction is more complete after a short interval than when attempted immediately after acquisition. Professor Ward says, "We seem left to conjecture that the difference is the effect of the process of assimilation working subconsciously" (p. 241); *i.e.*, it is due to the plasticity of the presentation-continuum.

Ebbinghaus's investigations as to the progress of forgetting resulted in the formula that, roughly, forgetting is proportional

to the logarithm of the time; a result which Professor Ward points out as being in harmony with Herbart's assumption that presentations sink below the threshold of consciousness in proportion to their intensity, the less there is to sink the slower the process. This result is also one which is intelligible without reference to the activity of the subject. It is intelligible as the decay of living processes.

Where then do we stand if we try to balance the accounts and interpret the results? It is plain that whether we consider the formation of the memory-continuum, or whether we consider the phenomena of remembering and forgetting, we must, according to Professor Ward, recognize the presence of determining factors other than the sense impressions and their images, even when these are treated biologically as living processes governed by their own laws, exhibiting the characteristics of all life: change, persistence, growth, decay.

I find it, however, extraordinarily difficult to obtain any clear view of the nature of this other factor, or factors, referred to as subjective activity, subjective selection, attention. The whole of experience is experience which, from a philosophical point of view, we attribute to an individual, a subject, and in that sense all experience is subjective. Again, if we accept the conception of mental life all experience is activity. But it is clear that Professor Ward means more than this when he refers to the activity of the subject. From the analysis of experience into a duality it would seem that there are aspects of experience where the dominant features justify the title "objective," and others where they justify the title "subjective," but the subject cannot be identified with any one aspect of experience. It stands over and above experience. It has experience. There is a significant passage in which Professor Ward speaks of Mind as the subject of experience plus its experiences (p. 408). It is to be remembered that the word "experience" was purposely selected by him as being more catholic in its significance than "consciousness."

Professor Ward attributes to the subject one capacity and one power. Of the capacity we have direct experience in feeling. What of the power, attention? The work of attention has to figure under many names. Now it is perception, now imagination, now thought. All the faculties of the old psychologists are reduced to "attention to different kinds of objects." Attention to a special class of objects, viz., motor sensations, is termed "conation." It has this distinguishing feature that it is preceded by feeling. Attention, then, has to serve as a name for the activity of the subject in its cognitional relations to different kinds of objects. Obviously, as such, it is not the name for a specific mental function other than cognition, even though it bears a specific name. Yet if this be so, it is strange that reflection on experience should lead us to postulate a subject-agent who manipulates the growing living processes, selecting this, rejecting that, combining these, severing those. Is the only ground for our conception of an active subject the fact that we find this selected, that rejected, these combined, those severed, and cannot otherwise explain how it came about? Does the case stand thus: the only direct witness of the subject in experience is feeling, but the explanation of cognition demands the postulate of an active subject-agent? On the whole, this seems to me to be one interpretation of Professor Ward; perhaps a misinterpretation, but, nevertheless one which reflects the general analysis of experience given in his table (p. 56).

In accordance with it, the question stated at the beginning of the paper should be answered thus: the faculty of memory implies the existence of an active subject-agent, but does not imply the existence of any specific function, conation.

But there are indications of a different view: indications which are more marked in those parts of the *Principles* which are new or rewritten than in those parts which are reproduced from the article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1885.

The definition of psychology lays emphasis on experience

understood as conative activity or behaviour, and it is stated that "not intellect but will, not cognition but conation, not sensitivity but activity, is the clue to the true understanding of the character and development of experience" (p. 20). "Life or experience as conative involves both activity and feeling" (p. 204). Is the conation in view here merely attention to motor presentations, with the proviso, "initiated by feeling"? I think not. When one turns to the account given of desire, can the "striving" there recognized as present be brought under the heading of motor experiences? Is the attitude of interested expectation, feeling? Does the "want" which Professor Ward says gives a new character to an object, endowing it with value, stand for feeling? If the answer be "yes," it will be difficult to avoid assenting to qualitative differences in feeling, and also to avoid extending the simple duality of pleasure and pain into something resembling Wundt's tridimensional system.

In discussing the question whether the strength of desire is proportional to the pleasure value of the aim, Professor Ward speaks of "seeking." He styles it a condition essential to desire. Such "seeking" is not cognition of the aim, nor can it, without straining, be brought under the category of feeling. Is it then to be conceived as motor sensation? The same type of experience is implied in the account given of concentration, ideational adjustment. "To this ideational adjustment may be referred most of the strain and 'head-splitting' connected with recollecting, reflecting, and all that people call headwork; and the 'absent look' of one intently thinking or absorbed in reverie seems directly due to that lack of sensory adjustment which the concentration on ideas entails" (pp. 173, 174). Is such adjustment "nascent movement"? If it is, why contrast it with sensory adjustment?

But the greatest indication which Professor Ward gives of recognizing a specific function which might be termed conation in Professor Stout's sense of the term, viz., "wanting the object

to be in some respect other than it is or in wanting it to continue as it is,"—is his account of "subjective being."

The pure ego or I, the "idea of pure reason," Kant's "focus imaginarius," cannot be conceived as an object, yet if it be not so conceived, how can it be the limit towards which the empirical ego, the self as known, points? Professor Ward's solution of this problem is that "experience is wider than knowledge" (p. 378). "That pure subject or ego which we reach in our analysis of experience at its rational level stands for no abstraction so long as we are content to distinguish it without attempting to separate it from its objective complement the non-ego. When in some supreme issue a man affirms himself, saying, like Cæsar crossing the Rubicon, or Luther entering Worms, 'I will,' to tell him then that this I of which he speaks is itself an utter abstraction, because our concept of it is the limit of a long process of intellection—surely this would be outrageous" (p. 379). Surely here Professor Ward is relying on the direct witness of the experience of subjective activity in contradistinction to the indirect witness gained by the intellectual reflection on knowledge and cognition? Can this direct witness, subjective activity, be that attention of which it is said, "the activity of attention . . . is one. It is only in relation to A and B that we are tempted to resolve it into a plurality of faculties"? (p. 66). No, for if the activity of attention truly be one, and that cognitional, then *ex hypothesi*, it cannot be the witness which establishes the being of the subject. But if, in the end, the being of the subject is guaranteed by a direct experience, that aspect of experience which provides the guarantee ought to be recognized in the psychological analysis of experience, and is for psychology the proximate fact. For such an aspect of experience "conation" seems the suitable name.

If this interpretation of Professor Ward's teaching be more correct than the one previously given, then the statement with regard to memory may be amended. The faculty

of memory implies the existence of a specific function, conation.

Dr. Richard Semon's treatment of memory is biological, but it is so in a very different sense from Professor Ward's. It is not in terms of mental life, but in terms of organic life that Dr. Semon traces out the formation of the memory-continuum.

In *Die Mneme* one has the lineal successor of Hering's *Ueber das Gedächtnis* and Butler's "Unconscious Memory." Dr. Semon uses the term "Mneme" for memory in Hering's sense, viz., a general function of all organic matter, and he tries, in the first place, to establish the general conditions under which such memory occurs. Human memory will be but a special application of such principles, and is dealt with in his book *Die Mnemischen Empfindungen*. The central fact to be explained is the reproduction or return of some action when the original conditions which gave rise to it are not repeated in their entirety. The problem embraces both the reproduction of response to stimulation and the reproduction of characteristics in ontogeny. Only the former is in place here

The series of events in the reproduction of a response is outlined thus: The excitation of organic matter by stimulation gives rise to what may be termed a response to the stimulation, which response may be continued in a weakened form even after stimulation ceases. There next ensues what, in relation to the state before stimulation, Semon terms a second indifference period. The organic matter, however, is not in the same state as before stimulation. This change in the character of organic matter is an "engramm." The proof of this change lies in the fact that hereafter the organic matter will yield a response to stimulation which could not have called forth that particular response previously. There is not only a new stimulation but also the bringing forth, or "ekphorie" of the "engramm" left by the old response.

Semon does not conceive the "engramm" as a persistence of excitation in the organic matter. In *Die Mnemischen*

Empfindungen he says, "We are not in a position to say more than that after a vigorous stimulation has run its course, the change which is produced is to be conceived as a change in the excitable substance, that is, as a substantial or material change." In other words, Semon favours that structural interpretation of persistence against which Professor Ward protests. All simultaneous excitations in an organism form a connected complex of "engramms." A situation which is a repetition of the original situation is the most effective one for reproducing the response, but when parts of the original situation are repeated, that part which succeeds in repeating the original stimulation effect will be most effective in bringing about a reproduction, for the repeated effect calls forth the appropriate "engramms," *e.g.*, "*a*" produces the excitation α , and "*b*" the excitation β . The excitation $\alpha + \beta$ is brought about by the stimuli $a + b$. But in virtue of the "engramm-complex" $A + B$, due to these excitations, the stimulus "*a*" can hereafter, acting by itself alone, produce the excitation $\alpha + \beta$; since "*a*" brings about effect α , and this "calls forth" the "engramm-complex" $A + B$, and thus gives rise to the response $a + b$.

Dr. Semon reduces all association to simultaneous association. An organism is a systematic whole of co-existing parts. At any moment there exists a co-ordinated totality of excitable conditions. Each stimulation has its effect without confusion with any other. A complex stimulation produces a co-ordinated response. Perception is a complex of this kind. Within the complex some elements are more enduring than others, thus in successive moments there are common factors. What exists at moment A will have some factors in moment B, and thus there will be an "engramm-complex" of A and B. If hereafter anything belonging to moment A is "called forth," it will inevitably, in virtue of its enduring factors, bring up what co-existed with it in moment B. All cases of successive association thus rest ultimately on co-existence. It is interest-

ing to note the contrast between Professor Ward and Dr. Semon here. When association is made to rest on movements of attention, the fundamental form of association must be successive, but when association is made to rest on the systematic co-ordination of response to co-existing stimulations, the fundamental form must be simultaneous.

"Engramms" are directly related to strength of stimulation. The special nerve path stimulated is most affected, but the whole nervous system is affected to some degree, with the exception of those paths which are so specialized as to be impenetrable by any but their "adequate" stimulation. There is, therefore, no definite localization of "engramms;" they cannot be thought of as deposited in certain cells. Plainly there is nothing in this account of the generation of a memory-continuum, if that phrase may pass, to imply conation.

In turning to consider Dr. Semon's treatment of some of the phenomena of memory, the theory of "homophonie" may be noticed first. Just as sense excitations are regarded as co-ordinated but not mixed, so "engramms" must likewise be regarded as co-ordinated but not mixed. Further, there is no mixture between sense stimulation and the reproduced response. If p_{or_1} signifies the original situation and p_{m_1} the memory evoked, then p_{m_1} is never fused with p_{or_1} . The likeness between p_{m_1} and p_{or_2} may be complete, as in the case of recognition, or partial, as when a definite memory of a different occasion is evoked by a situation; but be it complete or partial, p_{m_1} is never fused with p_{or_2} . More than this, upon repetition each separate "engramm" is distinct from those which preceded it. Instead of an "inextricable confusion" of "engramms" as the result of repetition, there results an "analysable consonance." This is what is termed "homophonie." Here, again, it is useful to contrast Dr. Semon and Professor Ward, and to recall the latter's protest against a theory of persistence whereby experience "drags at each remove a lengthening chain." It is true that Dr. Semon does not claim that each "engramm" can

actually give rise to a reproduction, but of their separate effectiveness, he has no doubt. Even when not giving rise to a reproduction they may contribute to the vividness or completeness of other reproductions. Here, indeed, he seems to come near to Professor Ward's conception of "plasticity."

In place of Professor Ward's "concordance," Dr. Semon presents the conception of "layers of engramm-complexes," differing in date, but each possibly containing what may be thought of as the same "engramm," through the presence of which the different layers become associated with one another. This is Dr. Semon's illustration: He sees in a garden at Torbole a tree with a blood red fruit and is told the tree is called the kaki-tree. Some years later he hears a discussion as to suitable colours for military uniforms, khaki is mentioned and he thinks to himself, "it must be very different from kaki fruit," while at the same time a memory of the scene in the garden rises before him. Some time after he is at a railway station where he hears a traveller ask for a ticket to Nago-Torbole. Again an image of the garden and the fruit arises. Months later in a restaurant fancy ice fruits suggest by their colour the kaki fruit and the garden at Torbole. Each recall gives rise to a different complex, but the complexes, by virtue of the "engramm" of the kaki fruit can be associated with one another. This would be Dr. Semon's explanation of the "tissue" of experience. The co-existence of filaments suffices for the weaving of the fabric.

The explanation of mediate associations and forward association is made clear by a scheme of the relations of excitations to one another in the successive moments of a series of events:

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	Successive moments.
A	a_1	a_2	a_3	a_4			
	B	b_1	b_2	b_3	b_4		
		C	c_1	c_2	c_3	c_4	
			D	d_1	d_2	d_3	

Let A, B, C, D represent events and $a_1 \dots a_4$, etc., represent the dying effects of A, etc., during successive moments. At the moment when event D takes place, there co-exists with it a_3, b_2, c_1 , thus association between a and c is not merely possible but necessary; hence the mediate association of a and c , similarly for b and d , etc.

If the same scheme be used to illustrate the relation of "engramms," it will indicate why "forward" rather than "regressive" association takes place. Should the event C be repeated on any occasion it will suggest the event D rather than event B, because the "engramm" of the original event C co-exists with the "engramm" of the fading b_1 , whereas the "engramm" of c_1 co-exists with the actual and vivid D. The association of c_1, D is regarded as stronger than that of C, b_1 . Professor Ward's movements of attention are replaced by the principle of the relative intensity of "engramms."

Obliviscence may be due, not to the dying away of "engramms," but to inhibition of "ekphorie." "Ekphorie" may be hindered, since it depends upon the partial return of the excitation which gave rise to the "engramm," and with a change in the state of the organism, such return may become impossible.

Does Dr. Semon, then, give an account both of the formation of a memory-continuum and of the phenomena of memory without implying the existence of such a function as conation? The answer so far would seem to be undeniably "yes." The temporal order of stimulations, their strength and repetitions, together with the basic facts of organic life, appear to explain memory in man just as they explain "mneme" in all organic matter.

Does Dr. Semon commit the fallacy against which Professor Ward issued a warning in his *Gifford Lectures*, "The bare term 'retention' itself, and all cognate terms, such as 'trace,' 'residuum,' are meaningless unless some present circumstance can be related to the past; thus they presuppose memory?"

This is the fallacy of the Behaviourist, *e.g.*, Watson, "Memory in our sense is a general term to express *the fact* that after a period of no practice in certain habits . . . the function is not lost but is retained as part of the individual's organization, although it may through disuse have suffered greater or less impairment" (*Psychology*, p. 304). For whom is this a fact? Only for someone who can bring past and present together by memory and compare them. Memory is presupposed. Dr. Semon, however, does recognize the "experiencing" of impressions and images in his treatment of *Die Mnemischen Empfindungen*. But this very recognition has its consequences.

Sense perception is complex and, as such, leaves an engramm-complex. The memory reproduction of the original perception is usually fragmentary, indeed for experience the difference between perception and memory is made to depend partly on this circumstance. What explanation is there for the fragmentary image? In accordance with the principles of "mneme" the whole complex should be reproduced. Dr. Semon conceives this as being actually the case, but says that many memory images are too faint to be experienced. He compares the remembered items to the summits of a submerged range of mountains. Just as only the high peaks would be visible and would appear as separate islands, so only the vivid impressions are reproduced in memory as fragments of the perceptual complex. Vividness in the original impression is thus treated as a determining factor, and vividness is carefully distinguished from intensity. Direction of attention to an impression gives it that vividness which ensures it being reproduced. One may compare with Professor Ward's statement that primary memory-images depend mainly upon the attention given to the impression. It is attention which selects elements in the sense complex and also selects features in the reproduction. The "summit" memories which are attended to become clearer, those that are not, fall back into the sub-conscious. The difference between sense impression and image is one of vivid-

ness, and it is this, rather than any difference in intensity which keeps an image and a sensation distinct when they are present together in consciousness. (*Cf.* Professor Ward, p. 173). The vividness of an image is not independent of the intensity of the sense impression, but nevertheless the image of an intense impression is not necessarily more vivid than the image of a less intense one. The only way in which the vividness of images may be increased is by attention.

When several sense impressions are experienced simultaneously there will be decreasing degrees of vividness among them in relation to some one vivid impression. If they belong to the same sense, simultaneous impressions will inhibit one another or give rise to consonance or become vivid in succession (retinal rivalry). In the case of competing trains of images the train followed must be one only of the competitors, or a single train into which members from each of the rival trains enter. There will not be two trains side by side. This fact of singleness in the train of images is important. Dr. Semon explains it as a condition of vividness. Apart from this requirement there seems no necessity for recognizing a limit in the number of sense impressions simultaneously present, and none for restricting reproduction to a single thread. Does the requirement of vividness lie at the root of intellectual incompatibility? Professor Ward distinguished the conflict of presentations to secure attention from the conflict of ideas due to content. Dr. Semon would seem to make both alike depend ultimately upon whatever determines vividness. Will the laws of "mneme" cover these conditions? In so far as vividness is not due to consonance of images or impressions, it is attributed to the selective action of attention. But of attention itself we have no explanation whatever, save what can be gathered from a somewhat cryptic footnote. "I should like to lay stress on the fact that the specific laws of the interplay of simultaneous and successive excitations, laws which have still in part to be discovered, correspond to what we have called attention. These

laws, however, will only form a separate chapter in that same book of law which we have attempted to study in the text of the present book" (*Mn. Emp.*, p. 341).

Are we to infer from this that finally vividness, and all that depends upon it, will be resolved into laws of stimulation and response? If so, there is no place for conation in the theory of memory. But in the meantime Dr. Semon, like William James, appears to use attention as an original force to give that character to images, without which all the mechanism of neural habits is of no effect for the explanation of the actual course of ideas.

What shape does the problem take in Dr. Freud's psychology? It is not easy to obtain a clear conception of principles, for Dr. Freud and his followers have been primarily concerned with establishing a method for psychiatry, not in working out a theoretical psychology. In the last chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams* there are some indications of a general theory. Dr. Freud sketches the outline of a primitive psychic apparatus of the reflex type. Stimulation, excitement, discharge should be its cycle of events, but, in addition to stimulation from without, this apparatus is subject to stimulation from within by bodily conditions. The excitement thus aroused is more continuous, and its removal, which requires a new situation, is accompanied by a feeling of gratification. The new situation and the feeling of gratification are associated, presumably on the principle of temporal contiguity, but possibly something analogous to Professor Ward's principle of subjective selection is implied. On the repetition of such an excitement there will arise a "psychic feeling" (a wish) which reinstates the memory of the situation which gave rise to gratification. The situation is revived with hallucinatory force. The purpose which such a simple apparatus could serve is to allow of hallucinatory "wish fulfilment" following the "wish situation." If in place of gratification painful fear arises with the new situation, there will be no reinstatement

of the situation in memory, on the contrary, any tendency towards such reinstatement will be repressed. The only energy in such a primary system is wish energy, and it is controlled by pleasure and pain automatically, being condensed in giving hallucinatory vividness to the memory of wish fulfilment. This simple reflex type of apparatus is supplemented by a secondary system whose occupation energy is governed by different laws. In face of the claims of the external senses, this system can inhibit the hallucinatory wish fulfilment, and thus find place to the trial and error processes by which the individual learns his world. The rough sketch of the two systems conveys a meaning so long as it is treated as a rough sketch only, blocked in partly in terms which suggest physiological processes, partly in terms suggestive of mental life. It is, I presume, as performances of the secondary system that one must account for those processes of perception, association, memory, intellection, which are described in commonplace psychology. The recognition of the two systems and of their relations to one another gives rise to the doctrines which have distinguished Dr. Freud's psychology.

As the secondary system develops there arises a conflict between its ideas and the wish fulfilments of the primary system. In place of gratification comes pain and consequent repression. But as the wishes themselves are beyond the inhibitory control of the secondary system these endure as potential forces of conflict. The wish energy may be transferred and condensed into any ideas repressed by the secondary system, and when sufficiently reinforced these ideas may break through the inhibitions to which they have been subjected. The bond of association between the wish and the repressed idea to which it transfers its energy seems to be some partial identity in content.

Of the events which take place in the two systems those of which we are conscious are only a small part. Consciousness is "a sensory organ for the reception of psychic qualities"

(*The Interpretation of Dreams*, p. 453). Sense impressions, images, including verbal images, and pleasure and pain, are cited as psychic qualities. "Mental processes themselves are devoid of quality except for the excitements of pleasure and pain accompanying them" (*ibid.*, 490). The primary system, the wish system, is unconscious. Its qualities therefore are never perceived as such, but only in their relation to the secondary system, much of which is also unconscious, in the sense of not being actually perceived; such is the "fore-conscious."

Dr. Freud tells us that, when the unconscious idea penetrates through the foreconscious to consciousness, and when a foreconscious idea is repressed and taken up by the unconscious or primary system, this is not to be conceived as a spatial change, but as a change in energy of the system concerned. Consciousness is regarded as exercising a regulative control over occupation energy (attention?). Both systems have the same *raison d'être*, wish fulfilment. "The primary process strives for a discharge of excitement, in order to establish a *perception* identity with the sum of excitement thus gathered; the secondary process has abandoned this intention and undertaken instead the task of bringing about a *thought* identity" (*ibid.*, p. 477). How does this general theory affect the problem of memory? What does the life-story of any impression become? Impression gives rise to image. Contiguity in time and similarity are accepted as conditions of association and reproduction as, to a certain extent, taking place in accordance with these conditions, but only to a certain extent. If mental life were solely on the model of the primary system, memory would be entirely incidental to the life story of wish. That would be remembered which was connected with wish fulfilment: that would be forgotten which was connected with pain. What would have been absolutely true of the primary apparatus is regarded as partly true for the whole apparatus. Much of what is reproduced and of what is forgotten finds its explanation in

the wishes of the unconscious. Moreover, in the dream the primary system makes use of the images of memory to secure that hallucinatory vividness which is characteristic of its wish fulfilment. These images are wrested from their true associations and their significance is only to be found by regarding them as the vehicles for the expression of ideas which belong to the unconscious. The relation of images to ideas was referred to in discussing Professor Ward. By this interpretation of dreams the whole problem of imagery and meaning is raised in its most difficult form. But whatever their signification, such reproductions must form part of the life history of the impression. Dr. Freud cites cases of forgetting, substitution of false memories and concealment of one memory by another. In every case he finds the explanation in some repressed element which has been associated with the memory in question, and thus taken it into the unconscious. The substitutions and the memories which conceal other memories (much as dream images conceal repressed wishes) "do not owe their existence to their own contents, but to an associative relation of their contents to another repressed thought" (*Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, p. 58).

It makes very little difference in principle what conception is adopted of the ultimate source of the wishes which belong to the primary system, whether all wishes are reduced to the sexual wish or whether a variety of instinctive wishes are recognized, in either case the structure of memory is regarded as at the service of the unconscious wish. One may ask is there any difference between this standpoint and that of Professor Ward, when he says, "Psychologically regarded, then, the sole function of perception and intellection is, it is contended, to guide action and subserve volition—more generally to promote self-conservation and betterment"? (p. 21). There is just this difference, and it seems fundamental. For Professor Ward, just as much as for Aristotle, intellect is the vision of the soul. To conceive of it as a blind slave directed by

a cunning master is to misconceive it. Consciousness of success or failure together with awareness of the situation is essential if action is to be guided by cognition, and this condition requires that even instinctive impulses should fall within the realm of conscious activity. Further, cognition for Professor Ward is governed by its own laws. Whatever interpretation is put upon subjective activity and its work in the generation of the memory-continuum and in the various phenomena of memory, it is self-consistent in its operations. This it could not be, unless that upon which it worked had inherent characteristics in accordance with which its operations were determined.

With reference to the influence of the unconscious wish on the forgetting of proper names, Dr. Freud writes: "the given explanation does not contradict the conditions of memory reproduction and forgetting assumed by other psychologists, which they seek in certain relations and dispositions" (*ibid.*, p. 10). But is this really the case? The conditions assumed, conditions of dispositions and relations, are conditions wherein wish fulfilment or non-fulfilment yields consciousness of success or failure. It seems impossible to piece together the laws of a psychology wherein the duality of the conscious and the unconscious is not recognized with laws which result from just that recognition.

In conclusion, what answer shall be returned to the question as to the faculty of memory and conation? In accordance with Dr. Freud's theories, it is not memory which implies a specific function of conation, but unconscious conation which implies memory and the laws of unconscious conation which determine many of its manifestations.

*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1,
on July 5th, 1920, at 8 P.M.*

XII.—MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

By W. F. GEIKIE-COBB.

Two questions are to occupy us in this paper: the fact of mysticism and its value for philosophy. That mysticism *is* is one thing; *what* it is is another thing, and it is one of the functions of philosophy to decide this latter question.

Our initial difficulty is due to the many shades of meaning with which the terms *mystic* and *mysticism* are charged. And of this variety a few examples may be usefully given. "All mysticism asserts, in contradistinction from the external, mechanical and dualistic character of ordinary orthodoxy, the immediate character of religious values."* "Mysticism is religion in its most concentrated and exclusive form"; it is "that attitude of mind in which all other relations are swallowed up in the relation of the soul to God."† "That occupation with the spiritual world which is of the essence of mysticism inevitably involves a view that at the least lightly esteems the world of sense."‡ "The conception (of the subliminal Self) is one which has hitherto been regarded as purely mystical."§ "The mystics of all ages have been so far justified in their contention that the form of our experience which presents the truest analogy to the experience of the Absolute must be supra-relational, or, in other words, that the most real type of finite experience must be one which transcends the distinction

* Höfding, *Phil. of Religion*, p. 214.

† Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, ii, 210.

‡ *Encycl. of Religion and Ethics*, ix, 114A.

§ F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, p. 13.

a cunning master is to misconceive it. Consciousness of success or failure together with awareness of the situation is essential if action is to be guided by cognition, and this condition requires that even instinctive impulses should fall within the realm of conscious activity. Further, cognition for Professor Ward is governed by its own laws. Whatever interpretation is put upon subjective activity and its work in the generation of the memory-continuum and in the various phenomena of memory, it is self-consistent in its operations. This it could not be, unless that upon which it worked had inherent characteristics in accordance with which its operations were determined.

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of subject and predicate.”* And again, “In holding that all genuine individuality, finite or infinite, involves a type of immediate felt unity which transcends reduction to the relational categories of thought and will, we may fairly be said to have reached a conclusion which, in a sense is mystical,”† and in his *Problem of Conduct*,‡ he says truly: “As the Alexandrian Platonists knew, it is not by knowledge or science, but in an intuition that is something more and less than knowledge, and cannot be described in language appropriate to our roundabout conceptual modes of experience, that the absolute whole, if apprehended at all, would have to be apprehended.” So Dr. McTaggart: “A mysticism which ignored the claims of the understanding would no doubt be doomed. None ever went about to break logic, but in the end logic broke him. But there is a mysticism which starts from the standpoint of the understanding, and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate, but to postulate something beyond itself. To transcend the lower is not to ignore it,”§ and “The view that selves are manifestations of the Absolute, in such a way that they change and perish while the Absolute remains unchanged is one which has always had an attraction for mystics. It is especially prominent among oriental thinkers.”|| “The course of philosophy is the transformation of the mystical conceptions of genius into rational cognition.”¶ Speaking of optimism Leslie Stephen remarks that “its adherents are ready to admit that the pure reason requires the support of the emotions before such a doctrine can be established, and are therefore marked by a certain tinge of mysticism”; the rest “have not been able to escape into any mystic rapture.”**

* A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysic*, p. 152.

† *Ibid.*, p. 413.

‡ P. 306.

§ *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 292.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¶ E. von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, ii, 234.

** *An Agnostic's Apology*, pp. 36-37.

Miss Jane Harrison in asking how a dead man can be a *daimon* of fertility objects that "the two aspects are incompatible, even contradictory—death and life are not the same, though mysticism constantly seeks to blend them."* Nettleship says that "true mysticism is the consciousness that everything which we experience, every 'fact' is an element and only an element in 'the fact,' i.e., that in being what it is, it is significant or symbolic of more.† Speaking of the Dionysian type of religion, Mr. Cornford says: "Because the province of a Mystery God is always, primarily, the human society from which he immediately springs, it is possible for him to remain human as well as divine. In this lies the secret of the vitality of mystical religion."‡ So Höffding says that "the feeling of love has a mystical character due to the arousing of uncomprehended organic instincts, and to the influence of these on the vital feeling and on the imagination."§ And again: "Value can only be preserved by means of changes and transformations. This state of things depends on the reality of the temporal relation and the reality of differences in general. Only by way of pure mysticism, the logical outcome of which is ecstasy, can we (sometimes) attain to a disregard of this order of things."||

Royce, while affirming that Mysticism is "not a vaguely applied name for superstition in general, or for beliefs in spirits, in special revelations, and in magic" says that "for the mystic, according to the genuinely historical definition of what constitutes speculative Mysticism, to be real means to be in such wise Immediate that, in the presence of this immediacy, all thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched, so that the finite search ceases, and the Other is no longer another, but

* *Themis.*, p. 269.

† *Philosophical Remains*, p. 32.

‡ *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 112.

§ *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 77.

|| *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 252.

is absolutely found.”* And “the true historical importance of Mysticism lies not in the subject to which it applied the predicate real, but in the view it holds of the fundamental meaning of that very ontological predicate itself . . . Mysticism consists in asserting that to be means, simply and wholly, to be *immediate*.”† Yet in spite of his ample recognition of the practical value of Mysticism, Royce in the end rejects it as a metaphysical guide, on the ground that like Realism it is a mere abstraction, and ends in a *salto mortale* from the world of the Manifold into the One which is zero. “The mystic ignores the sum of the series. He cares only for the final term itself, viewed as the limit which the other terms approach.”‡ Since Royce confines his criticism of Mysticism to its speculative activity this conclusion is not surprising. But speculation is not the peculiar work of Mysticism; it does not define its essence; it is hardly a property of it, and is probably not more than an accident.

Plotinus lends no countenance to the suggestion that Mysticism is essentially speculative. In the mystical vision there are not two things, but seer and seen are one. “Perhaps we ought not to speak of vision; it is rather another way of seeing, an ecstasy and a simplifying, a self-abandonment, a yearning for a touch, rest, and a striving after union with what is to be seen in the sanctuary.”§ So again: “The soul being filled with deity brings forth these (beauty, justice, virtue). And this is both the beginning and end to the soul. It is the beginning indeed, because she originates from thence; but it is the end because the Good is *there*, and because when the soul is situated there, she becomes what she was before Since the soul is different from God, but is derived from him, she necessarily loves him, and when she is there she has a celestial

* *The World and the Individual*, p. 144.

† *Ibid.*, p. 80.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

§ *Enn.*, vi, 9-11.

love; but the love which she here possesses is common and vulgar."* Finally, Mr. A. B. Sharpe finds himself unable to define Mysticism without the use of the discredited term "supernatural." The characteristic of mystical states is "that they are directly and immediately supernatural." Mysticism is, therefore, a passive state of the soul during which God himself illuminates it. "The only direct, immediate or experiential knowledge of God that man can attain to must be supernaturally bestowed upon him."†

It seemed necessary to cite reputable authors on behalf of the claims of Mysticism, because of the dislike, expressed or unexpressed, felt by professed philosophers for it. Their attitude towards it is perhaps well illustrated by a remark made by Talleyrand when the Host passed by in procession: "Nous nous saluons mais nous ne parlons pas." The above citations may serve as sufficient testimony that Mysticism represents a series of facts of experience, and also that it is a term of art which it is specially difficult to define with precision. It seems impossible, however, to dislodge from popular language the loose sense of the term *mysticism*.

In spite, however, of the appeal to the supernatural as alone constitutive of the mystic experience, it would seem that mysticism has a double aspect, one preparatory, or partial, or perhaps improper, and one final, complete and proper. The former is to be recognized in the search for the meaning of things, and the latter in the ecstatic experience in which subject and object melt into that mysterious Somewhat which is the ground of subject and object alike. Partial and successive experiences of a mystical character form a cumulative disposition which has its term in the mystical experience proper, much as progressive modifications of a structure emerge through epigenesis into something which, when it appears, we call a new creature.

* *Ibid.*, vi, 9, 9.

† *Mysticism: Its True Value*, pp. 61, 14.

A. It will perhaps be most useful if we illustrate a little what has been just called partial mysticism. And we will take first that study of nature which we call—

a. Science.—All men are concerned with a study of the nature of things and the uses and purposes to be found in them. And it makes no difference to our present inquiry whether they are studied for a practical or theoretical end; indeed, these are at bottom indistinguishable, for the establishment of a complete theory has a practical value; the doctrine of the Absolute, for example, is as truly a practical as a theoretical good. The exact study of things, then, is an attempt to trace them back to their origin and to follow them to their final cause, and every success in ascertaining their nature is of a mystic character, inasmuch as it is a discovery of some aspect of the Reality hidden behind the Appearance. For Mysticism assumes that the life is more than the form, and it is incompatible with all realistic striving to state philosophic thought, or any other activity of life in mathematical formulæ.

β. Mysticism is the ultimate explanation of phenomena such as those presented by instinct or impulse. The most thoroughgoing phylogenetic inquiry into instinct comes to a pause before the end is reached. The theory of heredity, even though carried back to account for pre-human antecedents, or pre-historic conditions, leaves us still with some unknown cause not to be found in the history of the object. Even so no doubt it will be found that *omnia exeunt in mysterium*, but at all events the mystic's hypothesis does carry us back, as does philosophic thought with which here it runs parallel, a stage further than science can. And to carry a process a step further back is always so far a service to science.

γ. The theory of evolution, or, more technically, of epigenesis, seems incapable of being unified without a dose of mysticism. For, presuming all species to have been derived from primordial protoplasm, we have to account for the power which has produced the many species out of the one root of their

existence. We have to account also for the adaptive power which has given success to the survivors, for as all are supposed to have started on equal terms, we must assume an unknown x , which has acted as a differentiating factor. But this x making for improvement in the case of some species has a teleological value, and having the whole in view we can but recognize it as mystical.

We may reach the same result by the way of psychology. When Dr. Ward explains* that *pleasure* is one thing and *pleasures* another, and that these latter become graded into higher and lower through accommodation and novelty, he is building on the fact that there is a power at work which constructs qualitative differences out of quantitative. But this fact is not obvious so long as natural differences occupy the attention exclusively; indeed it may appear to be not applicable to an enumerative whole when the many examples of degeneration are considered. Hence, if we conclude for a tendency to improvement in every lower organism we shall be applying a pre-judgment mystically arrived at, *i.e.*, by an intuition of the nature of the whole.

δ. A new chapter in human knowledge has been opened by anthropology with its description of folk-beliefs and customs. But these latter have been treated ordinarily as being merely the rude and primitive beginnings of our later culture. And little attention has been directed to the question of their validity. Rather, the assumption has been made that they have been over-lived, and that they have, therefore, ceased to have more interest for us than as landmarks of a long-forgotten and obsolete stage in our own development. Yet a closer scrutiny might disclose the fact that as a general rule folk-psychology, if formally false, is materially a true transcript of Reality. The universal belief of the savage in gods, whether high or low, celestial or telluric, witnesses to man's innate

* *Psychological Principles*, p. 267 f.

sense of the principle of Otherness, and is at all events more rational than the later attempt to dispense with the Other in favour of Self-deification. That the principle of Otherness should have held undisputed sway in periods when criticism was in possession of no scientific instrument is remarkable, and perhaps inexplicable, unless we have recourse to the hypothesis that man's mind is determined not only by a view of the *Manifold*, but also and concurrently by a synoptic view. But every synoptic view is identical with what our authorities are agreed in calling mystical.

ε. Since Rousseau's day many thinkers have insisted on his doctrine of a general will as the expression of the conation of a community. On the other hand, voices have been raised from time to time urging that psychological concepts are made chaotic by any such doctrine. And these latter seem to plead the better cause. Yet a man who urges that England, or the Catholic Church, stands for something more than a joint will of all, or for more than the joint agreement of the numbers of a governing junta, can hardly be silenced. Here too the solution of the antinomy seems to be in the mystic's hands. The will of the individual is the type of all will, and his will is distinct from the several wills of the rest, but it is not a separate will. It is a phase, perhaps a moment, of the universal will of the Absolute, the phenomenal expression of the one will. Similarly, every several will in the community converges on the same universal will, and at the same time expresses it. And if it be said that these several wills are over a large area contradictory of each other, the answer is direct; the volitions may be contradictory, but the "standing will," if we probe deep enough, will be found self-identical. The general will might be indeed accounted for on the supposition of the over-ruling activity of the will of a *δαίμων* or *genius patriæ*, whose will would be the standing will of all. But such a will would still be singular, and would have to use persuasion or coercion to secure the adhesion of the several wills of the members of the

community. In the former case, what would be operative in the phenomenal order would be the wills of the members acting jointly; in the latter case there would be no will at all, for freedom would be wanting. But whether acting directly through immanence, or indirectly through a departmental presiding officer, the will of the one is supreme over all lesser wills, and this conclusion is a product of mystic intuition.

ζ. The mystic is a devout lover of Nature. To him, "waving its row of lamps the universe sings in worship day and night. There the sound of the unseen bells is heard; there the Lord of all sitteth on his throne." The air is full of *daimons*, and the earth of the knowledge of the Lord. Nature is, for him, a treasure-house of natural and necessary symbols, and hence the creation of arbitrary and fanciful symbols is an impertinence, or a disease. True symbolism is gained from Nature by intuition, and rests on a system of correspondences where wheels revolve within wheels, for the spirit of the living creature is in the wheels. The mystic is untouched by any reminder that Nature is red in tooth and claw with ravine. He denies the fact, or explains it away, or disregards it as being an irrelevance. His intuition is of the unity, and as a mystic he takes little heed of the differences, holding them to be but incident to progress towards the perfection of the whole. If Nature be the vesture of the invisible King, then it is the King on whom the attention of the mystic is rivetted. The vesture has but a mediate value and is comparatively negligible.

In these examples of a partial or improper mysticism we note that the mysticism is of a nature akin to instinct. It dimly sees, but does not apprehend its object, and it builds on past experiences which now form the structure of the Unconscious. In fact, the mystic impulse is at once the ground of instinct, impulse, folk-beliefs, and the feeling for Nature, and also the vivifying principle which assures them their form and persistence in the Unconscious. Nature itself is in all those shapes already deposited in the Unconscious by æonian

experience. It is, however, the function of consciousness to survey the phenomena of the inner and the outer life in the light of reason, to point to their unity of origin and texture, and to bring the Manifold of experience under the One whose existence is a mystical postulate suggested by the intuitive unity of man's own mystical being.

B. The mysticism which we have up till now been considering is but the forecourt of the temple. It enshrines what has been; it suggests the ground on which the palace of Truth itself shall be erected. It is conservative rather than progressive. It assumes what cannot be demonstrated—an upward tendency in the world; asserts that what has been achieved is but an earnest of what shall yet be done; and, most important of all, maintains that the mind of man is in living union with a spirit, or power, which is the spirit, or power, whose peculiar function it is to draw under law all things to their perfection in the whole.

In the last paragraph we seem to have reached the parting of the ways between the mysticism which is true and the mysticism which is false. The mysticism which springs from the Unconscious, which is the sum of our past, human and pre-human, is not mysticism proper but memory. It seems to act in the same way as mysticism proper, but the appearance is fallacious. Its characteristic modes of activity are to be seen in mediumship, in speculation *in nubibus*, in automatic writing, crystal-gazing, inspirational writing, clairvoyance, and clair-audience, and in all similar phenomena. These all alike have their utility in revealing to us the nature and extent of the buried treasures of memory, and in reminding us, by the contrast they afford between the foundations of the Conscious and the formless ghosts of the Unconscious, how correct was the Greek thought which assigned good to the limited and evil to the infinite.

True mysticism, on the other hand, is of a forward look. Its roots are not in the earth but in the eternal Reason which over-

shadows and penetrates all thinking. Hence, every mystical activity proper is due to the inspiration of a higher power with which the mind of man is in touch by virtue of its kinship of nature. The mystic experience begins as intuition and is perfected in judgment.* It is true that the intuition is often so evanescent as to elude the grasp of reflection. It has but a glimpse "of incomprehensibles, and thoughts about things which thoughts but tenderly touch." But it does not seem to be correct to refer this intuition to feeling, if feeling be "the one capacity of the pure ego," by which it is either pleased or displeased with its presentation. Rather, the intuition is the beginning of thought, and may, or may not, succeed in vindicating its right to become thought. The cases, therefore, in which it succeeds should be taken as illustrating the character of those in which it fails. Thus we should conclude that all mystic intuition is neither thought nor feeling, but that the consequent activity concerned comes under the category of thought, and not properly of feeling, though of course here as everywhere some feeling is an accompaniment of the thought. In other words, mysticism proper is the most positive form which a moral valuation can take. It is a revelation not so much of the true as of the good; and though the good and the true have aspects in common, it has a positive, personal, unquestioning quality which is a necessary feature of a moral valuation even as we know it, whatever thought's ideal claims may be. It would follow from this that mystical experiences would be much more common were not most people content to take a shabby intellectualist interpretation of their most vital moments.

Mysticism, then, is an immediate apprehension of some interior good comparable to the immediate knowledge we have

* The mystical conception begins with the phenomena of imagination, and, provided nothing intervenes to disturb or interrupt, it is completed by an act of powerful intellection (*Récéjac: The Bases of the Mystic Knowledge*, p. 109).

of the objects of the external world. It is empirical and not speculative. Saint Teresa (an unexceptionable witness) says of herself that "a feeling of the presence of God would come over me unexpectedly, so that I could in no wise doubt either that He was within me, or that I was wholly absorbed in Him. It was not by way of vision; I believe it was what is called mystical theology."* So Scaramelli says:† "As the human body touches another body and is touched by it again, as it thus feels the other's presence, and this sometimes with enjoyment; so the soul touches a spiritual substance, and is touched by it again, and feels the presence with the sensation that pertains to pure spirit, and this sometimes with great delight; for example, when it is God who touches her and is present to her."

But it is not necessary to labour proof of the proposition that mysticism is by common consent an empirical knowledge of, or direct acquaintance with, a presented non-sensuous Good. Not only is Catholic mysticism at one about this, but Sufi mysticism, and indeed all mysticism, is in agreement. All mystics affirm also that their knowledge is intuitive, and as such is ineffable, incommunicable. That knowledge alone, which depends on facts, or on ideas of Reason, can be communicated; all that lies beyond these lies also beyond logic, and to be known must be lived through. But it is just this world of the beyond, this "excessive," which is the object of the mystic's awareness. And this world, by its very nature, is self-excluded from the operations of the intellect. Hence Philosophy is not called upon to pass judgment either on the fact that it is, or on what it is, apart from its expression. Its function in this respect is to pronounce merely whether what the reporter of a mystic experience says is or is not contradictory of its own accepted conclusions. But since these are confined to what Sense and Understanding jointly supply, and since mystic *data*

* *Life*, x, 1.

† *Tr.*, 3, No. 24.

are beyond these, Philosophy can only say: "Non ragionam di lor, ma guarda e passa." In other words, the function of philosophy when mysticism comes before it, is to accept the *data* of the latter as it does the *data* of the sensuous order, and then to find a place for them in its system of thought. In this sense the mystical intuition is perfected in judgment, even though here as elsewhere much of the living fact evaporates in the process of abstraction.

Here the objection might naturally be made that if the *data* of mysticism are of this intractable character their solution would be better found in hallucination, or alienation, than in the hypothesis of a reason of the heart which lies beyond the reasonings of the intellect. But in the first place it is noteworthy that acknowledged mystics have shown themselves on their guard against these aberrations of the mind. The delight that comes from feelings or visions is "very suspicious to come from the enemy," says Hilton. "It is more natural that God should communicate Himself through the spirit than through the senses," says St. John of the Cross. "It is very important to prevent souls from resting in visions and ecstasies; these graces are greatly subject to illusions; of this sort of gifts, the least pure, and those most subject to illusion, are visions and ecstasies," says Madame Guyon. We may say in general that the truer the mysticism the greater the caution shown in discriminating between the true and the false.* And, speaking generally again, the test by which all auditions and visions, whether intellectual, imaginary, or corporeal, are tried, is not only the circumstances of their happening, but even much more their value. Revelations of any sort, if genuine, must inure to the heightening of the life of the spirit, must be clear, free from self-seeking, not

* Cf. Hilton, *The Scale of Perfection*, i, xi; St. John of the Cross, *Subida del Monte Carmelo*, ii, xi; Guyon, *Vie*, i, ix; Father Poullain, *The Graces of Interior Prayer*, chs. xxi, xxii; Gerson, *De distinctione verarum visionum*.

self-contradictory, not referable to human agency, properly attested, and purely transmitted. And even so they are to be accepted with caution, and are not to be used as foundation for doctrine, but, though approved, are not more than "probabiles et pie credibiles."

In the second place, between pathological hallucinations and alienation and the mystic's sense of the presence of God, there is the difference of a whole scale of values. Between free memory-images and morbid hallucinations, are many degrees of reality, and in all a minimum of sensuous impressions is present. But the hallucination consists in the projection of a representation whereby it is mistaken for a presentation. The mystic's experience, on the contrary, whether justifiable or not, is, at all events, not of a hallucinatory character, because it lacks all reference to corporeal reality. "The immediate vision of the naked Godhead," says Suso, "is without doubt the pure truth; a vision is to be esteemed the more noble the more intellectual it is, the more it is stripped of all image and approaches the state of pure contemplation."* And although theologians have discussed the question whether the two outstanding figures of Catholic faith have appeared in bodily form, the evidence of the mystics themselves is against the supposition. St. Teresa, for instance, says that "when anyone can contemplate the sight of our Lord for a long time, I do not believe it is a vision, but rather some overmastering idea."† And in general, the visions, locutions and auditions of mystic literature seem explicable in terms of ordinary psychology.

We are here reminded that the mystic experience proper is one thing, and the mode of its formulation is another. The vision is as long-lived as a flash of lightning, but before it is gone the mind has given it intellectual form. The essence

* *Leben*, ch. LIV.

† *Int. Castle*, Sixth Mansion, ix, 5.

of the mystical experience consists in a transcendental apprehension of the reality which *appears* in all ordinary experience. These appearances, according to mysticism, are the garment worn by the reality on which perhaps no man can look and live. The myth of Zeus and Semele enshrines a law. But the mind of man presses towards awareness, and awareness implies a mental form; but the form can hardly comprehend the full content of the concrete reality, the touch of which makes the mystic. Hence the form by which the seer seeks to represent to himself that reality is inadequate, and if pressed, is misleading. The mystic is not mistaken when he affirms that the boundaries of the flaming world have for him for a brief moment been removed, but he cannot for all that be enabled to claim for his private explanation of that experience greater validity than that of a working hypothesis.

This is only to say that the mystic's explanation cannot transcend the limits of symbolism. The touch of reality is an inexplicable fact; the formulation of it by the mind is symbolic. The one is an "irruption" of the Absolute into consciousness; the other is the figurative expression by the mind of that which in itself is inexpressible. Indeed, every real particular is inexpressible, for what is expressed must be known as thought, and all thought is universal, and from the universal there has slipped out that particularity which makes the thing to be unique and unsharable. Hence the gulf between the *that* and the *what* in mystical experience is comparable to the difference which yawns between every *that* and every *what*. In all the activities of thought the materials we work with are symbols, the *data* of science no less than the *data* of art or of religion. And all are inadequate to express reality. But it should be observed that wherever thought is not a *chimæra bombinans in vacuo* there is assumed necessarily the same union of the absolute reality and of its appearance, and the same symbolic relation of the latter to the former. The symbol is a joint product of the Absolute and of the materials already

possessed by the mind for the purposes of thought. Hence, there is no *a priori* ground for regarding the mystic fact as abnormal and therefore suspicious.

Sensuous experience and mystic experience, then, are alike in that neither is fully expressible, and that whatever gets itself expressed succeeds by the use of symbols. But the symbols used are not deliberately selected by the conscious mind. They emerge from the unconscious. In that—if we may use metaphorical language—are stored up the memory images of all the objects of our experience, or else these are capable of re-creation at need. However we express it, the fact is undoubted but unexplained. A perception, or even a sensation, shades off into the unknown no more and no less than an apperceptive mass; an element of mysticism lurks in a presentation and lies at the base of all cumulative dispositions. Man can call spirits from his own vasty deep, and they will obey him—sometimes.* When they come, he uses them as symbols. He has Pascal's experience, and he cries out "Fire"; he is conscious of a higher Something, and he "feels" or is "touched"; joy enters his heart, and with Richard Rolle he says, "thought into song is turned, and the mind into full sweet sound is changed;" a new angle-point is made effective for the understanding, and the Servitor sings, "*Illuminare, illuminare Jerusalem*"; a feeling of utter imperfection calls for the variegated imagery of "pilgrimage"; a sense of harmony and

* Many will go further than this and postulate an "ethereal medium" which records not only the things retained in the memory of the individual from his own experience, but also images in an "earth-memory." Thus Æ. says (*Candle of Vision*, p. 56): "In tracking to their originals the forms seen in vision we discover for them a varied ancestry, as that some come from the mind of others, and of some we cannot surmise another origin than that they are portions of the memory of Earth which is accessible to us." Personify Earth, and postulate the power of transmission of thought from mind to mind somehow, and all this is credible. But still the record has to be read, and the mind that reads is still the central mystery.

unity is translated into the language of the "spiritual marriage"; the two-fold experience of an indwelling Spirit and a transcendent Power without is symbolized by the familiar doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity; Bāyāzid, when he finds in himself the love of God, can only say that "when God loves a man, He endows him with three qualities in token thereof: a bounty like that of the sea, a sympathy like that of the sun, and a humility like that of the Earth," all of which is couched in symbolic terms; so the Sufis speak of three organs of spiritual communication, the heart which knows God, the spirit which loves Him, and the inmost ground of the soul which contemplates Him. But we should miss the secret of mysticism if we took its symbolic utterances for its unutterable experience. And perhaps we may share the robust common-sense of Dr. Johnson who, speaking of Jacob Böhme, said that "if Jacob had seen unutterable things, Jacob should not have attempted to utter them." But, then, how else could others have been stirred to emulate him? Yet the main point is that we get back from symbols, and words, and names, to the mystic fact itself. Jalāluddīn Rūmī, addressing the scholastic theologian, says:—

Do you know a name without a thing answering to it?
 Have you ever plucked a rose from R.O.S.E.?
 You name His name: go, seek the reality named by it!
 Look for the moon in the sky, not in the water!

We are driven then from the symbol to the thing symbolized, and though we are compelled to limit ourselves to writing about it, we can perhaps set up one or two sign-posts on the road for the benefit of the travellers who are also seekers. Each, however, must do the travelling and seeking for himself.

α. The mystic is not seeking to get, or to know. He is seeking to become, and to be. And what that is is the secret known to himself alone. He believes himself to be unique, infinite in his reach, capable of an undreamed of perfection,

dependent on the "Other" for everything, at once everything and nothing. Yet he does not stand in isolation as if he possessed some secret denied to others, but when asked what he has to claim as his distinguishing mark he can only reply that he has nothing which differs from what all others have; "Where one heard noise, and one saw flame, I only know he named my name." His secret is to himself, but so, he avers, is that of everybody else.

β. The mystic's devotion is to the Whole which is the One, and in his most characteristic moments his whole being is suffused with a sense that the One alone is, and that the Many are but shadows. Hence, when he incautiously sets out to turn his intuitions into theology he is apt to talk as if his view was pantheistic. The mystic, however, as a mystic, has no creed, and if he is somehow tempted to form a creed, his mysticism is no longer pure but mixed. He has stepped into philosophy; the Good becomes the True, and *vous* has given way to *διάνοια*. In any case, pantheism is not the most suitable creed by which to formulate his intuitions, still less is it logically necessary.

But because the mystic is so deeply interested in the one incommutable Good he is open to the charge of neglecting its differentiations for thought. The distinction between good and evil is not for him sharply drawn, nor that between being and not-being. Time and space seem to him negligible, and subject and object imply a division which would be better away. This disinclination to allow for phenomenal differences is ordinarily regarded as the cardinal defect of mysticism. It does not, however, derogate from its essential value, but serves at best as a reminder that it needs for its guardian both science and philosophy.

γ. It would be a misunderstanding of the mystic if we supposed him to be concerned with his own interior states only. He does certainly turn away from the external world, as he turns away from all its differences, but he does not thoroughly

confine his attention to what he finds within himself. If he looks within, as he does, it is because he is aware that there is the Other which is the object of his supreme desire. And so far is he from exalting himself into his object that his whole endeavour is to sink and lose himself in it. No doubt the "introvert" becomes a mystic more readily than the "extrovert," but in the process he tends to disappear, and may indeed be said to become an "extrovert" of a peculiar kind. Or shall we say that the moral experience of the mystic is the arrogation of godhead with the austerity attached to the claim, and with a full sense of responsibility, as well as with the humility which is responsibility's better half?

No term is more generally associated with mysticism than that of ecstasy, and it is on ecstasy that Royce bases his condemnation of mysticism. He regards ecstasy as giving "a certain limiting state of that finite variable which is called your knowledge," and as being the zero into which consciousness disembogues. The error in this judgment is in the assumption that the ecstatic state in transcending consciousness annuls *all* consciousness. What is unconsciousness with regard to us here is not necessarily unconscious to us there. The intuitive flash of genius, like the ecstatic vision, subsumes ordinary consciousness, and fuses all differences in a whole cognized synoptically. The differences, however, remain as moments in that whole ready for the service of discursive thought. The mystic Absolute is not only the goal but also the process. Consciousness is a transition stage between two different kinds of Unconsciousness, but what it borrows from the lower, and enriches, it transmits to the higher. It does not seem to be true that the mystic supposes that "the finite search has of itself no Being at all, is illusory, is *Māya*, is itself nothing." On the contrary, it is an admitted mystic dogma that Reality lives in its appearances; that in the *via negativa* you strip off the accidental only, so what is left at every stage is real, though not the whole of reality; and that in the *via eminentiæ* you

start with what is real, find more of it as you climb, and at the top of the ladder retain what your discursive reason has garnered, and then intuitively crown it in a synoptic view. The mystic certainly does claim that his intuition puts him in touch with the real, and in this his claim differs in degree only from the claim of the poet that he is in touch with the real in the sensuous. But no mystic has ever claimed that, discursively or intuitively, he cognizes reality in its fullness; and he adds that he is not primarily concerned with reality under its aspect of truth. He differs from the physicist in method, but not in principle; to both finality is impossible.

Lastly, the problem of the mystic is the metaphysical problem of the nature of the self. If this be a mere "bundle or collection of impressions"; if it be nothing but the present thought appropriating the past; or if it be "an average statistical resultant of many conditions, but not an elementary force or fact," then the mystical fact does not emerge. This fact stands or falls with the fact of the transcendental self. Of this self we have no sure knowledge by description, but I submit that we have by acquaintance. I think, and I can add to this that I think that I think; when I make the addition, as I do every day many times, the knower of the object becomes the knower of the subject. In other words, he reveals himself as capable of activity in another capacity or form whereby the subject in the "phenomenal" world becomes an object in the "noumenal."* I, the Self that is aware of x , am also aware of my awareness, and I make the judgment on an intuition given by acquaintance that the self which is aware is identical with the self which is aware of the awareness. In that case that self can and does function in the phenomenal and in a world which is transcendental to the phenomenal. That is, it is a member of the transcendental order, and as such it is at home with reality and

* This self is "that subject whose activity is the subject's 'object,'" Volkmann, *Lehrb. d. Psychologie*, 4th ed., ii, 217.

with its two chief aspects. If this be once granted the mystical experience would seem as natural as the sensuous.

δ. The soul, however, to the mystic is not "the apex of a didactical pyramid," a cold abstraction reached by thought. It thinks, of course, but its thought is not that of dry reason, but is informed by the passion of love. And it is because of the dominance in mysticism of love that mysticism has become identified improperly with "feeling." When the soul is in presence of the one "it takes fire, and is carried away by love. The fullest life is the fullest love, and the love comes from the celestial light which streams forth from the Absolute one, the Absolute Good, that supreme principle which made life and made spirit, the source and beginning, which gave spirit to all spiritual things and life to all living things."* Plotinus and Plato agree that "love is an activity of the soul desiring the Good." "Love is not a relation between externals, but between Spirit and Spirit. It is unity in duality, the reconciliation of these opposites, known in experience. Human love is the sacrament of the union of souls yonder. It is immortal, almost immortality itself. . . . Three classes of men have their feet on the ladder—the philosopher, the friend of the Muses, and the lover. The intellect, æsthetic sensibility, and love, are the three 'anagogic' faculties."† So Richard Rolle says that "burning of love into a soul truly taken all vices purgeth . . . for whilst the true lover with strong and fervent desire into God is borne, all things him displease that from the sight of God would run."‡ Hence the mystic is able to solve in practical form the mystery of pain. He calls suffering the "gymnastic of eternity," and says with à Kempis, "Gloriari in tribulatione non est grave amanti." The vision of the Good enraptures

* Plotinus, *Enneads*, 6, 7, 23, and W. R. Inge, *Gifford Lectures*, ii, 131.

† Inge, *ubi supra*, p. 187 f.

‡ *The Fire of Love*, i, xxiii.

him, and he cries with St. Teresa, "let me suffer or die," because he has learned that it is the sense of the finite ego which shuts off the soul from the incommutable Good, and that it is through suffering that this sense becomes a servant instead of a master. Hence the air of unreality that is apt to cling round the ecstatic utterances of the mystics. The explanation is that they are in love with eternal beauty and that love makes every lesser object of little account. Hence too Pascal's vision of "Feu" ended with "Renonciation totale et douce." *Amans volat, currit et lætatur: liber est et non tenetur*, says à Kempis. And when Dante at length attained to the vision of the Supreme Light, he could only speak of it as loving and smiling, and give as his last word that it is Love which moves the sun and the other stars. Before this supreme experience of Love, it would seem that all discursive thought is foredoomed to silence as a worshipper in the outer court of reality.

TWO SYMPOSIA

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I. SYMPOSIUM: THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

By ELIE HALÉVY, MARCEL MAUSS, THÉODORE RUYSSSEN, RENÉ JOHANNET, GILBERT MURRAY, and SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.

I.—*By* ELIE HALÉVY.

SUR quel principe fonder l'établissement de cette "paix durable," à laquelle aspirent, ou disent aspirer, tous les peuples belligérants et tous les chefs qui les gouvernent? La formule qui a trouvé la faveur la plus répandue, c'est le formule de la "libre détermination des peuples." Le Président Wilson en a été le grand protagoniste; il s'agissait pour lui non d'abrégier la guerre, mais de la prolonger au besoin afin de faire l'économie de guerres futures, et de la conduire jusqu'au moment où tous les belligérants, sous la pression des Etats-Unis, seraient obligés d'accepter un remaniement de la carte d'Europe, de la carte du monde, conforme au principe des nationalités, enfin pour la première fois exactement respecté.

Laissons de côté l'idée d'un remaniement de la carte du monde et les problèmes, infiniment compliqués, qui portent sur les peuples d'Afrique et d'Asie. Laissons de côté le problème, bien grave cependant, de savoir s'il n'y a pas contradiction entre l'idée de libre détermination et l'idée d'une Société des Nations qui implique une limitation de la souveraineté, en d'autres termes de la libre détermination, de chaque nation. Demandons-nous seulement dans quelle mesure ce principe peut être, en lui-même et à l'exclusion de tout autre, considéré comme constitutif des nations entre lesquelles on vise à créer un état d'équilibre et de paix. La règle, c'est qu'aucun peuple, grand ou petit, ne doit être asservi à un autre peuple, englobé dans un autre peuple, contrairement à sa volonté; et le principe,

énoncé sous cette forme, semble être d'une réalisation très simple puisqu'il suffit, pour l'appliquer, d'inviter tous les hommes d'une région donnée à se réunir pour voter, à la majorité des voix, en faveur de leur inscription dans tel ou tel groupe national. Demandons-nous s'il n'est pas trop simple. Les idées simples sont des idées révolutionnaires et guerrières, parce qu'elles ne peuvent se poser qu'à l'exclusion et par la destruction de toute autre idée. Elles font violence à la complexité des choses. Elles ne travaillent pas pour la paix.

C'est sur d'autres principes—principe des frontières naturelles, principe de l'équilibre européen—qu'on avait jadis prétendu se fonder pour répartir selon les exigences de la justice les divers territoires nationaux. Faudra-t-il admettre que vraiment le principe des nationalités ait aboli ces vieux principes ? Les pacifistes aiment à rappeler qu'ils ont été fréquemment des causes de guerre. Oui, si on a voulu se fonder sur l'un d'entre eux, à l'exclusion de tout autre. Il en a été, il en sera de même, du principe des nationalités. Mais il semble possible de démontrer que le principe des frontières naturelles et le principe de l'équilibre européen sont, au même titre que le principe de libre détermination, des principes constitutifs d'une paix internationale durable.

Principe des frontières naturelles.—Il faut que les nations entre lesquelles on désire constituer une Société pacifique soient, chacune prise en elle-même, bien constituées ; et il ne suffit pas pour cela de la volonté, plus ou moins unanime, des citoyens qui les composent respectivement. Il faut encore que les nations soient enfermées dans des limites imposées en quelque sorte par la géographie physique, qui constituent au double point de vue militaire et économique, des frontières indiscutables. Les Alpes, les Pyrénées, sont des frontières naturelles. On parle bien français et italien sur les deux versants des Alpes ; catalan et basque sur les deux versants des Pyrénées. Si pourtant des guerres doivent éclater encore entre la France et l'Italie, entre la France et l'Espagne, ce sera au

sujet de leurs possessions africaines, non de leurs frontières alpestres ou pyrénéennes, qui sont fondées sur la "nature des choses." Il n'y a pas de frontière naturelle entre la France et l'Allemagne: une fleuve n'est pas une frontière naturelle. De là tant de périls de guerre. Dans l'Europe Orientale les nations, au sens ethnique du mot, sont à tel point enchevêtrées qu'il est impossible d'espérer que l'on puisse jamais effectuer là-bas un partage permanent des territoires nationaux. Ne faut-il pas admettre en conséquence que ces régions sont faites pour l'empire plutôt que pour la nationalité?

Ce principe des frontières naturelles que les écrivains de l'école pacifiste se plaisent à condamner, il serait facile de démontrer que les pacifistes les plus notoires sont incapables de s'en passer. Le principe suivant lequel chaque nation, pour être bien constituée, aura droit à ses débouchés maritimes, n'en est qu'une forme particulière: or il a été rangé par le Président Wilson, au nombre des quatorze points de la Société des Nations. C'est étendre encore un peu plus l'application du principe des frontières naturelles que d'affirmer la nécessité pour une nation, si elle doit être viable, d'être une nation économiquement "bien arrondie" et autonome. Or M. Keynes, si sévère pour le Président Wilson, parce que celui-ci n'aurait pas su, à l'en croire, imposer aux signataires du traité de Versailles le respect intégral de sa philosophie, admet que la Haute Silésie reste allemande au mépris du principe de libre détermination, parce que l'Allemagne a besoin, pour la bonne organisation de son économie nationale, des charbonnages silésiens. Nous ne voulons ici ni justifier ni critiquer l'attitude des deux pacifistes. Nous nous bornons à constater que les partisans les plus déterminés du principe de libre détermination croient devoir, en certains cas, faire appel, sous des formes détournées, au principe des frontières naturelles.

Principe de l'équilibre européen.—La paix c'est la justice et la justice, c'est l'équilibre. Il y a état de droit et paix durable quand des forces nationales contraires au lieu de se heurter et

de tendre réciproquement à s'anéantir, se limitent et se balancent. Or cet équilibre suppose réalisées deux conditions. Il faut d'abord que les nations soient, chacune prise en elle-même, bien constituées : à cela pourvoient les deux principes de la libre détermination et des frontières naturelles. Il faut, en outre, qu'elles soient, dans la mesure du possible, égales entre elles. Tous les systèmes pacifistes depuis le Droit des Gens de Grotius jusqu'à la Société des Nations du Président Wilson, reposent sur cette fiction de l'égalité des nations. Ne faut-il pas, pour que ces systèmes soient viables, que la distance ne soit pas trop grande entre cette fiction et la réalité ?

Brobdingnag est un Etat de cent millions d'habitants ; il est flanqué, à droite, par la petite monarchie lilliputienne, avec cinq cent mille habitants ; à gauche, par les vastes prairies des Houhynns, avec un million d'habitants. Un peu plus loin l'île volante de Laputa compte vingt millions d'âmes. Supposons que l'Etat de Brobdingnag soit pris de velléités conquérantes : que pèseront dans la balance l'intelligence des Lilliputiens, la sagesse des Houhynns, et tous les plans de paix perpétuelle qui s'élaborent dans l'île de Laputa ?

Le cas est hypothétique assurément : la réalité est-elle si loin cependant de ressembler à notre fable ? Essayons d'imaginer quelle figure pourra prendre la nouvelle Europe, au sortir de la crise qui a éclaté en 1914 et n'est pas encore dénouée. Voici la Russie réduite en morceaux. Dans sa partie occidentale, une série d'Etats qui peuvent compter les plus grands, vingt millions, et les plus petits, un million d'habitants. A l'arrière-plan, une Moscovie informe dont personne ne peut deviner encore autour de quel noyau elle se trouvera son organisation définitive. Au centre de l'Europe, une vaste Allemagne qui comptera quatre-vingt millions d'âmes si les Allemands d'Autriche, à qui nous accordons, par hypothèse, la libre détermination d'eux-mêmes, demandent à s'unir aux Allemands du Reich. Entre cette grande Allemagne et les Mers Noire et Méditerranée, une série d'Etats sans passé politique,

sans frontières naturelles : que d'occasions à de victorieuses incursions ! Et que pèseront contre cette masse les nations occidentales, même appuyées par le Grande-Bretagne ? Toutes considérations de politique intérieure mises à part, les pacifistes regretteront alors la disparition d'une grande Autriche et d'une grande Russie, capables de faire équilibre à la grande Allemagne. Ils reconnaîtront que la philosophie de l'équilibre européen s'est justifiée par un siècle de paix tel que l'Europe n'en avait jamais encore connu. Pussions-nous trouver, dans le chaos actuel, les formules d'un nouvel équilibre ! Ce que nous contestons, c'est que l'on puisse, comme paraissent le croire les écrivains pacifistes, se désintéresser de cette recherche.

Nous souhaitons qu'il n'il n'y ait pas de méprise sur le but vers lequel tendent les réflexions qui précèdent. Elles mènent à cette conclusion que la Société des Nations repose non pas sur un principe simple mais sur une pluralité de principes, qui doivent se compléter l'un par l'autre. Le pacifisme se fait tort et prend le caractère d'une utopie, quand il prétend réorganiser la Société des Nations en se fondant sur un seul principe présumé rationnel : pourquoi alors ne pas procéder par des voies plus simples encore, et réaliser la paix européenne par la conquête et par l'empire ? Mais justement c'est l'impérialisme qui, étant donnée la constitution géographique et morale de l'Europe, constitue, en ces matières, l'utopie par excellence. Combien de fois l'Europe, au cours des siècles passés, n'a-t-elle pas été épuisée par l'ambition des conquérants, pour se trouver après d'inutiles massacres, de nouveau divisée en nations qui savaient entretenir des relations pacifiques sans être fondues dans l'unité d'une monarchie universelle ? Le pacifisme, qui enregistre cette faillite de l'esprit de conquête, est, pour qui sait comprendre, la moins utopique, la plus sage, la plus prudente et la plus conservatrice des doctrines. Et qui sait si ce n'est pas là sa faiblesse ? Car l'imagination humaine est ainsi faite qu'elle a besoin de se nourrir de chimères. Il faut donc excuser l'homme d'état, épris de l'idée pacifiste, qui tente, pour séduire l'imagination populaire,

de donner à cette idée l'aspect d'une utopie. Ainsi a fait le Président Wilson : mais alors, malheur à la paix internationale ! Son programme est devenu un programme guerrier ; et maintenant, pour avoir voulu mettre à sa guerre le point final, le voici victime des passions nationales qu'il a lui-même déchainées.

II.—By MARCEL MAUSS.

NOUS proposons de substituer à la question abstraite des nationalités, la question tout à fait concrète des nations, de leur place dans l'histoire humaine, de leur rôle moral actuel, de leurs rapports, et des principes adverses du cosmopolitisme. Nous parlerons ainsi de réalités, car les nations sont des êtres considérables et récents, loin d'avoir terminé leur évolution. Notre méthode, dite sociologique, sera ainsi rigoureusement pragmatique.

1. *Les Nations.*

Nous demanderons d'abord qu'on nous accorde deux définitions : celle de la nation, celle de la société. *La société est un groupe d'hommes vivant ensemble sur un territoire déterminé, indépendant, et s'attachant à une constitution déterminée.*

Mais toutes les sociétés ne sont pas des nations. Il y a actuellement, dans l'humanité, toutes sortes de sociétés, depuis les plus primitives, comme les Australiennes, jusqu'aux plus évoluées, comme nos grandes démocraties d'occident. Qu'on nous promette d'utiliser la distinction classique de Durkheim entre les sociétés "polysegmentaires" à base de clans, les sociétés tribales, d'une part ; et d'autre part les sociétés "non segmentaires" ou intégrées. Parmi celles-ci on a confondu (Durkheim et nous-même avons aussi commis cette erreur) sous le nom de nation, deux sortes de sociétés qui doivent être distinguées. Dans les unes le pouvoir central est extrinsèque, superposé, souvent par la violence quand il est monarchique ; ou bien il est instable et temporaire quand il est démocratique.

Celles là ne méritent que le nom d'États, ou d'Empires, etc. *Dans les autres, le pouvoir central est stable, permanent ; il y a un système de législation et d'administration ; la notion des droits et des devoirs du citoyen et des droits et des devoirs de la patrie s'opposent et se complètent. C'est à ces sociétés, que nous demandons de réserver le nom de nations.* Aristote distinguait déjà fort bien les *ἔθνη* des *πολεῖς* par le degré de conscience qu'elles avaient d'elles mêmes (1276, a, 28, etc.).

Si l'on accepte cette définition, le nombre des nations devient singulièrement restreint. Elles apparaissent, surtout les grandes, comme de belles fleurs, mais encore rares et fragiles de la civilisation et du progrès humain. Les premières furent petites, ce furent les cités grecques. La première grande fut Rome. Depuis, je ne compte guère que sept ou huit grandes nations et une douzaine de petites dans toute l'histoire.

Pour donner un tableau complet des nations il faudrait encore les classer entre elles. Car elles sont inégales en grandeur, en force, en richesse, en civilisation, en âge, en maturité politique. Il faut en effet, sentir la grandeur et la dignité de ces œuvres des hommes et des temps que sont les grandes et vieilles nations. Elles furent aussi les plus fortes ; elles gagnèrent la guerre ou manquèrent la gagner. Cette inégalité est d'ailleurs reconnue par la pratique, autrefois de ce qu'on appelait le Concert Européen, aujourd'hui de ce qui est le Conseil d'Administration de la Société des Nations.

Telle est la description qu'on peut faire de l'état sociologique où est parvenue l'humanité. Les nations sont les dernières et les plus parfaites des formes de la vie en société. Elles sont économiquement, juridiquement, moralement et politiquement les plus élevées des sociétés, et assurent mieux qu'aucune forme précédente le droit, la vie et le bonheur des individus qui les composent. Et de plus, comme elles sont inégales entre elles, et comme elles sont fort différentes les unes des autres, il faut concevoir que leur évolution est loin d'être terminée.

De ces très simples considérations de fait, nous pouvons déjà tirer une première série de conclusions pratiques.

Les unes sont de droit international public. La première chose à faire est d'aider les sociétés qui ne sont pas encore des nations à en devenir. Or ces sociétés sont de deux sortes : les unes ont été autrefois des nations ou sont sur le point de le devenir. Pour la plupart d'entre elles, la guerre et le Traité de paix ont réalisé leur indépendance, et le problème des nationalités a perdu une partie de son acuité en Europe, par le fait de la disparition des tyrannies Allemande, Autrichienne, Hongroise et Turque. Ce fut un grand bien qui sortit d'un grand mal. Les autres de ces sociétés n'ont jamais été des nations et quelques unes sont même bien loin de ce grade. À celles-ci, les nations doivent leur aide. Mais c'est une nouvelle conception de droit qui vient de se faire jour : la théorie des mandats, des tutelles destinées à mener les sociétés arriérées à la liberté et à la civilisation. Il y a grande différence entre ces doctrines et les anciens usages d'annexion, de colonisation violente, de "Raubwirtschaft," comme disent les Allemands. Malheureusement la politique des zones d'influence est encore pratiquée dans l'Orient proche par les grandes puissances et par la Grèce.

Au point de vue du droit public et privé, il y a aussi à faire quelques constatations et à déduire quelques règles.

Non seulement les nations sont inégales entre elles, mais aucune nation moderne n'a atteint un tel point de perfectionnement qu'on puisse dire que sa vie publique ne peut plus progresser que sous une forme nouvelle et supérieure de société. Les plus élevées, celles qui se sont le mieux conduites pendant la guerre, la Grande Bretagne, la France, l'Allemagne (j'entends celles qui ont le plus et le mieux développé leurs forces nationales) ne sont pas encore des nations parfaites ni également perfectionnées sur tous les points. Elles ont fort à faire avant d'être parvenues à un équilibre d'heureuse centralisation et d'heureuse décentralisation comparable à celui où sont

déjà parvenues de petites nations qu'on pourrait prendre comme modèles, telles que la Suisse ou la Norvège.

Enfin c'est tout dernièrement, en Angleterre surtout, que s'est fait jour l'idée de la nationalisation, c'est-à-dire d'une forme d'administration, par la nation, des choses économiques qui appartiennent à la nation. C'est là la forme la plus récente du socialisme, et celle qui a vraisemblablement le plus d'avenir. Car elle n'est par déduite d'un idéal ou d'une critique dialectique de la société bourgeoise, mais d'une observation des faits et de l'idée que la meilleure administration des choses est celle des intéressés. Or cette nationalisation suppose l'abandon de la notion d'Etat souverain, qui, irresponsable, serait évidemment mauvais administrateur de biens économiques. Elle suppose, bien au contraire, la notion que la nation est un groupe naturel d'usagers, d'intéressés, une vaste coopérative de consommateurs, confiant ses intérêts à des administrateurs responsables, et non à des corps politiques recrutés, en général, sur des questions d'opinion, et en somme incompétents.

Toute la vie économique des nations tend donc avec peine à s'ébaucher. Mais c'est que tous les processus de la vie nationale sont loin d'avoir partout atteint leurs derniers développements, même dans de nations très vieilles et très grandes. Le sens du social et du national commence seulement à s'éveiller.

Le principe des nationalités, ou, pour mieux dire, la vie des nations ont donc encore une longue carrière à parcourir, en matière de droit international, de droit public et privé. Les nations ont devant elles un lointain et grand idéal, économique, esthétique et surtout moral. Avant l'Internationale, il faut faire passer dans les faits la Cité idéale, et d'ici-là les nations ne cesseront pas d'être sources et fins du droit, origines des lois, et buts des sacrifices les plus nombreux et les plus héroïques.

2. *L'Internationalisme.*

Cependant il est un certain nombre d'idées, de courants sentimentaux, répandus dans des masses considérables et qui semblent en contradiction avec cette vie nationale. On appelle communément ces idées du nom d'internationalisme.

Mais le langage courant est vicieux. Il confond en effet deux sortes d'attitudes morales bien distinctes.

Nous proposons de réserver le nom de *cosmopolitisme* à la première. C'est un courant d'idées et de faits mêmes qui tendent réellement à la destruction des nations, à la création d'une morale où elles ne seraient plus les autorités souveraines, créatrices de la loi, ni les buts suprêmes dignes des sacrifices consacrés dorénavant à une meilleure cause, celle de l'humanité. Il ne faut pas sous-estimer ce mouvement.

Mais si nous tenons à être juste il ne faut cependant pas lui donner une bien grande importance. La vogue qu'il a est celle d'une secte, renforcée par l'existence d'un État communiste en Russie. Elle cessera avec ces causes. D'autre part les classes ouvrières elles-mêmes sont de plus en plus attachées à leurs nations. Elles sont de plus en plus conscientes des intérêts économiques nationaux, en matière de travail et d'industrie; souvent elles sont protectionnistes, ainsi en Australie, en Nouvelle Zélande.

Ces idées n'ont ni plus ni moins de chances de devenir des idées-forces que toutes les Utopies. Car elles ne sont que cela. Elles ne correspondent à aucune réalité du temps présent; elles ne sont le fait d'aucune groupe naturel d'hommes; elles ne sont l'expression d'aucun intérêt défini. Elles ne sont que le dernier aboutissant de l'individualisme pur, religieux et chrétien, ou métaphysique. Cette politique de "l'homme citoyen du monde" n'est que la conséquence d'une théorie éthérée de l'homme monade partout identique, agent d'une morale transcendante aux réalités de la vie sociale; d'une morale ne concevant d'autre patrie que l'humanité, d'autres lois que les naturelles (Socrate,

d'après Plutarque, *de Exilio*, V). Toutes idées qui sont peut-être vraies à la limite, mais qui ne sont pas des motifs d'action, ni pour l'immense majorité des hommes, ni pour aucune des sociétés existantes.

Le deuxième courant d'idées a une toute autre force, une toute autre rationalité, une toute autre réalité. Il commence d'ailleurs à se clarifier des éléments adventices qui lui venaient du voisinage du cosmopolitisme et des Utopies où il était né. Nous proposons de lui garder le nom d'*Internationalisme*.

L'Internationalisme digne de ce nom est le contraire du cosmopolitisme. Il ne nie pas la nation. Il la situe. *Inter*-nation, c'est le contraire d'a-nation. C'est aussi, par conséquent le contraire du nationalisme, qui isole la nation. *L'Internationalisme* est, si l'on veut bien accorder cette définition, *l'ensemble des idées, sentiments et règles et groupements collectifs qui ont pour but de concevoir et diriger les rapports entre les nations et entre les sociétés en général*. Ici nous sommes non plus dans la domaine de l'Utopie mais dans celui des faits, tout au moins dans celui des anticipations du futur immédiat. En réalité, il existe tout un mouvement de forces sociales qui tendent à régler pratiquement et moralement la vie de relation des sociétés.

Ces forces procèdent à la façon dont autrefois ont été progressivement réglés, à l'intérieur des sociétés à base de clans, les rapports entre ces clans; dont, par exemple, la tribu supprima les guerres privées; ou à la façon dont, au début des grandes formations d'États, les pouvoirs centraux eurent pour principale tâche de limiter sévèrement la souveraineté des tribus, villes, provinces, etc. Il est certain que de nos jours toute la morale et la pratique tendent à ne plus considérer des États comme les êtres absolument souverains, ayant, comme le "Prince" de Machiavel, le droit naturel de faire, à tous quoi que ce soit, y compris l'injuste, et l'horrible pourvu que ce soit pour son propre bien. Il existe maintenant une morale internationale.

Cette morale certes n'arrive que péniblement à son expression, plus péniblement encore à des sanctions, sauf diffuses, bien plus péniblement encore aux institutions qui seules permettront à l'*internation* de devenir une réalité. Mais nous ne voyons aucune raison désespérer. Il y a au contraire des faits considérables et nouveaux qui dominent actuellement toute la vie de relation des sociétés et qui ne pourront pas manquer de s'inscrire dans la pratique et dans le droit.

La guerre et la paix qui l'a suivie ont, en effet, eu deux conséquences qui ne sont contradictoires qu'en apparence. D'une part elles ont consacré le principe de l'indépendance nationale, et d'autre part elles ont manifesté un fait qui, désormais, domine toute la vie de relation des sociétés : celui de leur interdépendance croissante. Les ruines de la guerre et la nature de la paix ont même extraordinairement accru cette interdépendance. Ce qui est plus important encore, politiquement et moralement, c'est que cette interdépendance est connue, sentie, voulue par les peuples eux-mêmes. Ceux-ci désirent très nettement qu'elle soit solennellement marquée dans les lois, dans un véritable droit international, public et privé, codifié, sanctionné. Ici les peuples sont en avance sur leurs dirigeants, dont certains, vieillards sceptiques, font trop peu crédit à leurs propres mandants. Mais il n'est pas possible qu'un aussi fort mouvement de l'opinion publique ne soit fondé dans la réalité et n'arrive à s'imposer en droit. Aussi bien, là où cette opinion était forte et éclairée et correspondait à des intérêts conscients et groupés, la Société des Nations commence à être une réalité : nous faisons allusion à la partie du "Covenant" concernant la législation internationale du travail et nous faisons remarquer que les deux points dont, malgré tout, les Sénateurs Américains n'ont pas pu se désintéresser, sont : le Bureau International du Travail et la Cour Permanente d'arbitrage et de justice.

Nous pourrions à la rigueur nous contenter de cette preuve. Mais nous préférons donner une énumération des principaux

faits d'interdépendance des sociétés modernes et montrer comment elles les conçoivent.

1°. La guerre laisse les sociétés dans un état *d'interdépendance économique absolue*. Le marché mondial, surtout celui de l'or, n'a jamais tant dominé les marchés locaux. La division du travail entre sociétés détentrices de matières premières et sociétés manufacturières n'a jamais été poussée plus loin. Le ravitaillement des pays épuisés, la reconstruction des pays dévastés, sont pris en mains par des organisations internationales. Les publics, les gouvernements parlent, chose qui eût été inouïe il y a six ans, de monnaies, de crédits internationaux. On règle les échanges de marchandise par contrats passés entre les nations. On admet le droit des nations pauvres à être soutenues par les nations riches.

2°. *Interdépendance morale considérablement accrue*.—Les mouvements de l'opinion humaine prennent une généralité qu'ils n'ont jamais eue. L'Europe, puis le monde entier, se soulevèrent d'abord contre les guerres dynastiques, puis contre certaines façons de conduire la guerre, au mépris du droit des gens. L'opinion publique, même celle des puissances centrales répudie la diplomatie Machiavélique, celle des traités secrets, de l'irrespect des traités. C'est tout cela qu'expriment les fameux quatorze points au Président Wilson, auxquels aucun État n'a encore eu le courage de refuser d'adhérer. Tant le philosophe qui les formula a sûrement exprimé la volonté des peuples.

3°. *Volonté des peuples de ne plus faire la guerre*.—Il a fallu démobiliser très rapidement.

4°. *Volonté des peuples d'avoir la paix, la vraie*.—La "Paix armée," le principe Crétois de la paix qui est une guerre non proclamée (Platon, *Lois*, 626a) ont fait leur temps. Les peuples veulent qu'on désarme. À tort ou à raison. Mais il est évident qu'ils renoncent aux plus grands de leurs intérêts plutôt que de rester sous les armes, comme on voit, en ce moment, en Orient proche, la France et le Royaume Uni renoncer à bien des ambitions.

5°. *Limitation des Souverainetés nationales.*—Ceci est, à mon sens, le fait moral et politique le plus notoire de la Paix, si boiteuse qu'elle soit. Le Pacte de la Société des Nations, même s'il reste inappliqué, a consacré une principe juridique nouveau : c'est le caractère permanent, absolu et inconditionnel du principe d'arbitrage qu'il proclame. Il ne contient plus ces réserves sur l'honneur et les intérêts vitaux des États que contenaient les traités passés suivant les principes d'avant guerre. Chose aussi neuve et aussi importante, il est prévu que la Société des Nations sera elle-même un organe d'enregistrement et d'application des traités. En fait elle fonctionne, déjà, en cette qualité. C'est elle qui a organisé et ratifié les plébiscites. Elle s'est substituée déjà à bien des institutions qu'on croyait indispensables, elle a déjà établi bien des précédents, ces sources du droit. Enfin, chose mal connue, elle a déjà commencé à chercher à sanctionner ce droit écrit et non écrit dont elle est l'instrument. Ces sanctions ne sont pas encore celles de la force. Elle a agi, nombre de fois par une sorte de contrainte morale comme celle qu'elle exerce dans les régions à plébiscite, où, c'est elle qui a, en somme, empêché les recours à la violence. Elle empêche en ce moment la violation des droits des minorités. Rappelons encore les sanctions prévues en matière de droit ouvrier. Et espérons que la Commission de Fondation de la Cour de Justice, qui fonctionne à la Haye, va trouver les règles, les procédures et les forces qui assureront le caractère exécutoire des décrets souverains de cette Cour.

Tel est l'état du mouvement d'internationalisme dans notre monde moderne : il ne tend pas vers une supra-nation qui absorberait les autres nations. Il est à peu de chose près, légèrement supérieur à celui de la Grèce quand, pour établir la paix entre les cités, elle fondait les Amphictyonies : il est presque identique à celui où Socrate eût voulu voir les Grecs, lorsque, pendant les horreurs de la guerre du Péloponnèse, il souhaitait qu'ils se considérassent (*Rep.*, 470 b) tous comme des Hellènes et que leurs guerres ne fussent traitées que comme des

soulèvements, des révoltes châtiées ou apaisées par les autres. L'humanité veut être peuplée de nations "douces, sages, et philanthropes"; elle veut que la guerre ne soit plus qu'une leçon de "prudents amis qui ne veulent ni l'esclavage ni la ruine" du pêcheur.

3. *Conclusion.*

Ces tendances des peuples doivent trouver chez les philosophes le plus entier concours. Rien n'y est contraire aux principes de l'indépendance nationale, ni au développement des caractères nationaux. Ceci se prouve par fait et par raison. La solidarité organique, consciente, entre les nations, la division du travail entre elles, suivant les sols, les climats et les populations, aboutiront à créer autour d'elles une atmosphère de paix, où elles pourront donner le plein de leur vie. Elles auront ainsi sur les individualités collectives l'effet qu'elles ont eu sur les personnalités à l'intérieur des nations : elles feront leur liberté, leur dignité, leur singularité, leur grandeur.

Ensuite pourquoi les philosophes désespéreraient-ils ? Il y a déjà une étape de franchie. S'il n'existe pas encore de droit humain, il existe déjà une morale humaine, dont les plus cyniques doivent tenir compte. Il existe déjà des choses, des groupes, des intérêts humains ; et derrière ceci, il peut y avoir toute la masse de l'humanité, capable de sanctions autrement dures que la simple désapprobation. On l'a bien vu.

Enfin pourquoi les philosophes ne prendraient-ils pas une position d'avant garde dans cette marche ? Ils l'ont bien prise quand il s'est agi de fonder la doctrine des démocraties, et celle des nationalités. Anglais et Français furent en avance sur leur temps, et il ne faut pas oublier ni Kant, ni Fichte. Pourquoi choisiraient-ils de rester à l'arrière garde, au service des intérêts acquis ?

Leur voix n'eut jamais plus de chance d'être écoutée, si elle est sincère et trouve les formules sages et nécessaires. Tout comme au temps de la guerre du Péloponnèse ou à celui

des formations des premières dynasties chinoises, à celui de Confucius et à celui de Socrate, les peuples se tournent vers ceux qu'ils appellent leurs "sages" et que les réactionnaires appellent des "sophistes."

III.—By THEODORE RUYSSSEN.

Nous définirons la nationalité : un groupe ethnique privé de l'indépendance politique et qui aspire à la conquérir ; c'est, si l'on veut, la nation en puissance, mais assez consciente de cette puissance pour tendre de toutes ses forces au droit de prendre rang, en pleine égalité, dans la Société des nations libres.

1.

La controverse au sujet du problème des nationalités met aux prises un grand nombre de théories, dont les extrêmes s'opposent terme pour terme.

D'une part, la théorie *libérale* ou *élective*, soutenue principalement en France et en Angleterre, subordonne le fait de la nationalité à la conscience des individus. Elle invoque, sans doute, des critères externes, mais facilement accessibles à la conscience : traits physiologiques très apparents, communauté de langue, de religion, de traditions ; mais, en définitive, elle fait dépendre le sort des nationaux de leur volonté librement exprimée.

D'autre part, la théorie autoritaire, qu'on peut appeler aussi *érudite*, soutenue principalement en Allemagne, dans les pays slaves et, dans une certaine mesure, en Italie, subordonne la définition de la nationalité à l'affirmation d'une autorité politique, appuyée elle-même sur la compétence plus ou moins sincère de certains érudits ; elle invoque des critères difficilement accessibles à la conscience nationale : indice céphalique, étymologie, préhistoire ou histoire des origines. Elle fait peser sur la nationalité le déterminisme du passé.

2.

Ni l'une ni l'autre de ces théories ne peut suffire à déterminer la fonction politique de la nationalité, car ni l'une ni l'autre n'est entièrement vraie—ni d'ailleurs entièrement fausse.

D'une part, il n'y a pas d'exemple d'une concrétion nationale absolument spontanée; la nationalité est toujours un *fait* avant de devenir une *idée*. La conscience qu'un peuple a de lui-même est extrêmement faible, précaire et malléable; elle ne devient consistante que sous l'action d'une élite plus consciente, mieux informée, qui peut bien fortifier les caractères nationaux, mais qui peut aussi les altérer, les exalter de façon plus ou moins arbitraire. De sorte que le sentiment national est souvent un sentiment réel, mais vivifié par des moyens artificiels.

D'autre part, même sous un régime d'autorité incontestée, il n'y a pas de système érudit si efficace qui puisse engendrer un sentiment national, là où ne subsistent pas certains facteurs conscients élémentaires.

On peut concevoir la synthèse des deux aspects de la nationalité: Enrichir dans un peuple le sentiment national, sans lui présenter l'idéal national comme un absolu qui se suffise à lui même, mais comme un facteur qui ne peut jouer qu'en fonction de la Société Générale des Nations. En définitive, cultiver à la fois et harmoniser le citoyen et l'homme.

3.

Au point de vue politique il apparaît manifestement impossible de satisfaire intégralement toutes les aspirations nationales, même les plus sincères; car on aboutirait à un emiettement des nations qui irait à l'inverse du mouvement moderne de centralisation lequel aboutit à la constitution de vastes formations politiques.

Il est, d'autre part, intolérable d'abandonner le sort des peuples à la tyrannie d'une idée nationale imposée du dehors ou d'en haut par une autorité politique. Le droit des nationalités,

extension des droits de l'homme, ne peut concevoir que sur la base démocratique.

Le conflit est donc inévitable entre l'effort d'affranchissement et la tendance à la concentration, entre le nationalisme et l'impérialisme.

Mais on peut concevoir une atténuation du conflit :

1° Si les Gouvernements des nations impérialistes réduisent leurs prérogatives à la défense de leur sécurité et à la garantie de l'ordre public, laissant aux nationalités leur pleine autonomie politique et leur libre développement culturel :

2° Si les nationalités renoncent à revendiquer les avantages et les risques de la pleine souveraineté et concentrent leurs efforts sur la défense de leur autonomie locale et de leur caractère culturel.

On peut espérer que la Société des Nations, en restreignant l'importance de la souveraineté politique des nations, rendra plus facile le développement des nationalités autonomes, et l'on doit, en tout cas, s'efforcer de transformer les nations impérialistes en fédérations de nationalités, fédérations associées elles-mêmes en une libre confédération mondiale fondée sur la base du droit.

IV.—*By* RENÉ JOHANNET.

VOICI les idées qu'il me semble les plus opportun de dégager à l'heure actuelle, concernant le fait nationalitaire.

D'abord c'est *un fait*. Que nous le voulions ou que nous ne le voulions pas, qu'il s'agisse de l'Allemagne ou du Canada, de l'Irlande ou de la Pologne, de la Grèce ou de la Turquie, de l'Arabie ou des Indes, le type d'Etat qui tend à prévaloir est de plus en plus national, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne se rassemble plus sous l'autorité d'un souverain, mais sous la tyrannie d'une idée, l'idée de patrie nationale.

Il n'est pas douteux non plus que la définition la plus

correcte de la patrie nationale est celle qui la fait dépendre du consentement des intéressés et de la conscience commune qu'ils ont d'appartenir à une même nation.

Cela posé, aucun des problèmes soulevés par la crise nationalitaire n'est résolu, mais beaucoup d'autres apparaissent. Il ne suffit pas en effet de définir, il faut *faire vivre*.

Un Etat sans frontières, comme l'Arménie, la Pologne, ou la Tchéco-Slovaquie, est un monstre, un animal de volière dont l'existence sera tragique. La propagation de l'idée nationalitaire tend d'autre part à créer du désordre à l'état endémique, en sapant les bases des grandes communautés civilisatrices, dont la besogne n'a pu se poursuivre qu'à la faveur d'une hiérarchisation des nations entre elles par l'idée impériale et sa réalisation empirique.

Des théoriciens peuvent s'imaginer la possibilité d'un moyen terme où viendraient se marier les deux idées, d'empire et de nation. La réussite vitale d'une pareille formule sera très rare. L'idée nationalitaire, une fois partie, tend irrésistiblement à son terme, qui est l'indépendance nationale.

Cette indépendance une fois assurée, la force des choses contraint les dirigeants de cet Etat nouveau (ou renouvelé) à réaliser son maximum de puissance en s'adjoignant par force ou par ruse des nations moins résistantes.

De la nation à l'empire la différence de fait est seulement *chronologique*. Seuls des théoriciens, confinés dans le plan spéculatif, peuvent jouir des différences essentielles qui les séparent du point de vue philosophique. Vivre, pour les Etats, ce n'est pas penser, c'est *faire de la politique*.

Seules ont chance de réussir intellectuellement les théories philosophiques dont la politique mondiale a besoin. Actuellement, je veux dire depuis le XVI^e siècle environ, *l'idée nationalitaire se développe intellectuellement en fonction de la rivalité politique des grands empires modernes*. Et il semble que sa seule réalité objective consiste à fournir un régime de transition entre la période de rivalités impérialistes, qui tend

à son apogée, et la période de retour à une unité comparable à celle de Rome.

Il est difficile au philosophe de prendre une attitude *simple* vis-à-vis du fait nationalitaire, dans un monde régi non par la théorie mais par les passions. La position du politicien est autrement facile ! Clémenceau ou Lloyd George peuvent du même geste étouffer et exalter deux nationalités. Wilson de même. Le théoricien, lui aussi, s'adjuge des facilités analogues.

Le philosophe est plus perplexé. Car il faut qu'il juge non seulement la pièce, mais les acteurs et les mobiles, *le tout formant un bloc indissoluble*. Les théoriciens séparent toujours les deux choses. Ce n'est pas possible. Leur inexpérience complète la rouerie du politicien de façon absolue et non relative ou adventice. D'une part le politicien ne songerait pas à utiliser les théories nationalitaires, si elles n'existaient pas. D'autre part cette théorie n'existerait pas sans politiciens pour l'imaginer ou la nourrir.

Ce qui met le comble à l'imbroglio, c'est que les théoriciens nationalitaires se prennent pour des philosophes et que les politiciens croient obéir, même en rechignant, à des théories, les uns et les autres s'estimant capables d'occuper le plan de leur partenaire. Par exemple le politicien se juge supérieur au théoricien et *vice-versâ*.

Je considère la question comme insoluble autrement que pour la philosophie de l'histoire, dans la mesure où cette philosophie n'est pas de l'histoire tout court.

Assurément ce ne sont pas de purs fantômes que les idées de patries nationales, mais elles ne brillent de leurs couleurs vraies que lorsque on les situe dans une phase de devenir impérialiste. Pratiquement la vogue de l'idée nationalitaire en 1920 est le signe d'une recrudescence de rivalités impérialistes. Nous devons nous représenter l'avenir sous un aspect très militariste par ce que très nationalitaire. Rien de semblable ne s'est vu depuis quinze cents ans.

V.—*By* GILBERT MURRAY.

1. LIKE most terms of current political discussion, the term nationality is not susceptible of exact definition. For our purpose a nationality is a self-conscious group which, in its most typical form, bases its feeling of unity on a common name and a common feeling of kindred, however fictitious. Greek colonies drawn from mixed sources usually invented an eponymous ancestor, who then became the symbol of their unity. And psychologically the same tendency still survives, even if contradicted by known facts. For instance, Americans of the most diverse origin tend to feel themselves "true Americans."

The typical nation is, or aspires to be, also a unity of political organization. When this unity is consciously absent, it becomes immediately the main desire of the national group. The group demands "freedom" or "self-government" or "autonomy." Such a demand generally produces a hostile reaction in the larger body of which the "national group" forms part,—a demand for "integrity," a resistance to "dismemberment."

2. The emotion of nationality is at present much more inspiring and dangerous than that of religious, geographical, or economic unity. It is, or claims to be, a unity not based on reflection nor even on will, but on physical fact, profound and unalterable. Nationality is normally a source of deep irrational pride as well as fellow-feeling. Normally every man is proud of having been born where he was born, and of belonging to the nation to which he does belong. This pride is not rationally justifiable, but it is in general a healthy stimulus and a cause of self-respect. National feeling, to this extent, is a valuable element in human society. It produces a feeling that *Noblesse Oblige*. A man who has nothing else to be proud of except that he belongs to some nation can feel at least that it is more incumbent on him than on those born in less distinguished places to act according to a certain standard. A man with no

taste in literature or art may learn that certain books or pictures are characteristic of his country, and consequently enjoy them.

3. How is it that this innocent and rather beneficent state of mind becomes a cause of widespread madness, crime, and disaster? Practically always from one of two reasons: resentment against a common oppression, or the intoxication of a common success. Germany and all the great conquering nations have at one time or another become dangerous through consciousness of success. But the great conquering nations are few in number, and much the commonest cause of intense national feeling is a common oppression. When any group is oppressed, the members of that group are drawn together by common emotions into a passionate unity (unless indeed the persecution succeeds in actually breaking down the group altogether). Begin to rob bakers or journalists or landlords as such, and they will stand together as such. Go through Macedonia pillaging the Vlachs, and the Vlachs, previously indifferent, will love one another as well as hating you. Persecute heretics, and the same result will follow. But there is a great difference between national and religious groups on the one side and all ordinary economic or vocational groups on the other. The former have an ideal and irrational quality, which is capable of swift and infinite expansion, leading to martyrdom and fanaticism, whereas the economic groups stand on a solid and finite base, and do not go much beyond it.

It is most instructive to notice how religious intolerance, once one of the strongest collective passions, has practically died out where there is no religious persecution; whereas national passion has increased to the point of insanity all over the world. The causes of this have probably been (1) the increase of national pride in the great conquering races, as the power of nation over nation has increased, while the power of class over class has diminished. (2) The more definite demarcation of nations: *e.g.*, the increase of elementary education, leading

to greater consciousness of national language, literature and history. (3) The fact that oppression and violent injustice, formerly sporadic, irregular, and due to many causes, have of late been largely concentrated in national forms. For one thing, empires oppress and exasperate their subject nations, while not venturing to stamp them out by massacre, as they might in the past; for another, the great armed nations, through their political and economic rivalries, have all threatened each other with such appalling dangers that each has very properly and justly earned the fear and hatred of all its neighbours. Whatever may occur in the future, of late years there has been no reason for Catholics to dread Protestants, or for employers to dread working men, at all comparable to the reasons which Russians had for dreading Germans or Germans Russians. For example, employers and workmen do not actually buy firearms and poison in order to kill each other.

4. Can this dangerous increase of national feeling be met and checked? To a great extent, I think, it can, by the methods of the so-called "League of Nations against War." A "League against War" does not, of course, constitute in the ordinary sense either a League or an Alliance. It constitutes chiefly a way of behaviour.

Nations at present hate each other, some moderately and some to the point of suicidal madness, largely because they have been in the habit of (1) plotting secretly against each other; (2) competing against each other in matters of territory and trade; and (3) when the occasion seemed favourable, making war—i.e., doing each other the maximum possible injury. The Covenant of the League goes as far as it can towards the definite prevention of all these things. It accepts provisionally the existing national units, as they happen to be left by the Great War, and then imposes certain definite agreements upon all its members. (1) There is to be no secret plotting. The members all meet regularly in common council; and all treaties and agreements have to be laid openly before the whole League.

(2) Though the League unfortunately cannot directly protect subject nationalities in parts of the world not affected by the war, it has henceforth the duty of laying down the terms on which a governing State shall administer any territory which it receives as a result of the war. And the prevention of grave abuses and fiscal exclusions in those territories will probably have an influence in other colonial territories as well. (3) The members of the League have all pledged themselves, and are further bound by strong sanctions in the Covenant, not to attack each other by surprise.

Whether these covenants can be carried out, whether the majority of the great democracies have reached the necessary standard of intelligence and decent feeling to wish them carried out, are points open to discussion. But if they are carried out, the emotion of nationality will probably subside gradually from its present inflamed condition to something normal and healthy. Of course the cessation of oppression will not immediately produce a cessation of national hatred. Some of the most extreme outbursts of national passion now taking place are in countries which are not oppressed at all. Still oppression and the fear of oppression are the real roots of the danger. A horse instinctively shudders at the smell of a tiger, and a Serb flies into fury at sight of a Bulgarian, who returns the compliment. But if tigers became vegetarians, or if Serbs and Bulgarians ceased for a few generations to behave to one another as the worst criminals behave, the shudder and the fury would cease. There may be difficulties with the tiger, but for the human beings there should be at least some hope.

VI.—By Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK.

WHAT do we mean by nationality?

For the present purpose we may dismiss technical questions of political allegiance and its consequences. Their solution is technical and often highly artificial; they are the business of

lawyers and diplomatists. It would take us too far to consider the influence of speculative theories on jurists, courts of justice, and ministries of foreign affairs. All we can do here for princes and rulers and publicists, if we can do so much, is to warn them against being led captive by obsolete maxims or superficial novelties. *Erudimini qui iudicatis terram.*

We may dismiss, again, as being remote from the purpose in hand, the older and larger significance of the word "nation" which did not connote political unity as either existing or desired.

Dictionary definitions will help us very little. They can give only a condensed report of literary usage; and if the usage is vague the dictionary must be vague too.

To constitute a nation in the sense of modern politics we must have at least, I conceive, a body of people so numerous and compact and so situated in other respects as to be capable of forming a self-governing community, not necessarily an independent one. If they are not already such a community there must be a general desire among them to become so. Not that every self-governing community is or tends to be a nation. One and the same nation may and often does include many autonomous bodies having their own particular characters but all sharing in common the national characters which distinguish the whole nation from the rest of the world and are on the whole more important than the differences of the components. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Province of Quebec have each their marked individuality, but no one calls either of them a nation.

The existence of a nation at a given time and in a given region is a matter of fact. If the facts are obscure or undergoing a visible transformation there must be a corresponding doubt or suspension of judgment.

How many nations, actual or potential, are there in the wreck of the Russian empire?

Can any man give a certain answer to Captain Macmorris's

question "What is my nation?" Is there one Irish nation or two, or one divided against itself?

Is there an Indian nation in any intelligible sense? Will there ultimately be one or several?

A few such questions are as good as many for stimulating reflection; the reader may add more if he will.

Let us now consider the elements of nationality as they are commonly esteemed, and their relative importance. When I say nationality I refer to the political sense of "nation" as above mentioned, and exclude affinities of speech, culture and the like so far as they have no direct political effect. A citizen of the Canton of Ticino taken at random will probably be Roman in religion and North Italian in language and manners. It may well be that he is more at ease with a man of Milan or Venice than with a man of Berne or Geneva. But we must not ascribe Italian nationality to him if we are to use terms with any tolerable exactness.

Most men, I suppose, would agree in the list of material factors in national character. They are race (in which I include reputed as well as actual descent, and in the common case of mixed descent the predominant racial character), language, religion, social custom, and political tradition. It is certain that no one of these alone will suffice to make or preserve a nation. It remains to be seen whether any one is necessary. Further, a certain measure of geographical continuity must be assumed as essential for the conduct of government; and the external pressure of a common danger imposing union for defence may be decisive, and has been so in at least one conspicuous example, that of Switzerland; though the same cause may have a very different effect in compelling a multitude to tolerate a political system which to other intents is not national at all.

First, then, as to race. It is almost too notorious for demonstration that racial unity is by no means a necessary condition of national union. We shall hardly find an unmixed

race in the civilized world. Every great nation includes men of many stocks whose diversities are manifest to the naked eye. You shall meet in Paris a Breton, a Burgundian, and a Provençal who are all good Frenchmen ; in London, a Yorkshireman, a man of Kent, and a Cornishman who are all good Englishmen ; in Rome, a Lombard, a Tuscan and a Sicilian who are all good Italians. Again, if we try to sort out British and French citizens by racial characters we shall get Normans and Yorkshiremen in one group, Welsh and Bretons in another. In the United States as a whole there has never been anything like racial unity since the first days of independence, whatever may be the case in a few of the older States, such as Kentucky and Virginia, which have been less affected by immigration. Conversely, similarity in race, or, indeed, in the other characters, is no warrant of union or even friendly relations. It is enough to point to Chile and Peru.

Language offers a more plausible test, plausible enough to have been at one time fashionable. But it is far from conclusive. Switzerland is very much a nation and has three official languages : the Swiss codes are trilingual and all three texts authentic. Belgium and Canada have two. Such cases are no doubt exceptional, but they show that one common language is not a necessity. The polyglot empire of Austria is broken, but multiplicity of tongues was perhaps the least of its defects. Inheritance of a common mother tongue, on the other hand, is of itself no security at all for union or peace. Not to speak of civil wars, the witness of history reaches from the wars of Athens and Sparta to those of Austria and Prussia.

A common mother tongue would appear at first sight to be almost a necessary condition for working up collective emotion whether for good or bad ends. One cannot easily conceive a Chauvinist Switzerland. Nevertheless experience forbids us to dogmatize. Panslavism is less compact and less dangerous than Pangermanism, but it is something ; and the Slavonic peoples are so far from understanding one another's speech that a

Panslavonic Congress at Moscow was reported many years ago to have found that the only tongue practically useful for its proceedings was German. Similarly lettered Indians of different provinces often speak and write English among themselves. Altogether, language is a more definite bond than race, and goes deeper into men's lives (exceptions excepted) than religion: but we cannot give it a dominant place.

As to religion, the reactions of political and religious motives are exceedingly complex. It is certain that community of faith and discipline has often furnished national sentiment with potent symbols and vehicles, as on the other hand the rivalry of churches and creeds has gone near to break up flourishing nations. Uniformity of religion may in some circumstances do much to keep a nation together, but I do not know that it has ever made a new one. Christianity in its various forms, and Islam, less free from variation than most Western readers think, have at divers times converted many nations; they have not created any.

The Sikhs, indeed, being in their origin a purely religious order, were put to self-defence by persecution, and from the time of Gur Govind onwards developed their community into a militant and formidable power. That case is, I believe, unique.

In modern civilized states political unity and strong patriotism are found quite compatible with wide religious difference, not only in ecclesiastical government and forms but in beliefs which are fundamental or at least appear so to their adherents. But religious agreement can do nothing or next to nothing to check national or dynastic strife. So long as the Papacy was a temporal power the Holy Father himself was often at war with Catholic princes. On the whole we must say that religion has great power to reinforce national sentiment for better or worse, but very little initiative. It has to be national first.

We come then to the factor of common tradition and custom, in which I include both social manners and public

institutions. This, I conceive, is really more important than any of the others; and herein the political element is the stronger. The most effective bond of the British Commonwealth of nations, holding together an infinite variety of race, language, religion and culture, is our Common Law symbolized in the King. Further, this is the one kind of community that seems truly indispensable. National custom, public or private, is of course a complex affair to which the other elements contribute in varying proportions. But no multitude of men can be called a nation unless and until it is in possession of some such traditions however formed. Contrariwise the growth of true national unity may be hampered or even arrested by forms of government which are not really national. The old French monarchy with all its faults was genuinely French, and accordingly much of its legal and administrative system has survived the Revolution. In Russia, Peter the Great, with the best intentions, imposed a bureaucratic scheme which was alien to the national spirit. Under the stress of war, which consolidates and fortifies whatever is truly national, we have seen Peter the Great's machine of government collapse into chaotic ruin. Neither race, language nor religion, not even all of them together, will make a trustworthy bond without organic public institutions.

So far I have done nothing but recapitulate notorious facts. For this I make no excuse: elementary facts are just those which are apt to be overlooked in discussing the higher politics. If they point to any distinct conclusion, it is, in my judgment, that the outstanding conditions of natural frontiers, geographical and physiographical relations in general, and their economic consequences, must still count for very much, and in many cases be practically decisive. Thus I find myself led by my own road to pretty complete agreement with my friend M. Elie Halévy. All formulas break down before the hard facts: the only true remedy is a general will for peace, a will that must be cosmopolitan without ceasing to be national.

II. SYMPOSIUM: IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE PLATONIC ΕΙΔΟΣ PRESUPPOSED IN THE ANALYSIS OF REALITY?

By C. E. M. JOAD, A. D. LINDSAY, Miss L. S. STEBBING, and
R. F. A. HOERNLÉ.

I.—*By* C. E. M. JOAD.

IN discussing this question, I do not wish to raise the controversy as to what Plato meant by the εἶδος or Form. This particular controversy belongs to the history of philosophy, and although it doubtless raises many interesting and important questions, it does not necessarily raise the question which I want to ask, namely, whether in the analysis of Reality we are driven to assume that the existence of something very like Plato's Forms or universals is presupposed in our reasoning about the phenomena we experience.

(1) Before I can proceed to answer this question, it will be desirable to say a few words, in order to describe what I mean by a Form, provided that by doing so I can keep clear of the further question of whether what I mean is necessarily what Plato meant.

The kind of entity I wish to describe, when I use the word Form, is that which Professor Taylor has endeavoured to establish as the true meaning of the Platonic universal.

The Forms are self-subsistent entities, known by mind, but not by the senses, and they constitute the pattern or model which God used in creating the sensible world. They form, says Professor Taylor, "a supraphysical world of entities . . . and it is these unchanging entities . . . which are the objects with which the definitions and universal truths of exact science are concerned."

The important thing for my present purpose is to point out

that the Forms are in no sense mental entities. They are not "in the soul." They are the objects of thought and knowledge, but they are not knowledge. They are not "a kind of notion of the human mind" (Lutoslawski), nor "valid truths" (Lotze), nor "mystical essences" (Plotinus), nor have they any trace of the mental in their constitution. They are, in Professor Adam's words, "single, independent, separate, self-existing, perfect, and eternal essences forming the objective correlate of our general notions."

Not only are the forms non-mental, but they are separate, both from their particulars and from one another. The importance of these two characteristics will be brought out when we come to consider the nature of other entities, which have been put forward by philosophers as alternatives to Plato's forms.

Now although it may be urged that Plato himself wavered in different Dialogues between different conceptions of the nature of the Forms, there can, I think, be no doubt that as a general rule he intended to signify, by the use of the word *εἶδος*, an entity such as that I have described. Whether he did do so or not cannot be discussed any further here, nor can I discuss the vexed question of the relation between the Form and the various particulars in which it is manifest: what I desire to do is to establish the fact that the particular conception which I have indicated is necessarily involved in our analysis of reality.

(2) I think that one of the simplest ways of establishing the fact of their being Forms is by the process of elimination.

Let us consider such an object as a beautiful picture. If we ask ourselves the question wherein the beauty of the picture resides, I think that three answers are possible.

- (a) That it is in the mind of the beholder.
- (b) That it is a relation between the mind of the beholder and the picture.
- (c) That it is in the picture.

(a) This conclusion is sufficiently repellent on æsthetic grounds. It can only lead to the establishment of a criterion of art, which makes æsthetic value dependent not upon the intrinsic qualities of a work of art, but upon the effect produced by that work upon the minds of those who behold it. If value is to be assessed solely in terms of quantum of appreciation, we are driven with Tolstoy to regard the greatest work of art as that which is appreciated by most people; while for the purpose of comparing the value of different works, we can only resort to the expedient of counting heads. What are generally acknowledged to be the greatest works would come off sadly according to this criterion, public taste, counting by numbers alone, infallibly preferring Ethel M. Dell to Shakespeare.

The view that the opinion which is to form the standard of value should not be assessed in terms of quantity only, but that we should establish a standard of qualitative appreciation by having recourse for our criterion to the consensus of opinion among experts fails to deliver us from the subjectivist impasse, owing to the difficulty both of distinguishing any agreed consensus, and of agreeing as to the experts whose opinion is to count. If, for instance, on this view we put the question, "How do we know that the *Meistersinger* is better than the *Merry Widow Waltz*?" the answer will be, "Because of the opinion of the experts who unanimously prefer it." If we ask, "Who are the experts whose judgment is to set the standard," the only answer appears to be, "You may know them from the fact that they unanimously prefer the *Meistersinger* to the *Merry Widow Waltz*."

The circumstance of a theory being repellent on æsthetic grounds is not, however, a sufficient reason for discarding it.

A more important objection to this view, however, seems to me to lie in the confusion that it implies between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. In this, as in all other philosophical discussions, the strength of one's arguments

depends ultimately upon the validity of one's own conception of certain fundamental things. In this way every philosophical argument begs the question in the sense that its validity presupposes the truth of the philosophical position it endeavours to support. It is best, therefore, that I should at once state dogmatically, since I have not space to defend the position here, that for me the possibility of my being able to know a thing depends upon there being 'a thing for me to know, which is something other than my knowing it.

Thus I make a distinction between the fact that two plus two makes four and my knowledge of the fact, on the ground that it is only because the fact is different from my knowing it that I am in fact able to know it. On similar grounds I make a distinction between the beauty of a picture and my appreciation of that beauty, the former being an external concrete fact which subsists independently of myself: the latter a mental occurrence which only happens because I exist.

I maintain that the two facts are fundamentally distinct, and that it is only by regarding them as indistinguishable, which means, in the long run, the same thing as identical, that it is possible to assert that the beauty of the picture is in the mind of the beholder. The appreciation of the beauty is in the mind, but it is only there because the beauty is not.

If a beautiful picture and my appreciation of it are really identical, I am unable to conceive how it came about that they were ever supposed to be different; admitting for a moment that the difference is an illusive appearance only, it is impossible to understand how out of perfect unity even the appearance of difference can be generated.

(b) The view that the beauty of the picture consists in a relation between the mind and the picture, appears to me not only to be tainted with the subjectivism which attaches to the former view, but to rest upon a similar confusion between known object and knowing subject.

Let us suppose that an admittedly beautiful picture, the

Round Madonna let us say, is being contemplated by x people; and let the amount of beauty which results from the number of relationships with the x people be termed y . If the number of contemplating people is increased to $x+a$, the beauty of the picture will presumably increase proportionately to the increased number of relationships and become $y+b$. The value or beauty of a picture therefore, instead of being constant as is commonly supposed, varies continually on this view, according to the number of people who happen to be looking at it or thinking of it.

Let us suppose further that the Round Madonna is being contemplated by the last intelligence in the universe; we may assert that it is still beautiful because the necessary relationship exists. Let us then suppose that the last intelligence is suddenly abolished. Is any modification made in the qualities of the picture? I cannot see that it is. I cannot see that the picture has undergone any change in any of its properties, save in the one respect that it has ceased to possess the property of being contemplated by intelligence. Its form, colour, grouping, and conception remain unchanged. Yet if this view is correct the fact that the relationship of contemplation no longer exists means that the picture is no longer beautiful! This view is correct only if we assume that where B is a relation between A and C , B is really the same as C , so that by abolishing B we have at the same time altered the qualities of C . Only therefore on the assumption that the contemplation of a beautiful picture is the same thing as the beautiful picture contemplated, can we hold that beauty resides in the relationship between knowing mind and known object and not in the object.

(c) As this assumption seems to me to be incorrect, I conclude that we are thrown back upon the third alternative, namely, that the beauty is somehow an intrinsic quality of the picture, that it is not therefore dependent for its existence upon any mind or collection of minds, and that the picture

would still be beautiful even if all mind were eliminated from the universe.

We may now have recourse to the train of reasoning used by Plato. What is the common quality in virtue of which we call both a sunset and a picture beautiful? Do you get at that common quality by adding together all the beautiful objects in the universe, and saying that there is no beauty outside or beyond their sum? Or is it not rather true that the common nature of which both the picture and the sunset partake is something outside and beyond them both, and that it is only in virtue of their participation in it that they are called, and in fact are, beautiful? And further, is it not of this common nature that we are thinking when we think of beauty quite simply, and not of any particular beautiful object? For it is clear that a thought about beauty is a thought about something. It is a thought about something which is other than the thinking it, because if it were a thought about nothing it would have no meaning. If beauty were nothing, then when I think about beauty, I should think about nothing, and there would be no difference between thinking about beauty and not thinking at all. But there clearly is a difference, which is due to the fact that in thinking of beauty I am thinking of something. What is the nature of that something?

(3) In answering this question I propose again to adopt the method of elimination; to consider, that is, two alternative views on this subject which are commonly entertained, of which the first is regarded as rendering the existence of Platonic universals as superfluous, while the second is supposed to convict them of being erroneous.

(α) The first view is that commonly advocated by psychologists who regard the position which I have assigned to the *εἶδος* as being adequately filled by concepts, which are subjective mental creations, explained as being the "import of a percept in relation to systems which interest the perceiver."

Psychologists expressly warn us against the reification of such concepts; *i.e.*, the ascription to them of substantive existence in their own right apart from mind.

What does this line of argument involve?

It begins with Berkeley who denies the existence of abstract ideas, insisting that a thought of triangle is a thought of some one particular triangle we have known, while an abstract thought of motion is impossible.

Modern psychologists have somewhat modified Berkeley's notion. Semon for example believes that we do have abstract ideas which are formed somewhat as follows:—

First we have a generalized idea or image, which is not of any one thing, but is a vague reproduction of a number of similar things. The first stage to an abstract idea, *e.g.*, of whiteness, beauty or triangle, is a kind of blurred picture of a number of different impressions of different instances of whiteness or beauty, which presents only the salient features of these different particulars. This generalized image forms the basis of an abstract idea. What is needed in addition to complete an abstract idea is a definite image of some one of the concrete instances of the generalized image. Without any additional content, therefore, it is possible to arrive at an abstract idea or concept, by combining a series of vague impressions of particulars, with a definite fixed impression of some one of the particulars.

These concepts or abstract ideas may be vague and general or definite and general. Vague general abstract ideas, which we possess in large numbers, are according to Ribot, turned into definite general abstract ideas, by the addition of a particular belief or judgment as to the object of the idea.

The complete psychological concept therefore may be analysed into:—

- (1) A vague generalized image of a collection of particulars.
- (2) A definite image of some one of the particulars.
- (3) An accompanying judgment or belief as to the object of

the general abstract idea formed by the combination of (1) and (2).

Now this analysis is one which I am not prepared to dispute. It seems to me probable both that we do have such abstract ideas or concepts, and that they are formed in the way described; but the admission of their existence and the analysis of their constitution does not seem to me to afford any more ground for doubting that they have objects which exist independently of them and are different from them, than the fact that we obtain a series of sense impressions from contact with a table affords a ground for doubting that there is a table.

I wish to emphasize this point because the triumphant establishment by the psychologists of the mentally formed concept is often regarded as in some unexplained way doing away with the necessity for anything so unpleasantly metaphysical and transcendent as a Platonic universal. But unless we are to destroy the distinction between mind and its object, to which I have already referred as an article of faith, the one so far from rendering the other superfluous, is necessarily required by it, the concept being the mental correlate of the universal, that by means of which the mind knows the universal, just as the senses are the medium by means of which mind knows the particular.

(b) I have not space to deal with what appears to me to be the other chief alternative view to the theory I am advocating, the Hegelian view of concrete universals.

These differ from Plato's εἶδη in two important respects: they are mental and they are not separate.

There is in fact only one true type of the concrete universal, namely, self-consciousness, and as this, being partial, is not truly real, we are left with only one universal, namely, the Absolute itself. But if we adopt the methods of Hegelian dialectic we are entitled, or rather compelled to assume that this view of reality is no more true than its opposite, being itself tainted with the same element of partiality and

fragmentariness, which it uses to discredit rival theses of the constitution of the universe.

The field is therefore left open for other theories which do not in establishing themselves imply their own refutation; and I submit that the view which I have sketched above is open to less objection from the point of view of a priori logic, than most a priori theories which seek to prove by reasoning what the nature of the universe must be.

II. — *By* A. D. LINDSAY.

I FIND myself in such fundamental disagreement with almost everything in Mr. Joad's paper that, if I were to take up every point he makes on pain of being supposed to agree with what I do not challenge, this paper would be interminably long. I must content myself, therefore, with a statement of certain difficulties in the position he has taken up, in the hope that Miss Stebbing, in dealing with these, will make the position of the defenders of the thesis rather more precise, and I shall leave it to Professor Hoernlé to develop a positive alternative.

Some of Mr. Joad's arguments for the Forms are based on the inadequacy of alternative positions. I should not accept either his statement or his criticism of these positions, but I could not elaborate my reasons for dissent without encroaching on the part I have proposed to leave to Professor Hoernlé.

I shall follow Mr. Joad in assuming that we are not concerned with the correctness of his or other people's exegesis of Plato's doctrines, and I shall not pursue the tempting path of asking whether Plato himself in the Parmenides has not knocked the bottom out of the position which Mr. Joad is defending. He has defined the kind of entity he wishes to describe when he uses the word Form, and I shall accept his definition. I note only that, in the sentence he quotes from Mr. Adam, the words "perfect" and "eternal" occur, and that

in his exposition he says nothing of these characteristics of the forms. It will be fairer, therefore, to omit a discussion of the difficulties, especially in regard to the reality of change, which the ascription of these characteristics to the forms applies. They are after all sufficiently discussed in Plato's later dialogues.

Mr. Joad's thesis then is that there are "single, independent, separate, self-existing essences forming the objective correlate of our general notions"; that these are known by mind and not by the senses; that they are non-mental; and that they are separate both from their particulars and from one another.

Before discussing this thesis, I must say something of the much more general position Mr. Joad takes up when he says that every philosophical argument begs the question in the sense that its validity presupposes the truth of the philosophical position it endeavours to support. If this is really so, I cannot see the purpose of arguing. If, after a little desultory sniping from hastily made trenches which we do not mind abandoning, and in which we cannot be really hurt, we are going each to retire to the impregnable security of the dug-out of prejudice, I should prefer to avoid the mud and stay in the dug-out. But I am prepared, with Mr. Joad, to "beg the question" that the possibility of my being able to know a thing depends upon there being a thing for me to know, which is something other than my knowing it," so long as Mr. Joad is prepared not to beg the question, but to argue whether his particular thesis follows from his presupposition.

I cannot see, however, how it follows from Mr. Joad's supposition, either (1) that the fact that we know a thing proves that that thing is non-mental; or (2) that the fact that we use general notions in judgments implies that these general notions have "objects which exist independently of them and are different from them."

The first point is surely simple. If the fact that what I

know is not my knowing it, implies that what we know is non-mental, then clearly we cannot know what is mental, and as Mr. Joad uses the term "know" in the wide sense of "being aware of," "reflecting on," or "discussing," it is difficult to see how the term "mental" can mean anything at all, and non-mental will share the fate of its correlative. The discussion then falls to the ground. I do not want to argue that the fact that I know a thing proves that it is mental (that seems to me as silly an alternative as its opposite), but simply that these wide generalizations on the nature of knowledge, be they idealist or realist, do not carry us any further. For of three things, (1) either the general notion "mental" is unmeaning, and then there are general notions, which unsuspectingly turn out to be unmeaning, and therefore have not a form as objective counterpart; or (2) we have not knowledge but something else of what is mental, and then the general presupposition about knowledge will not show that all general notions have a form as objective counterpart, and we shall have to ask if we know general notions or their counterpart at all; or (3), and this is surely the right alternative, the distinction between mental and non-mental falls within knowledge.

The fatal result, as it appears to me, of arguing from this general presupposition, as Mr. Joad does, is that all distinction between subjective and objective, illusion and fact, vanishes. Mr. Joad chooses the example of beauty. The example is not an easy one for him, as he is doubtless aware. If he can prove his general contention in regard to beauty, he may well consider that most of his work is done.

The facts with which we must all start are surely that in contemplating certain objects we experience a certain distinctive pleasure or emotion, and that it is in virtue of this pleasure or emotion that we call the objects, in contemplating which we experience it, beautiful, in some such way as we call a coat or a chair comfortable, but with a difference. The difference is that whereas if a chair feels comfortable, it is

comfortable, and that is all about it, because "is comfortable" means "feels comfortable," while in our appreciation of beauty we recognize that we may be wrong, may have æsthetic pleasure where we ought not to have it, and may not have it where we ought to. How is this objectivity of æsthetic experience to be explained?

Mr. Joad argues that it cannot be explained so long as we hold that the beauty of the picture consists in any relation between, the picture and ourselves. I cannot accept his argument. It seems to me an extraordinary doctrine that there can be no kind of standard in ourselves, that we cannot distinguish between lower and higher states of ourselves, between the vulgar and the fine mind, in ourselves and in other people. I do not, however, press this point, because it is the next stage in Mr. Joad's argument to which I wish to call attention. I might criticize his positive answer to the æsthetic question and ask how the assumption of an independent beauty explains why some æsthetic appreciation is right and some wrong, unless it can show that when I appreciate the *Meistersinger* I have seen beauty in itself, and am comparing the *Meistersinger* with that standard, but when I appreciate the *Merry Widow* I am not making any such comparison. We need not, however, go into such questions because Mr. Joad himself gives up the question of æsthetic objectivity. He says that "the circumstance of a theory being repellent on æsthetic grounds is not, however, a sufficient reason for discarding it." I think myself that it is, but that is for the moment no matter. Mr. Joad's argument is that "the appreciation of the beauty is in the mind, but it is only there because the beauty is not," and that therefore the picture would still be beautiful even if all mind were eliminated from the universe." Now this argument is based on the mere fact of the appreciation of beauty, and will apply to the appreciations of all the people who prefer the *Merry Widow* and the novels of Miss Ethel Dell to the *Meistersinger*

and Shakespeare. Their appreciations of the beauty of these inferior productions would seem to involve that these "would still be beautiful even if all mind were eliminated from the universe," though both Mr. Joad and I agree that they are not beautiful at all. Further this principle is not confined, and is not meant by Mr. Joad to be confined, to æsthetic judgments; it applies to all judgments. But if the fact that we make a judgment implies that not only what we are judging about, but also what we judge about it, exist independently of us, then all judgments are right, and that is surely repellent not only on æsthetic but on logical grounds.

The same point may be made of a later part of Mr. Joad's paper, where he accepts the psychological account of the formation of general ideas, a process in which subjective considerations may obviously play a large part, but finds in his acceptance no ground for doubting that such general ideas "have objects which exist independently of them and are different from them." Then the fact that men have had the general idea of phlogiston proves that there is an objective counterpart of that idea existing independently of us and of other general ideas, and the same holds of all general terms which are the expression of men's erroneous beliefs. If all mental operations are nothing but awareness of non-mental entities existing independently of us, then not only the distinction between mental and non-mental, but the distinction between true and false, is unmeaning.

The fact that we use general terms such as phlogiston which are afterwards discredited, shows that, if there are "forms" in the sense defined by Mr. Joad, they cannot be the objective of all our general notions, and that, if we accept the theory, we must go on with Plato and ask, "Of what are these forms?" The general argument from the nature of knowledge and the existence of general notions will not do, because it proves too much. Another and perhaps a more fruitful way of putting the same point is to say that the

general argument from the nature of knowledge is based on the nature of awareness, and that its application to general notions assumes that we are aware of them, or rather of their counterparts, in the same way as we are aware of objects. But this is the whole question: "Horse I see, but horseness I cannot see." We cannot discuss the implications of the existence of general notions, if we omit the fact that they are used in judgment, and fail to realize that the question is not what we are aware of, but what we mean. This is the answer to the point which Mr. Joad makes when he begins his consideration of the relation of beauty to beautiful objects. "It is clear that a thought about beauty is a thought about something. It is a thought about something which is other than thinking it, because if it were a thought about nothing it would have no meaning. If beauty were nothing, then when I think about beauty, I should think about nothing, and there would be no difference between thinking about beauty and not thinking at all." The answer is that when I am thinking about beauty, I am thinking about my æsthetic experience which I have expressed in judgments that this or that is beautiful. There *is* no such thing as phlogiston, but I can think about phlogiston. It is not just a collocation of letters, but has a meaning, but its meaning implies an erroneous judgment about the facts.

We need not, however, in criticizing the doctrine that there "are single, independent, separate, self-existing, essences forming the objective correlate of our general notions," confine ourselves to general notions in which an error is implied. Plato in the *Parmenides* asks whether there is a "form" of dirt. He gives no precise answer to the question himself, but must not we make some such answer as implied in the remark that "dirt is matter in the wrong place?" If we take the various things which we call "dirt" and ask why we apply that name to them, our answer must include the fact that we find them disagreeable, that they are in the wrong place for our

purposes. If we eliminate our purposes, or at least our finding the things disagreeable, then the various things which are united under the term dirt, will be separated off according, say, to their chemical constituents, and the term dirt will have no meaning.

Of course, when we discuss beauty, or phlogiston, or dirt, as distinguished from a beautiful picture, or a hot bath, or a dirty face, we are aware of something which is independent of our awareness of it, but that something may simply be the word, *i.e.*, a noise or marks on paper, but what we are aware of and what these words mean are not the same. Mr. Joad talks about objective correlates of our general notions. But if he can talk about general notions as he does, are they not, on his own showing, objective in his sense already? Why, then, should they have a counterpart. A word is as objective as anything else; my hearing or seeing it does not change it. Why should it have a double objectivity? Not because the object of knowledge is independent of the knower, but because it has a meaning. That meaning must have been given to it, and the giving implies judgments, beliefs and intentions which may be wrong.

I have been attacking the doctrine that *all* general notions have forms as objective counterparts. It might be expected that I should go on to examine a limited form of the thesis, and ask whether there are any general notions of such a kind that they have forms as counterparts. Clearly it is possible to hold that while much classification is arbitrary or pragmatic, all is not so, that, if we often divide reality according to our purposes, we sometimes "carve it at the joints." The arguments which have been advanced from the existence of subjective and discredited general notions will in that case not apply. The purpose of the discussion will, however, be better served, I think, if I stop here, for the essence of Mr. Joad's position, as I understand it, is that the mere use of a general term in judgment implies a form corresponding to it. He makes, and his argument allows him to make, no discrimination between one

general notion and another, and it is just this failure to discriminate which I think fatal to his position. I do not know any argument for the existence of *abstract* universals other than this general logical argument, which I have endeavoured to show is invalid. It is surely no accident that it is in one and the same dialogue that Plato raises the question, "of what are these forms"? and after criticizing the abstractedness of the forms begins the construction of a new theory.

III.—By L. SUSAN STEBBING.

PROVIDED, that the words "the existence of" be deleted from the question raised in the title of this symposium, I should reply in the affirmative. Nevertheless, I am in considerable disagreement with Mr. Joad. First, I do not consider that the rejection of the two theories that he rejects constitutes any proof of the positive thesis that in the analysis of Reality we find certain entities which are non-mental, non-physical, non-existent, and self-subsistent. Secondly, I should not use Professor Adam's phraseology in describing the Platonic εἶδη just because he includes the adjectives "eternal" and "perfect" which, as Mr. Lindsay points out, Mr. Joad conveniently omits to consider. To this I shall return.

My agreement with Mr. Joad is, then, limited to the assertion of the positive thesis stated above. I shall, however, neglect minor points of difference, because in the short space at my disposal, I want to attempt to reply to Mr. Lindsay's further difficulties and to indicate briefly the reasons for asserting the thesis.

Mr. Lindsay suggests that I should answer certain difficulties that Mr. Joad's paper has raised. I will attempt to do so.

(1) The fact that we know a thing does not prove it to be non-mental. Certainly I agree that we may know mental

entities, but the act by which an object is known is never the object of any knowing act. This seems to me not an article of faith but an analysis of thought, which requires emphasis only because some philosophers have failed to recognize the distinction, simply assuming that the object is necessarily mental, because the act is mental. All that I desire to assert is that no conclusion as to the status of an entity follows from the fact that a given entity is the object of a mental act. This being so, the burden of proof surely rests on those that assert that universals are mental: *prima facie* they are not.

(2) There is a possible interpretation of this statement in which I should hold that it is true, but not in the precise form in which it is asserted by Mr. Joad, nor for the reasons which he gives. There are phrases in common use among philosophers to which possibly no *εἶδος* corresponds; for example: there is no *εἶδος* corresponding to the word "round-square," but, then, there is no "general notion" or "mental correlate" here; there is the apprehension of a shape or noise, which is a case of perception; no universal is concerned at all.

Mr. Lindsay makes it a main criticism of Mr. Joad that he cannot discriminate between one general notion and another, and that, therefore, the distinction between truth and error, illusion and reality, vanishes. But even if we hold what Mr. Lindsay calls the "unlimited thesis" that all general notions imply objective counterparts, this criticism does not seem to me valid, for it might well be that the *εἶδη* must themselves be discriminated and that the object of a true judgment has characteristics which distinguish it from the object of a false judgment, which characteristics are independent of their being known, and which may fail to be discriminated. Indeed it seems to me that this must be the case, and that just because we do make erroneous judgments it follows that the fact that an object is known does not imply that it is real (or the object of a true judgment). What we need is surely a more careful examination of the

types of objects involved. This is outside the scope of the present discussion, but the validity of Mr. Lindsay's criticism rests upon the arbitrary assumption that such an examination could yield no satisfactory result. Space does not permit me to pursue this further.

An affirmative answer to the question we are considering does not, however, involve the assertion of Mr. Lindsay's "unlimited thesis," for if, as he seems to admit, *some* general notions have "forms as counterparts," then an analysis of reality presupposes the Platonic universal. This is the position I desire to maintain and for which I wish to offer some positive grounds.

If we consider the nature of such universals as *red, just, two, number, square, change*, three alternatives seem possible: (i) that they are mental; (ii) that they are physical; (iii) that they are non-mental, non-physical entities, capable of being known by a non-sensuous activity of mind, possible objects of mental acts of knowing, but nevertheless independent of those acts. In other words, universals are *εἶδη* or forms regarded as non-mental self-subsisting entities.

Mr. Lindsay rejects (ii) and (iii); I am not sure if he accepts (i). Some philosophers certainly do accept it, and it is this that is to be primarily rejected in using the Platonic term *εἶδος*, or the term—which I personally prefer—*universal* in the sense that Mr. Russell has made familiar.

Mr. Lindsay says that the distinction between mental and non-mental falls within knowledge. I am not sure what he means by this. If he takes non-mental to be equivalent to "*non-object-of-knowledge*," then, of course, it does; but no one has disputed this. If, however, he means by non-mental everything in the universe which is neither mind, nor quality or characteristic of a mental act, then surely by definition it falls outside knowledge. Mr. Lindsay himself points out that there are mental activities besides knowledge, and he has thus, it seems to me, destroyed his own assertion.

I do not think that either Mr. Lindsay or Professor Hoernlé is likely to support the second alternative which I also reject. I shall then pass to the consideration of the third, which is the alternative that I accept. That is, that there are entities in the universe other than mental entities and these entities are other than physical entities. It will, I think, be admitted that there is at least one property which characterizes certain entities in virtue of which property these entities are called mental; and there is at least one property which characterizes other entities in virtue of which property these entities are called physical. There are also I think other entities that are characterized neither by mental nor by physical properties, and these entities are what I mean by Platonic *εἶδη* or universals. I admit that I cannot point to *the* characteristic in each case on account of which the one class of entities is described as mental and the other as physical, but we all do use these terms as though we thought that some sort of meaning attaches to them. In the brief space at my disposal I can only say that both mental and physical seem to me characteristics of acts or time-processes only, *i.e.*, of events. Thus all these entities which are events are either mental or physical; hence the distinction between mental and physical is a distinction that falls wholly within the temporal sphere; timeless entities (that is entities having no position in time), are thus by definition neither mental nor physical. The problem then is: are there any such entities? It seems to me that it is these entities, possible objects of mental acts of thinking, that we properly mean by universals.

The number "two" is not itself a couple but it is a characteristic of all couples; two things can be seen but *twoness* cannot be seen. A similar remark applies to such a universal as *horse*, if by "horse" we mean the complex of properties which characterize all horses. There are universals the instances of which may themselves be universals, *e.g.*, colour is a universal having as its instances such universals as red, blue, and so on. But in each case the universal is not an object that can be

sensed; it is the object of a mental act but it is not apprehended through the medium of the sense organs. Mr. Lindsay appears to neglect this when he argues "Horse I see, but horseness I cannot see." But this is just the point, for if the statement is true, then "see" means "perceive by means of the visual organs," and of course we could not see horseness unless it were a particular existent characterized by sense qualities. But to keep Mr. Lindsay's example, we could *apprehend* horseness; or, to take an easier example, we do *apprehend* red; we are not confined to the apprehension of particular red things. In this apprehension of the universal "red" no visual organ is concerned; even to suppose that there is seems absurd, and leads directly to the "third man" difficulty.

In this connexion Mr. Joad makes an assertion that I am wholly unable to accept. He says, "unless we are to destroy the distinction between mind and its object . . . the one (the mentally formed concept) so far from rendering the other (the universal) superfluous, is necessarily required by it, the concept being the mental correlate of the universal, that by means of which the mind knows the universal, just as the senses are the medium by means of which the mind knows the particular." There seems to me not the remotest degree of parallelism here between the function of the sense organs in becoming aware of particular existents, and the function of the psychological concept in the apprehension of the universal. Mr. Joad's account surely makes the concept a *tertium quid* between the mental act and the universal which is non-sensuously apprehended. It is, moreover, this insistence upon the correlation of the concept with the universal, and the parallel with sense knowledge, that appears to justify, on the one hand, Mr. Lindsay's criticism that there is no way of distinguishing between a concept that corresponds to a real object and one that does not, and on the other hand, Mr. Joad's assumption that we are aware of the counterparts of our concepts in the same way as we are aware of sense-objects.

In my opinion the whole case for the separate being of the universal rests upon the fact that a universal is not apprehended in any mode parallel to the apprehension of a particular through the medium of sense, and yet that it is apprehended as an entity distinct from the act of apprehension itself.

Mr. Joad has chosen to discuss only the universal *beauty*, and in so doing he has raised questions that lie outside the scope of our problem. Hence, I can only say here that I am in complete disagreement with most of what he has said about it. Much of Mr. Lindsay's criticism of Mr. Joad here seems to me quite irrelevant to the main thesis, and consequently I shall not discuss it. Their preoccupation with such a complex universal as beauty arises, I think, from the fact that both regard the Platonic *εἶδος* with undue reverence. Thus Mr. Joad accuses his subjectivist opponents of being anxious to do away with "the necessity of anything so unpleasantly metaphysical and transcendent as a Platonic universal." This whole mode of speech, and the attitude from which it springs, is in my opinion mistaken. It is not in order that we may have immutable, eternal, perfect objects of contemplation, that we admit the reality of the universal; we are forced to admit their reality because in attempting to give an inventory of the entities in the universe we find that we cannot leave them out. The contemplation of these entities may give us the extreme satisfaction that Mr. Russell says it does, but it is not for this reason that we admit them. If I attempt to classify the kinds of objects of which I can become aware, I find that there are two well-distinguished types: (1) those objects which I come to apprehend through the sense organs, and (2) those which I cannot apprehend through the sense organs. But I do apprehend red, number, difference, beauty, and so on, and in apprehending red, for instance, I apprehend that quality, characteristic or attribute which is common to all red things. That is a universal. What we mean by saying that anything is red is that it is

characterized by the adjective red, *i.e.*, it participates in the universal red of which it is an instance. The nature of this participation needs further discussion, but it is not the question at issue here. All that I am concerned to assert now is that red as a characteristic, or universal (for these are synonyms) is capable of being apprehended apart from the existence of anything red, and that it cannot be apprehended in the same way as a red thing is apprehended, *i.e.*, by means of the sense organs. If this be admitted, then the reality of the universal—in the sense in which I am concerned to assert it—is admitted.

Finally, my only objection to describing these universals as Platonic εἶδη is that to do so may seem to countenance Mr. Joad's inclusion of the two adjectives, *eternal* and *perfect*, both of which I should reject as being eulogistic adjectives. "Eternal" seems to suggest "everlasting," which I desire to reject; "perfect" seems to imply something that satisfies our desires, hence implies value. The intrusion of value, and the element of emotion that it indicates, seem to me the main objections to Plato's εἶδη.

Personally, I doubt whether Plato would accept the emasculated universal that I would substitute for his εἶδος.

IV.—By R. F. ALFRED HOERNLE.

FOR various reasons, my position as fourth member of this symposium on universals is more than usually embarrassing. The wording of our problem is not the one which I would have chosen; and now that the papers of my fellow-symposiasts are before me, I find that Mr. Joad and Miss Stebbing have given to the discussion a direction so different from the one in which my thinking on universals moves, that I hardly know whether I can say anything which they will think relevant. On the other hand, I find that Mr. Lindsay proposes a division of work

between himself and myself, of which I learn only through his paper, and which—it is not unfair to say—throws the heavier part of the burden on me. However, I shall do my best to play the part assigned to me, though my performance must, in the circumstances, be something of a *tour de force*.

A.

Miss Stebbing having re-stated Mr. Joad's thesis in a more restricted form, I will begin with some comments on her position.

Our problem, as I understand it, is to determine whether a correct analysis of reality requires us to acknowledge the subsistence of universals realistically conceived. For Miss Stebbing, to analyse reality means to "give an inventory of the entities in the universe," to "attempt to classify the kinds of objects of which I can become aware." The result is, for her, a universe comprising only three kinds of entities, viz., (1) physical entities, (2) mental entities, (3) universals, which are neither physical nor mental. Physical and mental entities are further grouped together as *events*, and thus as temporal, whereas universals are timeless. Of the "self-subsistence" of universals, which is their one positive attribute in the opening passage of Miss Stebbing's paper, I can find no further mention, unless the *obiter dictum* that red is capable of being apprehended apart from the existence of any red thing, is intended to bear on the point. So far, then, the *principium divisionis* in the inventory of entities appears to be time. Particulars which exist in time, and are either physical or mental, stand over against universals which subsist timelessly. Yet presently Miss Stebbing goes on to offer a fresh inventory, based on our manner of apprehending objects, which may be either "through the medium of the sense-organs" or "non-sensuous."

This is the position which I shall now attempt to criticize.

(1) Miss Stebbing apparently regards her two inventories as furnishing identical groupings. Particulars exist in time and are apprehended through the senses. Universals are timeless

and are apprehended by a non-sensuous mental act. But is Miss Stebbing really prepared to assert that *minds*, which she classes as particulars, are perceived by the senses? Or, again, is she quite sure that even every "physical entity" is perceptible by the senses, *e.g.*, an electron? Or, if an electron is not "physical" for her, what is it? Even the old atom used to be described as imperceptible. It would not mend Miss Stebbing's case to say that the fault lies with our sense organs, for, apart from the obvious answers to such a contention, we must hold Miss Stebbing strictly to her enterprise of classifying all entities of which we are actually aware, according to the manner of our awareness of them. Now she must, I think, say that we are aware of electrons. She will hardly claim that we perceive them by the senses. Hence she cannot but put them, together with minds and universals, into the class of objects non-sensuously apprehended. But this result destroys the whole point of her scheme, and with it what she explicitly offers as one of the strongest arguments for the recognition of self-subsistent universals.

(2) But, further, I would like to question the view which Miss Stebbing shares with Mr. Joad, that universals cannot be apprehended by "sense," but only by "mind." It is plausible to say that, whilst we can see a red thing, we cannot see redness. But I would remind Miss Stebbing and Mr. Joad that they agree in holding the particular thing to be red only because of its relation to the universal redness. Whatever language they may use about this relation, they admit that the universal is involved in the particular being what it is. But if so, the perception of the particular as being what it is, cannot leave out the universal. If the redness of a red object, being a universal, is not perceived by the senses, what is perceived by the senses? If whatever there is of character or quality in an object of perception is universal, and if no universal is apprehended "through the medium of sense organs," what is there left for the sense organs to do? I

would urge upon Miss Stebbing and Mr. Joad that they cannot offer an intelligible account of the perception of particulars without offering also an intelligible account of the relation of particular to universal. At present neither of them furnishes a theory on either of these two points, and I suggest that their attempt to do so would soon convince them that the facile distinction between particulars as perceived by sense and universals as apprehended by pure thought will not work. We shall all agree, of course, that redness, in the abstract, cannot be seen, and that we can think of it without at the moment seeing any red thing. But these facts do not seem to me to bear the theory of universals which Miss Stebbing and Mr. Joad seek to erect upon them.*

For me the moral of the discussion, so far, is the two-fold one, that (a) without an account of the relation of particular and universal such an "analysis of reality" as Miss Stebbing and Mr. Joad offer, lacks all plausibility; and (b) that the attempt to classify the entities comprised in the universe according to our manner of apprehending them is a failure.

(3) So far I have been examining the internal consistency of Miss Stebbing's position. But I am bound now to say that I find myself in complete disagreement with her whole conception of what an "analysis of reality" requires. It is really startling to think that modern *Gegenstandslehre* is shrinking the task of a genuine *Phänomenologie* to the dimensions of an "inventory of entities." It is more startling still to find that every entity is apparently to be placed in one of the three pigeon-holes—mental, physical, neither-mental-nor-physical. I cannot help wondering whether, as a student of philosophy, Miss Stebbing really finds this the most illuminating way of dealing with the manifold realities which enter into her experience. How, for example, does she fit *living* beings—plants, animals, humans—into her hard-and-fast pigeon-holes? Or what does she do with such things as a state, or a church? One might have hoped that Kant and

the post-Kantian idealists had, at least, awakened us from the Descartes-ian nightmare of making all analysis of reality revolve round the antithesis of material and mental. I hardly know how to convey to Miss Stebbing my sense of the misdirection of philosophical effort in her programme.

B.

In turning to Mr. Joad's paper, I gladly record my substantial agreement with Mr. Lindsay's criticisms. I could wish that Mr. Joad, in framing the title of our symposium, and in his own paper, had omitted all reference to Plato's εἶδη. It would have saved him from the paradox of forbidding us to discuss what 'Plato meant by "Form," and yet bidding us discuss whether we must not assume the existence of "something very like Plato's Forms." To Mr. Lindsay's just observation that Mr. Joad omits to discuss the perfection and eternity of his Forms, I would add that even more remarkable is Mr. Joad's failure to enlarge upon the function of Forms as "the patterns or models which God used in creating the sensible world." I, for one, should have thought a fuller explanation of this point highly relevant to an analysis of reality, especially from a professed apostle of "common sense" in philosophy. I agree with Mr. Lindsay's point that Mr. Joad, by ignoring the function of universals in judgment, has cut himself off from distinguishing between real and unreal, fact and illusion. It may appeal to Mr. Joad as a realist, if I enforce this criticism by a reference to Mr. Bertrand Russell's similar argument against Meinong in his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*.* And, finally, I would add that, as I personally do not hold the psychological theory of universals, I feel no call to defend it against Mr. Joad's attacks. On the other hand, I cannot but think that

* Perhaps I may be forgiven for referring here also to my *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, pp. 85 ff.

his brief remarks on the "concrete universal" suffer from something more than "lack of space."

But I may, perhaps, offer some observations on Mr. Joad's "realism," with which Mr. Lindsay has dealt only in passing.

(1) First of all, the reminder may not be out of place that not one of the well-known philosophical theories of fine art—Schopenhauer's, for example, or Hegel's—raises about beauty the kind of question which Mr. Joad raises ("wherein the beauty of the picture resides"), or attempts to answer it by offering to beauty the choice of three residences, viz., the beholder's mind, the picture, and a relation between the two. I would suggest to Mr. Joad, what above I ventured to suggest to Miss Stebbing, that if he were not obsessed with the notion of parcelling out the universe among the pigeon-holes "mental" and "non-mental," it would never occur to him to ask any such question about beauty, or any other universal. Whatever locus he may assign to beauty in accordance with his scheme, is he prepared to say that his answer helps him, or anyone else, to understand better *what* beauty is, in such a way as to justify, *e.g.*, his own preference for the Meistersinger over the Merry Widow Waltz? The problem of æsthetic philosophy surely concerns this objective standard operative in æsthetic experience and judgment, and no amount of argument about the locus of beauty in mind or out of mind throws any light on the nature of that standard, which is the genuine Form or essence of beauty. There is only one point here on which I agree with Mr. Joad, and this is, that if we raise his sort of problem at all, it is essential that in our answer we should keep beauty and the picture together and avoid locating beauty "in" the mind, as "subjective" feelings of a spectator, whilst leaving the picture "outside" the mind as a "physical object." Any sane theory is bound to refuse such a divorce of æsthetic quality or value and æsthetic object, but a sane theory will equally refuse the foolish choice between locating both beauty and the picture outside mind

and locating them both inside. These antitheses are wholly irrelevant. They result, I cannot but think, from a fundamentally false orientation. The philosophical study of the realm of reality which we call fine art demands a qualitative analysis of the experience of beauty in the products of the typical forms of art. Nothing less than this whole phrase, "experience . . . art," will describe the field, or datum, of æsthetic philosophy, and nothing will lead the inquirer into a blind alley more surely than the notion that, because "experience" has been mentioned, his first and main task is to sort out what is "mental" from what is "non-mental."

(2) This is, of course, the point where Mr. Joad, and Miss Stebbing too, as good realists will join issue with a charge of confusion of, or failure to distinguish between, the "mental act" of apprehension or appreciation and the "non-mental object." They remind us elaborately that "the possibility of my being able to know a thing depends upon there being a thing for me to know, which is something other than my knowing it" (Mr. Joad); or that "no conclusion as to the status of an entity follows from the fact that the given entity is the object of a mental act" (Miss Stebbing).

Personally, I find these statements, within their own four corners, eminently respectable and innocuous. My trouble is to think who can be the "philosophers," vaguely referred to by Mr. Joad and Miss Stebbing, who have been reckless enough to deny them. Will Mr. Joad and Miss Stebbing in our oral discussion please oblige with chapter and verse? Does Mr. F. H. Bradley, for example, argue anywhere that because x is the object of a mental act, therefore x is to be classified as "mental"? Or does Dr. Bosanquet, let alone Hegel, anywhere say that we can know something without there being anything there for us to know? Not even Berkeley says anything of the kind. With him, as Mr. Laird in *Mind* some years ago pointed out, the distinction of "act"

and "object" is fundamental. And though he does call the object "idea" and speaks of it as "in the mind," he emphatically denies that it is a "mode" of mind, *i.e.*, a state of the knowing mind; and least of all, of course, is it for Berkeley the act of knowing itself. In fact, the adjective "mental," as used by our realists in framing their indictment of the idealist, covers a multitude of ambiguities. The three theories, for example, that the object exists only so long as it is apprehended by a mind; that it is a product of the mind's synthetic activity; that it is a state of the mind itself, are quite different from each other, and no purpose is served by calling the object indiscriminately "mental" in all three theories. Moreover, realists have not, so far as I know, furnished a satisfactory account of the part played by mental activity—by judgment and inference, by synthesis and construction—in bringing to light the real nature of an object. To such an inquiry the bald distinction between mental act and non-mental or independent object makes no contribution. And, in turn, its own plausibility diminishes greatly for any mind which is at all alive to the problems presented by mental activity.

In general, it seems to me that Mr. Joad gets his realism on terms too cheap, *i.e.*, by ignoring complications the recognition of which would, I think, shake its foundations. He proposes the experiment of "supposing" the Round Madonna to be contemplated by the last intelligence in the universe, and that intelligence to be then abolished. "Is any modification made in the qualities of the picture? I cannot see that it is." This, I confess, seems to me a purely verbal argument, for everything depends on the meaning, *i.e.*, the theories, we connect with the terms employed. I suggest to Mr. Joad that, if he really wishes to put the matter to the test, he should appeal, not to a supposititious but to an actual experiment. This is not an invitation to him to commit suicide in the interests of philosophy. There are less fatal ways of separating one's intelligence from an object. The story goes at Harvard that, on his visit

in 1914, Mr. Bertrand Russell made the experiment of leaving the lecture-room and inviting his class to watch whether they could perceive any modification in the desk as a consequence of his withdrawal. The experiment, I grant, shows that in this case the withdrawal of *another* spectator makes no *visible* difference in what *I* see. But what is the relevance of this? The really crucial experiment would bear on the question whether *what I see* is modified by *my* withdrawal. The experiment cannot be made, and the matter becomes one of argument and theory, into which far more complicated considerations enter than Mr. Joad's common sense permits him to remember. To mention only one point—what of the facts of relativity, which led Mr. Russell to construct his theory of a physical thing as a system of *sensibilia*, which become actual sense-data whenever one of an infinite number of perspectives is occupied by an actual mind? On Mr. Russell's theory, then, there is a "modification," for the presence of a mind results in the difference between a sense-datum and a *sensibile*. It would not help Mr. Joad to reply: "Yes, there is a modification on Mr. Russell's theory, but there is none on mine." For the whole point of my criticism is that his experiment yields different results according to the different theoretical contexts in which it is conducted, and therefore it is indecisive for, or against, any one theory in particular.

In so far as these criticisms throw doubt on the sufficiency of Mr. Joad's realism in general, they weaken his argument for independent Forms which, on its positive side, is a special application of his realism.

C.

It would not be fair, however, if I, too, played the canny Scot and contented myself with criticizing Miss Stebbing and Mr. Joad, without giving them something to fire at in return. Hence I shall now attempt to sketch the kind of theory of the place of universals in reality which I should wish to defend.

When I reflect on the part played by universals in the "analysis of reality," in "reasoning about the phenomena we experience," I do not, as I have said, find myself led to the kind of question which Mr. Joad asks about beauty, or to the kind of inventory-work which attracts Miss Stebbing. I take "reasoning about the phenomena of experience" as I find it actually practised, and try to determine the nature of universals from the part they play there. Without universals—Mr. Joad will concede this to be a sound Platonic sentiment—no science. I look, then, to the sciences, and especially to the natural sciences. The laws which they discover, the classificatory systems which they trace, will be acknowledged to be universals. The chemist investigating the properties of an element is concerned with a universal. So is the zoologist who determines the characteristics and life-history of a new species, and its evolutionary affinities. So is every scientist who formulates a law concerning the causal (*aliter* functional) correlation of phenomena. That scientists do not talk in terms of "Forms," or "Essences," or even "Universals," is, of course, irrelevant. But it is relevant to note how utterly foreign to a scientist's analysis of reality is such a question as whether a universal like oxygen is mental or non-mental, or whether it is perfect, or eternal, or timeless, or "non-existent" (as Miss Stebbing has it), or whether it served as a pattern to God in creating. And the same is true of philosophical analysis when engaged upon some concrete phenomenon. The philosophical theory of the state, for example, studies a universal very deeply involved in our being. Has it any occasion to ask any of the above questions about the state as a universal?

And more: the universals which in the study of this concrete world of ours come everywhere to light, are not "separate" or "independent" or "self-subsistent," if these terms mean either (*a*) that universals are separate from each other ;(= Mr. Joad's "Pluralism") or (*b*) that they are

separate from "particulars" (as Miss Stebbing especially has it).

(a) The separateness of universals from each other is, I should have thought, sufficiently disproved by every scientific law, a law being a correlation of universals. More in detail: it is common ground between us, I understand, that every quality or "nature" of an object is universal. I hope the general fact of *implication* is likewise common ground. But implication means that one thing is what it is because certain other things are what they are, and *vice versa*, so that a change in the nature of one necessarily brings with it changes in others. On this "mutual responsiveness" (to use Bosanquet's term) of universals depends the very possibility of reasoning about the phenomena of our experience at all.

(b) The doctrine of the separateness of universals from particulars seems to me a pure illusion begotten by abstraction, or, to put it differently, by a failure to remember the categorical basis of all concepts, however abstract, which are framed in obedience to a genuine cognitive interest. It is superficially plausible to think that, because we can talk of redness or humanity in the abstract, and because these words have a meaning, that meaning must be construed as a peculiar sort of "object" subsisting timelessly in the Realm of All Entities Whatsoever. And then—pocketing the affront to common sense—we may even extend this doctrine to cover phlogiston and unicorn. In the face of such a view it is refreshing to be able to quote Mr. Bertrand Russell's reminder that a sense of reality is vital in inquiries of this kind. The proper way of dealing with the situation is, surely, to discriminate among concepts those which are deliberate fictions of imagination, those which, from the point of view of fuller knowledge, are recognized as errors, and those which in serious judgment are "referred to reality," *i.e.*, are asserted to be true. These latter constitute the "real" or "true" nature of objects, to the discovery of which the effort of knowledge is directed. But in

attempting such a discrimination, we shall lose our way unless we begin with the recognition that the minimal datum of experience is never a mere "particular," but always a *this-such*. Do we ever meet with any "phenomenon in experience" which does not hold our attention and affirm itself in its environment of other phenomena by its determinate nature? Specify any actual phenomena: it is always *this*, and it is always *such*. Yet the character or nature of any phenomenon, as exhibited on any one occasion, is commonly a mere fragment of its whole nature, which has other sides not now exhibited; which varies with different settings; which has ramifications manifold to be explored. Here the cognitive interest in the analysis of reality takes hold, following the clues of difference, and identity, and identity in difference; tracing the systematic interconnexions of universals; and always "referring them to reality," *i.e.*, predicating them of this actual world, the existence of which every thrill of experience attests.

In its general outlines this view is, of course, so well represented in modern philosophical literature that I need not enlarge upon it here. I will only add, with reference to Mr. Joad's allusion to "concrete universals," that "self-subsistence" surely cannot be predicated of any abstract universal, of "such" divorced from "this," of a quality or nature or form not embodied in actual existence. At any rate, the general formula for the analysis of reality is that it is the attempt to determine, and express in judgments, the nature (or, if you like, the "form") of that which exists. The contradictory judgments which occur in the course of this attempt bring home to us the experience of error, as a result of which we define the goal of knowledge emphatically as the *true*, or *real*, nature of that which exists. Thus the term "reality" covers both *existence* and *truth*; and an analysis of reality yields always a theory, *i.e.*, a judgment claiming to express the true nature of that which exists.

Mr. Joad and Miss Stebbing will probably reply that in

all this I have said nothing relevant to their main contention, viz., the "realistic" thesis that universals are "non-mental," or "independent," or "separate," at least in the sense that they are other than the acts of mind by which they are apprehended, and subsist (or "exist," as Mr. Joad has it) whether or no they are apprehended by any mind at all.

This contention I am ready to concede, subject, however, to (a) an interpretation, and (b) a qualification, neither of which, I fear, our realists will accept, and which together will probably deprive for them my concession of all its virtue.

(a) The interpretation is that the so-called "independence" is an exaggerated way of expressing the claim to truth of our judgments. It is so, we say, and was so before we discovered it, and would have been so had no one ever discovered it at all. Things are what they are, whether or no any mind is aware of them. But this, I submit, is only a picturesque way of saying: once true, always true; and in saying this, we should not forget that actual judgments are, in varying degrees, relative and subject to revision or amplification with advancing knowledge. If it amuses realists to lay down the abstract principle that there subsist universals independent of any mind's apprehension of them, and to apply this principle indiscriminately to everything from redness to unicorns, well and good. But I submit that no amount of argument in support of this position has the least relevance to the settlement of the kind of problem which is typical of the concrete analysis of reality—such a problem as what being red *implies* in the context of the actual world, and whether any object which we call red is *really* red as tested by these implications.

(b) And the qualification is that when we thus plunge into the analysis of reality as presented in actual experience, we cannot divorce the question of universals, or of anything else, from the question of the truth of the judgments through which the nature of objects is expressed, and from the experience which underlies the judgments. If the terms experience,

expression, judgment, give occasion to realists to insist upon distinguishing between "mental" and non-mental," well and good. But, once again, what is the relevance of this distinction to the main question, which is whether we have good reason to trust that the nature of things reveals itself in the data of our experience, and controls, as "the logic of facts," or as "what we are obliged to think," our judgments and endows them with the value of truth and knowledge? The abstract distinction of "mental" and "non-mental," so far from throwing light on this question, tends rather to obscure it. It directs our attention away from what really matters.

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